From: John Stephenson Area: Public Key Encryption To: Dexter Richards 6 May 95 17:56:36 Subject: A quick test UpdReq DR> Thanks John, the change to the bat file did the trick. Great to hear. DR> Is this DR> a problem with quotes, or with the changes made in PGP to eliminate the DR> "blank line trick" or something that we are doing wrong. I don't know. PGPWave auto-removes any quotes before decrypting. Could this be a problem with it? Hmm.. shell when you get a message with a signature, check the file with a text editor just before it checks the signatures, and manually remove the quotes. Then run PGP on it directory and tell me what happens. If it works then it's a problem with PGPWave. If it doesn't the problem could lie with bluewave passing the message to PGPWave. (possibly line wrapping?) - John ... Oxymoron: Friendly Enemies. 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: John Stephenson Area: Public Key Encryption To: John Cruz 6 May 95 17:56:36 Subject: PGPWave UpdReq JC> This is my PGP key. Please send me a copy of PGPWave... I'm using JC> PGPBlue and from what I hear, PGPWave blows it away. If you have internet ftp access you can now download a current version from oak.oakland.edu archive site under: SimTel/msdos/offline. It should be pgpw108a.zip. Or you can login as a guest account using the below origin, the login is "guest" the password is "guest". Btw we here have switched to RemoteAccess here, so people can navigate this BBS a bit better and with more familiarity. Also you should be able to file request it as "PGPWAVE" form the origin line if you have a fido mailer. Don't have -too- much fun with it. ;) - John ... Oxymoron: Limited time. 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Thomas Junker Area: Public Key Encryption To: John Stephenson 7 May 95 17:23:00 Subject: PGPWave source code gone UpdReq -=> Quoting John Stephenson to Ian Hebert <=- IH> However, there is one feature of the program that I would IH> very much appreciate if you would modify--could you please include some IH> type of toggle switch to turn off the clock? JS> I wish I could. I have lost the source code to PGPWave. Meaning I JS> can't update it any further. What? Are you serious? JS> To do the changes you wish, I need to rewrite all of PGPWave from JS> scratch. Far out. In that case you should make your future releases of this and all other sofware free of registration fee, as was the first, until such time as you figure out how to take proper care of source code. I am not amused. Well. Since it's probably moot now anyway, maybe this is an appropriate time to ask: Do you have any idea why PGPWave eats the input message when Decrypt is invoked? It then goes ahead and calls PGP, which correctly complains that there is no message to decrypt. This is especially fun when returning to the mail reader which then locks up in confusion over the missing original message. How about the sytem rebooting when I try to have PGPWave invoke a spellchecker by means of a .BAT in the config? How about PGPWave causing a reboot on *any* configured call to a .BAT file? How about PGPWave eating its own config file? Any time I try to change the config from within PGPWave it consumes its config file. If you charged for this, maybe you *would* have the incentive to take care of the source and to make it bulletproof. ... Life might be easier if we had the source code. 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Andy Hayes Area: Public Key Encryption To: SHAWN MCMAHON 5 May 95 04:01:00 Subject: Send/rec PGP Msg's UpdReq In a message to ANDY HAYES, SHAWN MCMAHON said... SM> AH> Just kidding man, but who's Richard Dale? (: SM>He lost an argument with me once, and twit-filtered me as a result. Oh, my, sorry.... Guess I should say on your good side, eh? (: SM>Now, he insults me from time to time without provocation, here in the echo. SM>It's rather amusing, actually; but every echo has somebody like him. No kidding, actually, some echos have two. Andy |-| Jose (: * QUOTEOLX 2.4 1892898 * * OLX 2.2 TD * A good frame of mind . . . but no picture. 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: John Stephenson Area: Public Key Encryption To: Jeffrey Bloss 6 May 95 17:56:36 Subject: Send/rec PGP Msg's UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- JB> Just a nit, but PGP doesn't perform well under these circumstances to JB> begin with. :( Even "anonymous" encrypted messages will cause PGP to JB> display "This message can only be decrypted by...." errors. Pretty JB> much kills the "to whom" security unless you're prepared to generate JB> enough key pairs to boost the S/N ratio above the traffic analysis JB> threshold. JB> IH has a point, but not a practical one. ;) But! If you don't have the keys, or if the keys have been exchanged privately, you can't see who's it going too. And you never can see who's it coming from, unless you can validate a signature of it. :) Btw I like your comment, but I enjoy mine much better. :) - John ... Oxymoron: Understanding Wife. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.i Comment: Give me liberty, or give me death. iQEVAgUBL6q/CVjng/R29tmFAQHK0Af+NBKGddzwlDXk5wCY/+SiXmyHXB3oMjpC O8Zswv2ovToY3dE43W3AvCL6/+zp++1tJ/Tbskr5QQbfwwaX9eb3V+zHWDCZE34w zMr8vWXmUHYavkwm9LY+C+JERASEx6Ao26TzeCUDg8L77VWiMhZZ/5tqBDjSjLy4 11CoapkyR19fhsvrdUaUIz61wMPK/+WKHT0r2NVKM70nVeZg2zt6jgQUiCAB7dOm HoiBrjSdFFMc42dB1zOiiNDrY069CCgfR3GywBf3quAF//ixp5zENXFU9FJiwXAR ionQKiMaSon9c5Hs2ydK5b/esc8orXJLMLbTGtZ9I0RH6/LzZoVGSg== =iptY -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- It just has some sort of appeal to me! :) 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Glen Todd Area: Public Key Encryption To: David Chessler 8 May 95 09:12:22 Subject: encrypted messages UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Bright the day, David! Sunday May 07 1995 02:13, David Chessler wrote to Jeffrey Bloss: JB>> The NSA *is* the approving authority for exportable encryption DC> No. The State Department has the final say in the matter. If you can DC> convince State that it is in the National Interest for you to be granted an Which, IMO, is a totally bass-ackwards interpretation. In an 'allegedly' free country, the burden of proof should be on the government to prove that the specific export does in fact constitute a clear and present threat to the people of this country (and not to just a few bureaucratic egos), rather than the citizen having to prove the opposite. Again IMO, the current system smacks of the Napoleonic Code idea of 'guilty until proven innocent'. Wind to thy wings, Glen - --- GoldED/386 2.50.A0307+ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Joe McCarthy would have loved the Clipper chip iQEVAwUBL641+UsDfAvy+TXBAQGvQAf/Vb+g14dsf3h3NnQnR2KWAQUNfwqmXA6C 0HDoUosB+RJHWJ7qQO10HfyjrzbcItXrfIuz+JQqEOxMtJUJe26mA9R9aGdCNNX8 xRuVP1umlQl0Iv/+S8/U//3EA0m0kzUWUWxtJmD4pjkggEPlHw6SDXUMPa/7LyEy Sfqwm/z1KHMXY5dpYGzv1solBmWwZLu6TsMaJSCH27NYiB2yqTKgiXP+dhHWCM+w 0KXGhDnPwUP+xRhn1pBfKto/vscIFvaiWhz6b7PurMl5jlBgzyOjtNZhfgQL1kXF 5SBxrNoTZhQ13E3hxrc3nyKxix7dMEX/rCE/tW3rkAfdUPWbkCJ08g== =OWx1 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ... Good judgement is from experience is from poor judgement! 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Chris Freeh Area: Public Key Encryption To: Quake!noc.cis.umn.edu!klp 7 May 95 20:47:00 Subject: Freeh Calling For Ban On UpdReq +------------------|Quake!noc.Cis.Umn.Edu!klp wrote: ||Picked this up in alt.security.pgp, anyone have any more info, or a copy |of the newsbytes article? ||Newsbytes News service reported today that FBI Director Freeh is now |calling for a ban on PGP and other unbreakable encryption methods. | +-------------------------------------| Looks like a distant relative is over-reacting again. The only reason the gov wants to ban the PGP is beacuse they can't break it. CHRIS FREEH 1:102/332 chris.freeh%tlc@salata.com --- TAGIT A child spueals real loud when picked up by the ears! 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Glen Todd Area: Public Key Encryption To: Jack O'Neill 8 May 95 09:10:22 Subject: Freeh calling for ban on PGP? UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Bright the day, Jack! Saturday May 06 1995 16:07, Jack O'Neill wrote to Christopher Baker: CB>> "Encryption capabilities available to criminals and terrorists CB>> endanger the future usefulness of court-authorized wiretaps," JON> Translation: JON> "Encryption capabilities available to citizens inhibit our ability to JON> monitor the populace." You got that right. JON> Next we'll have Newt holding up a "terrorist manual" obtained from a JON> public library and calls for the closure of libraries. Why do the JON> actions of the followers of Cyril at Alexandria come to mind? Possibly because they're the same group? Wind to thy wings, Glen - --- GoldED/386 2.50.A0307+ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Joe McCarthy would have loved the Clipper chip iQEVAwUBL640kksDfAvy+TXBAQELwAf/bMSSzcu9cRYX5UMvzTLaddNnMus648lP 9D4nAYh22/5sX/55P2nZqsTLYU6F6BvrtGJExm8rwb+wH44CDYHfDV+e0kNaGu0X iJWeYsv8TRM6/e+Y0tJRQ33rOJsMdynhtNq3ZOZyyqaOLLYbYjvkv0TLAoGN4grm 7NFcyR/eAn/kFw5M/YxnFxYB8aqX2EcJwHd8rQ3wEsLr+7DH/ayo3n1TKU4G7I0D Ywh9DFjfJsRe9JBqgevX+EIqdKwX1bJhWpuKODR7C8mwDM/d5e/wfOV7PX2TZwPU LEAat0rlNaniZwoITpXMdUNLSfMqdcBytzTQWJF0aKeB3X6s6pVMZA== =gy6X -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ... Due to intense mind fog, all thoughts have been grounded. 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: jason carr Area: Public Key Encryption To: Thomas Junker 8 May 95 12:44:56 Subject: PGPWave source code gone UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- TJ> Far out. In that case you should make your future releases TJ> of this and all other sofware free of registration fee, as TJ> was the first, until such time as you figure out how to take TJ> proper care of source code. "You should" unplug your modem until you learn some gratitude for freeware authors. TJ> I am not amused. We'll all lose sleep over your current state of [non-]amusement. TJ> Well. Since it's probably moot now anyway, maybe this is an TJ> appropriate time to ask: TJ> Do you have any idea why PGPWave eats the input message TJ> when Decrypt is invoked? It then goes ahead and calls All this could be resolved by invoking the DEL command liberally. Repeat as necessary. TJ> If you charged for this, maybe you *would* have the TJ> incentive to take care of the source and to make it TJ> bulletproof. Hey, I've heard a /lot/ of positive comments on this application. TJ> ... Life might be easier if we had the source code. So write your own bulletproof ap and distribute the code. jason timEd-B9 - Do not store at temperatures above 120 degrees. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Cryptography and echomail aren't mutually exclusive. iQCVAwUBL6512EjhGzlN9lCZAQFoKwP/cKbdsmUo/vWo8KvN8zJhW4oaP9JW2K42 riV7s5Aom0bmZCTyhQW3as57an1JOB6pC2+7czlrg2yW+tKZIYOjAH1hoEClGu5n przGMZOQBpnHg4ExlPVYdczc53UfSAwteXLMU2t2gBFM5Jx9aV2aUdxZyaeIdkGc ETL0ldBU31A= =JUBL -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ... Key fingerprint = 60 97 B2 AE 7D 90 11 2F 05 1C 35 98 E9 B9 83 61 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Michael Babcock Area: Public Key Encryption To: JASON CARR 6 May 95 22:44:00 Subject: Send/rec PGP Msg's UpdReq Jason said something about Re: Send/rec PGP Msg's to Michael on 05-03-95 06:22 JC> Sounds cool. Are you going to post peridical progress reports in JC> here? That way we can goad you into doing the rest of it. :) Sure...how's this : haven't worked on it for 1 and a half weeks now :) Been dabling in ASM too much to get the time...but I'll go back to that one eventually ... maybe in the next month :) ... Here I sit with a worm on my tongue! "Baited Breath!" ___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12 mbabcock@feldspar.com 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: jason carr Area: Public Key Encryption To: Alan Pugh 8 May 95 06:54:16 Subject: Re: Send/rec PGP Msg's UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- jc> 90% of people are idiots, regardless of their use or non-use of PGP. jc> Their cars are also likely low on oil, and their kitchen knives are jc> dull. AP> AP> not necessarily idiocy. personally, i'm happy with people who take AP> the initiative to use pgp. they are at least cognisant of the issues, AP> though not necessarily fully fluent in all the issues involved. _i_ AP> am quite serious about encryption as i see it as a boon to the future AP> of our Republic. many people will never get all aspects of it down, AP> but i think education on these issues can only increase as technology AP> advances and encryption becomes more common. Yeah, the allusion I was making was not as well-known as I thought it might be. It sounded harsher than intended because I was echoing the quote (I don't know who said it): 90% of is crap, but then again 90% of everything is crap. AP> 'tis true, but it breeds uncertainty. this is not necessary a good AP> thing. it is inevitable though. i support this tweaking though my use Software chaos theory! Sourcecode entropy! :) AP> except in relative terms) i figure 3k keys will be the standard in a AP> couple of years. Prolly so, but I guarantee I won't be generating any 3k keys on this 8088 laptop! :) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Fully-encrypted echos =work= iQCVAwUBL63p4EjhGzlN9lCZAQFPewP7BTFYYD0TIWWFtdSfiak8tHvSOy1FCXOK YmVT8qu3VeVEYA96ogfA9zeIRp15mUIHOtYV7fszWRDh2WkgXPbez8O+MlFfUHiB c/L1BwlbQR3Razm6pyFudJJS47xqWV23498WDkF/z3VXsHvP/qyuZNoldMjRGVWD 1gHC8pTv6gI= =xpux -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- jason ... BW-PGP.BAT / BlueWave 2.12 / PGP 2.6.2 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Jeffrey Bloss Area: Public Key Encryption To: David Chessler 8 May 95 01:40:00 Subject: Re: encrypted messages UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- DC>> JB>DC>> Maybe. NSA has nothing directly to do with export licensing. DC>> JB>The NSA *is* the approving authority for exportable encryption DC>> No. The State Department has the final say in the matter. If you can DC>> convince State that it is in the National Interest for you to be granted a NO! The State Department has almost *NO* say. Existing laws give the NSA the power to regulate the export of cryptographic material. If you want an export license, you submit your product to the NSA. THEY approve it, or not... period. Who handles the paperwork is irrelevant. DC>> conventional munitions. ITAR is enforced by the State Department, and the DC>> State Department must take responsibility for the decisions. And BTW, it's not ITAR anymore, it's DTR (maybe that's why you're confused). The "letter of the law" is contained in [Defense Trade Regulations, 22 CFR 120-130, Office of Defense Trade Controls, May 1992]. You may also want to check out [NSDD-145] and [OMB Circular A-130]. You should read these documents. Try the NIST BBS at (301) 948-5717. At the very LEAST grab a copy of the "Computer Security Act of 1987". Be warned... it's a Lynx system. Go for the VT100 emulation. ;) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: -=[ Privacy Through Random Acts Of Encryption ]=- iQCVAwUBL62ucekStfMM4BMZAQH8UwP/frHDTHH9zrFNQdNe3Uj06m20u4rk2C7+ PdWxXMRIFfLI4gKLOhEfvZzJDSw7HM57PdflPuOFXxjSZA6EzU4eI2V0AoPGScuB ZIslqCUzyyh5Lu/BZElcab7kWjvDRcIHuhjymekBWjmq8NuXp+0E9oZm3NfwMvlY Cag5Zo9u1aA= =I82G -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Jeffrey Bloss Area: Public Key Encryption To: David Chessler 8 May 95 02:13:00 Subject: Re: encrypted messages UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- DC>> JB>I claim, and have backed up with references, that contrary to your DC>> You have referred to a number of documents, but, by not giving specific DC>> citations to them in printed format or their URLs, there is no way anyone DC>> can verify your claim. There most certainly is! Take the time to do the research... don't speculate. I've helped you along by giving reference to some of the best sources of information available. It's a terribly long paper trail, takes some time, but it's worth it. Start by sifting through section 18.2 (I think... it's 18.x anyway) of Applied Cryptography. There you'll find contact information for other authorities. I absolutely refuse to retype hundreds of pages of text just to satisfy your whims. You'll have to do the work yourself. DC>> >belief "many" countries restrict or regulate the use of personal DC>> >encryption software... and that more and more countries are tightening DC>> As far as is known, these restrictions apply only to specific uses of As far as is known by WHO? By you? As far as is known by *me*, these restrictions apply to ALL usage of encryption tools by ALL people. The greater majority of the governing bodies on the face of this planet DO restrict, criminalize, or otherwise try to prevent the use of PGP and anything vaguely resembling it. And the numbers ARE increasing. :(( DC>> encryption. General personal use, via Email, Fax or telephone is DC>> unrestricted in most countries. Restrictions apply only to telegraph and DC>> telex. And since you're into sources, where do you get this notion? DC>> >this control. Your own account of actions in the former Soviet Union DC>> >would also seem to support this claim. DC>> No. The Soviet Union had been completely unrestricted by law, until the DC>> current decree. This does not support your claim. Horsehockey!! It DOES support my claims... I quote myself from a few lines up: "[..] "many" countries restrict or regulate the use of personal encryption software... and that more and more countries are tightening [..]" I think we'll all agree that a move from "legal" to "illegal" falls squarely on the "tightening regulations" side of the fence... no? DC>> JB>DC>> JB>... Why put Braille dots on the keypads of drive-up ATM's? DC>> JB>DC>> Ever use one by walking up to it? DC>> JB>Ever hear the words "tag line"? DC>> You're responsible for the tag line. You must have believed it made sense DC>> or was funny, or you would not have written or stolen it, much less used i It is funny, and it does poke your "senses" a bit. What it's not, is topical, important, or something that requires comments from the peanut gallery. If you have nothing better to do than quibble over tag lines, don't waste my bandwidth. :-( ... Do frogs ever kermit suicide? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: -=[ Privacy Through Random Acts Of Encryption ]=- iQCVAwUBL622YOkStfMM4BMZAQGhUwP9GMGQqv1zcvreb5Dx7wGJsI53PK3Jm766 miq2H9kmGEMbzL/Cg8bKExe+shuy5Un/UpnV8FEZ1XXnCKg9/xcZc8HMqu/K73OD g45YRXiiMJult6zroY/0vz9HoQa4F4o0g2xigX50QPmulTy/BkxRSMTRlWC+QSU/ 1RbHqAlxCNE= =xCxM -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Jeffrey Bloss Area: Public Key Encryption To: Shawn Mcmahon 8 May 95 17:59:00 Subject: keyring problems UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- SM>> I> Using "-m" does page the display (and PGP has a built-in pager if SM>> I> you don't want to worry about picking one), but it seems SM>> There is another reason to use the built-in pager; it doesn't write SM>> anything to the hard drive. Who cares... we're viewing the contents of a *public* keyring. Nothing can be compromised by writing the list to a file, printing it, mailing it to your friends, or broadcasting it on national TV. It's already public knowledge. :) ... How does the guy who drives the snowplow get to work? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: -=[ Privacy Through Random Acts Of Encryption ]=- iQCVAwUBL66UFekStfMM4BMZAQEF6wP9EOhdJJZgj/jCyiq8AIMlyfdjc2lniong dceY3A8hp5GTAWd4NEWOGgoUA8UJ+NSuXSnApNN3R6DPJ4tOLqPkOMF8XN1HewM4 JiHv435gzhzD7ePQ0dOXg4ubNvszfhsrybLVGncP32ix1FqJs5d2EAp2b0JbsR6N cQloSilrKik= =LaQU -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Jeffrey Bloss Area: Public Key Encryption To: Jason Carr 8 May 95 09:40:00 Subject: Re: Send/rec PGP Msg's UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- JC>> JB> begin with. :( Even "anonymous" encrypted messages will cause PGP to JC>> JB> display "This message can only be decrypted by...." errors. Pretty JC>> I think his idea was that you'd pick out those msgs that had a JC>> pre-arranged SUBJ: line. You wouldn't be trying to decode those posts JC>> that weren't to you, therefore not "only decrypted by" errors... Yes, but we're talking about a "third party" trying to derive something useful from the numbers of messages and their senders/receivers. In this case, those "only decrypted by" errors would have value that increased as the numbers of specific errors were collected and analyzed. A cryptanalyst would be specifically LOOKING for these name/key-ID errors, counting them, and basically tallying deviations in things like frequency and length of posts using specific ID's. Changes in these figures paint "something's up" pictures with varying details. ;) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: -=[ Privacy Through Random Acts Of Encryption ]=- iQCVAwUBL64fPukStfMM4BMZAQHNYQP9EWsyNZ2o2kckhZEsjSko/no+nEnaEdy2 rXXmDsTGMb7/GZK4B4sGWJ7S8fh8BuL08CFJx97xh2AYrxWphK7zxsbkaQzhWFZG vfZzx8rxXz9+S7cFsbIDb7vGhJQGF//ldx5FgE+pXh4sUEIiXog0z2dIHF7hEmjd RECqbTd/on0= =Ixty -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ... If it wasn't for C, we would be using BASI, PASAL and OBOL! 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Jeffrey Bloss Area: Public Key Encryption To: Ian Hebert 8 May 95 10:32:00 Subject: Re: Send/rec PGP Msg's UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- IH>> JB> display "This message can only be decrypted by...." errors. Pretty IH>> JB> much kills the "to whom" security unless you're prepared to generate IH>> JB> enough key pairs to boost the S/N ratio above the traffic analysis IH>> Hi Jeffrey! Hey! :) IH>> Of course the whole idea is to generate keypairs that don't reference a IH>> real-id; suppose you have a key such as: IH>> pub 2048/34D8632F 1994/08/17 Xenu > Key fingerprint = 38 1D 9C DC C8 B8 B3 ED CC 30 54 AD EC A6 12 IH>> sig 34D8632F Xenu > intimate, you would just have to generate a series of throwaway IH>> keypairs. Not only that, but you'd have to somehow randomize usage of the fake keys, and still keep the important messages straight. Again... doable, but a logistical nightmare. IH>> As far as tracing mail through the remailers goes, I will admit that IH>> even Bruce Schnier thinks that they aren't sufficient to foil Bruce Schiener is only skimming the surface. Many "anonymous" remailers actually keep records of who sent messages and where they went. The smart "cryptanalyst" only needs to get some braindead Judge to issue a warrant for the seizure of the equipment running it. :( I really don't know specifically what remailers/setups keep records, or a percentage figure. Your guess is as good as mine. ;-) IH>> chaining a message through 100+ remailer hops, just to see if it could IH>> be done. I remember he made a comment to the effect of, "I pity the NSA IH>> employee who's gotta unravel this one..." Job security. IH>> I seem to remember reading somewhere that the FBI were sufficiently IH>> alarmed over 'BlackNet' that they actually began an investigation into IH>> it.... They also investigated the Branch Didivians. ;-) IH>> But practical or not, it still is interesting, n'est ce pas? It's ALL interesting to me. :)) And FWIW, I'm not really disagreeing with you about the need for, or the functionality of, an anonymous system. I'm just raising questions about some current implementations, and compatibility of the encryption software "standard" of choice. ;) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: -=[ Privacy Through Random Acts Of Encryption ]=- iQCVAwUBL64rfekStfMM4BMZAQEKOwP8DaIfSQXynUdm2L5TUtU1rDf/z5oQXe15 e+UjM+Ze4gfz/pD0MEKzK8czwkXu71SI5EcZ5ZHLYufMtvHD/hplTqIVSBXP8MYN 2A1nknoDVJJGHALUZkPQwEyPS9DfOzH7j/nTcfZl0G0XNdO+WtxfzCfJg+i2yP4G eH2B/D5TBxY= =jJlv -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ... Hookd on foniks wurkd for mee! 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Jeffrey Bloss Area: Public Key Encryption To: John Stephenson 8 May 95 11:10:00 Subject: Send/rec PGP Msg's UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- JS>> JB> begin with. :( Even "anonymous" encrypted messages will cause PGP to JS>> JB> display "This message can only be decrypted by...." errors. Pretty JS>> But! If you don't have the keys, or if the keys have been exchanged JS>> privately, you can't see who's it going too. And you never can see No... that's what I'm trying to say. PGP will CLEARLY display the recipients name or specific key ID if the private key is not found locally. This compromises anonymity. RSA key management wasn't designed with anonymous remailers in mind. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: -=[ Privacy Through Random Acts Of Encryption ]=- iQCUAwUBL640PukStfMM4BMZAQEeaAP3TLbZ9G1bxe0hKn/IgYzYVC6X4guTPdW/ axr7FkzjZ+qtciRY6E5KBY75rHvEI9uaEXBCH01qm7tXfZUXg7MhCInhbKghponu TjjJNtQFX3Qgn1Ro36+3Nc4rLA47a5MlMGvgtwIXSsZHID4Yz6j87O0kYv4XDNTC paasGIZkJA== =nKTM -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ... If it wasn't for C, we would be using BASI, PASAL and OBOL! 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: David Chessler Area: Public Key Encryption To: Richard Dale 8 May 95 08:47:00 Subject: Re: encrypted messages UpdReq On 04-30-95 (11:16), Richard Dale, in a message to David Chessler about "RE: ENCRYPTED MESSAGES", stated the following: RD>DC>*possession of copying machines, mimeographs, faxes, and even >typewriters may be >DC>*controlled, in the vast majority of all countries there are no >restrictions on >DC>*the use of PGP or other strong encryption. RD> Which is exactly why I didn't say "most" countries. Twenty > countries can be "many" countries. As you point out, even the most So far your list is under 10. Well, your defender Bloss claims it's most countries, though he presents no evidence that the laws are being enforced, or are even applicable to modern messages. > mundane equipment can get you into trouble. A few years ago it > seems like not a week went by where a newspaper office didn't get > bombed. I shudder to think what happened to private individuals > who met in secrecy, used codes, or whatever. Those who used codes were better off than those who did not. I'm not aware of any instances where people were harassed for using encryption, where they not being already being harassed, and more severely, for sedition, treason, lese majesty, criticising the government, belonging to the wrong political party, or other "crimes against the state." > * Origin: Sound Advice - 24 Nodes (816)436-4516 (1:280/333) -- ___ __ david.chessler@neteast.com d_)--/d chessler@capaccess.org chessler@trinitydc.edu * SLMR 2.1b * E-mail: ->132 1:109/459 david.chessler@neteast.com 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: David Chessler Area: Public Key Encryption To: Scott Mills 8 May 95 09:06:00 Subject: Encrypted messages UpdReq On 05-06-95 (22:02), Scott Mills, in a message to David Chessler about "ENCRYPTED MESSAGES", stated the following: > DC> sighted people don't object to Braille, and it makes things easier >for > DC> maintenance. SM> All the drive-ins here have big signs saying that due to insurance >reg's walk up business is not allowed. I also notice that ATM's have No such signs here. It still simplifies matters that there's only one keyboard that has to be installed and maintained, rather than two or more models. Since the braille doesn't add to cost. >braille key's but no output that the blind can use. Of course we're >drifting further and further off topic..... Ian Herbert also made that point to me. Actually, a blind person could memorize the prompts and work the machine, even if the function keys change meaning. Besides, a sighted person might be helping the blind person, who would still find the braille helpful in entering his PIN number. > * Origin: The House of Confusion (703)690-9621 (1:265/2) -- ___ __ david.chessler@neteast.com d_)--/d chessler@capaccess.org chessler@trinitydc.edu * SLMR 2.1b * E-mail: ->132 1:109/459 david.chessler@neteast.com 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Laurence Lane Area: Public Key Encryption To: jason carr 30 Apr 95 18:51:02 Subject: Send/rec PGP Msg's UpdReq *** Foreword: I'm experiencing rather grave echomail difficulties. It appears that only four of my posts have actually "echoed" over the past month and half. Please notify me by e-mail or netmail if you receive this message. Of course, an on-topic echomail reply is welcomed as well. :) Thanks! Answering a msg of , from jason carr to Jeffrey Bloss: Regarding the idea of encrypted echo mail... My idea is just the opposite of yours; instead of encrypting individual messages, encrypt the FTN mail packet. That would provide for secured transportation and leave the receiving system to its own security devices (after the packet is decrypted and processed). That would also be a great way to eliminate mail bombs in smaller FTN systems or within a NET or HUB level in Fido. Just a couple of thoughts... laurence.lane%selfhelp@cjbbs.com 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Laurence Lane Area: Public Key Encryption To: Tom Almy 2 May 95 13:34:58 Subject: Send/rec PGP Msg's UpdReq Sunday April 30 1995 11:22, Tom Almy wrote to Laurence Lane: LL>> Why not just mail direct? TA> Traffic analysis -- people would know that person A sent a message to TA> person B. With the Usenet group the only thing know would be that TA> person A sent a message (contents unknown). The thought never occured to me. Thanks. laurence.lane%selfhelp@cjbbs.com 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Laurence Lane Area: Public Key Encryption To: Ian Hebert 4 May 95 00:58:48 Subject: Send/rec PGP Msg's UpdReq Monday May 01 1995 20:08, Ian Hebert wrote to Laurence Lane: [ encrypting USENET posts... ] LL> Why not just mail direct? IH> The main reason for not mailing direct, for using a newsgroup such as IH> alt.anonymous.messages, is that you wish to preserve your anonymity. IH> If you mail directly to someone, you must of necessity, have an IH> address to mail to. It doesn't matter if the address is real or IH> pseudonymous, it is still an address. That makes sense. IH> Using a newsgroup for receipt of messages makes it virtually IH> impossible to trace a sender or a recipient. You may have seen the IH> recent post I made concerning 'Blacknet'. It is believed by some IH> parties that the current message is a hoax, but Blacknet was IH> originally tried out by cypherpunk T.C. May, as an experiment, to see IH> how it would work. IH> Apparently, by all reports, the methodology is sound. As long as the IH> underlying encryption is not broken, parties may safely exchange IH> information of all types in complete anonymity, with almost perfect IH> safety. My first impression of Blacknet is not good at all, even if it was just used as an example. The post specifically speaks of buying and selling sensitive information through secret bank accounts and such. Sending this info to an unidentifiable and untraceable source? It exemplifies the fear that many have against encryption. laurence.lane%selfhelp@cjbbs.com 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Shawn McMahon Area: Public Key Encryption To: Scott Mills 8 May 95 11:24:18 Subject: encrypted messages UpdReq Despite the stern warnings of the tribal elders, Scott Mills said this to David Chessler: SM> All the drive-ins here have big signs saying that due to SM> insurance reg's walk up business is not allowed. How do blind people read those big signs? :-) 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: John Schofield Area: Public Key Encryption To: Tom Almy 8 May 95 17:08:54 Subject: keyring problems UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- --====-- MB> I don't trust any keys practically...but as far as mail's MB> concerned... if I get a key off the keyserver or the keys echo, and MB> your signature comes out right (see above quote) then it's good enough MB> for keeping...but i'm not going to sign it :) TA> However I would contend that except in cases of extreme paranoia, a TA> FREQed key from a nodelisted individual, or (over the Internet) a TA> FINGERED key would be sufficient to know the message came from the TA> individual with that particular node number or Internet address. That's TA> certainly as good as telephone verification would be, which is what TA> Phil Zimmerman recommends. I sign keys if I have met with their "owner" personally (and checked fingerprints, etc.) or if I FREQ the key from a Fidonet address. However, I would be hesitant to sign keys based on Fingering someone over the Internet. For someone to fiddle with a FREQ request, they would have to fiddle the telephone co's records, so that calls were forwarded to an "imposter" mailer. (Changes to the nodelist would be quickly detected.) It's possible for someone to fiddle the phone co. in this way, but pretty difficult. However, fiddling with IP addresses, domains and finger text is much simpler. Any number of people could fiddle this request. It's simply not anywhere near as "secure" (a relative term) as FREQ-verification. John -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: The Sprawl BBS at +1-818-342-5127 -- your privacy source! iQCVAwUBL66thWj9fvT+ukJdAQE/4QP/fkgQvN00lrG0mVtZeL7zqoCojcjUGc4A pu3WaezThiGEv6Jigbx85iPPpW4MbXKFVqEsGRIU/QDMDA2gyXdvpDYJYxE5qPSA YaCNSgbS6qPiae24N6Y6yihI4gG2+u7UWywouIJ2ZEm6Ra08ovIV3dhHUARoNCq0 RjLNBJtffNU= =nbeR -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ... "When cryptography is outlawed, bayl bhgynjf jvyy unir cevinpl." 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: jason carr Area: Public Key Encryption To: Michael Babcock 9 May 95 06:25:14 Subject: Re: Send/rec PGP Msg's UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- MB> Sure...how's this : haven't worked on it for 1 and a half weeks now MB> :) What??? Get back to your IDE! :P MB> Been dabling in ASM too much to get the time...but I'll go back to MB> that one eventually ... maybe in the next month :) I heard ASm is the Land of No Return... 8-o -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Fully-encrypted echos =work= iQCVAwUBL680k0jhGzlN9lCZAQEDnwQAmfVwjTmqCbso68RmrELpuKzl6B+TVvSa Qrp9WYt6Cr05JdPYtkqQZQf+cEPi1Hl0s6NHTCqjt9SXCSiHeDiLlAGVJBV5YcwG bP51nMWy7P9FwFzAh7KqMAaXKqv4GribQuLYLjCnYES7RFHeC9B+4HWjKAcOasn3 IaRr/OrRRn8= =GuPi -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- jason ... BW-PGP.BAT / BlueWave 2.12 / PGP 2.6.2 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Glen Todd Area: Public Key Encryption To: Robert Purnell 9 May 95 14:01:52 Subject: Congressional E-mail question UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Bright the day, Robert! Monday May 08 1995 00:07, Robert Purnell wrote to All: RP> Considering the current atmosphere of "the need to control something" RP> to prevent terrorist activity, and the suggestion of banning PGP to RP> assist those ends, doeas anyone on this echo have a congressional E-mail RP> directory so we can get our opinions to our representatives with a clear RP> sig at the bottom of our message? I would also appreciate this. Wind to thy wings, Glen - --- GoldED/386 2.50.A0307+ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Joe McCarthy would have loved the Clipper chip iQEVAwUBL6/KWUsDfAvy+TXBAQFvbwf/Ysn5+/M2J+ePyZ+EE+5KPB3RLt4XvREe DnQtqyOj03JBNQkI12CPFpeewUtkX7VdMe2lzRYkbQhrvDGeXqg9skkFvBWOtKv6 D0kf+VHEtzktYAzWDLjxTvC5G2uZ3vKk/sh3ofOPOHcVaG4YsndXPi8id2dnvCPI VT1rUlWUtJEJTqC4dRiAaFec5R21jrnxLEK2wfUH/SuTML0lq6HkUeL9KqCKod+X UhWpAT53IIk/unGtlBuJiSF6XdoWsN70VTpnqf5JXINYl0+tXu8RN52ivgBX1dv9 7fLK+eQPJN/SKsSqgsRC1Kg1anQVQMJ5gXARe0AFv3U0OJlMFPGD6w== =fnv5 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Gary Roth Area: Public Key Encryption To: Andy Hayes 7 May 95 17:16:00 Subject: PGP stuff UpdReq AH>GR> AutoPGP version 2.2b2. 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: John Schofield Area: Public Key Encryption To: Thomas Junker 9 May 95 11:01:30 Subject: PGPWave source code gone UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- --== I wish I could. I have lost the source code to PGPWave. Meaning I JS> can't update it any further. TJ> What? Are you serious? TJ> Far out. In that case you should make your future releases of this TJ> and all other sofware free of registration fee, as was the first, until TJ> such time as you figure out how to take proper care of source code. I TJ> am not amused. TJ> If you charged for this, maybe you *would* have the incentive to take TJ> care of the source and to make it bulletproof. I just had to respond to this message because of Thomas's incredible snottiness. Thomas, relax, please. As the author of EZ-PGP, I believe my word carries some weight when I say that John Stephenson has written the best off-line mail-reader <--> PGP shell around. When I get more time, I'll be updating EZ-PGP to compete more directly with PGPWave, but right now, PGPWave kicks EZ-PGP's butt and kicks PGPBlue's butt. So PGPWave is the best shell out there, and it's free! Then something bad happens to the author (and I can guarantee that *he* is much more upset about losing the source than you are) and you act like a snotty, spoiled child. Thomas, I am not amused. John Schofield -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: The Sprawl BBS at +1-818-342-5127 -- your privacy source! iQCVAwUBL6+tJWj9fvT+ukJdAQFeiwP6A19rNFFTyHlmnxBu9pOmsnYAH/oJOsuG szZHSleicrSqnwpx7WQPvGkP/UUfwZGHEIsbUeyzEI4vU4Jy/jYyoZC/1OsISAZv lhQ36mEOBg8GKdKLFo/UmgomXSAg8+T5cO0Wgp/cb6+1pGJS6j+UGOCBYL3tt84j AnJAiiHRbio= =4+1c -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ... "What do you mean you reformatted the cat?" 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: jason carr Area: Public Key Encryption To: Jeffrey Bloss 9 May 95 19:57:36 Subject: Re: Send/rec PGP Msg's UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- JB> Yes, but we're talking about a "third party" trying to JB> derive something useful from the numbers of messages and JB> their senders/receivers. In this case, those "only JB> decrypted by" errors would have value that increased as the JB> numbers of specific errors were collected and analyzed. A Ahhh, it begins to dawn on me. I see your point now. I was stuck off in near-sightedness land. Thanks for explaining. jason timEd-B9 - But Honey, you NEED SVGA for dBase management! -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Cryptography and echomail aren't mutually exclusive. iQCVAwUBL7AsJ0jhGzlN9lCZAQHOjAP+OW46VBlJclrjVS3hTvTmU0rBa2bwzf0m i8NyHE7GfC6Vf/OJwZf/KZdQogWpNaV7DKNLKOQRrSutRYKSgZcMOMVuohmSF04f YwopQ7ZYTuMXnmh5/bBoEDhvW8bCuvYc2orMxsynaTli80pa8ckkiYtTTZUh+O+D F1Oi9ZfvPHY= =0zNK -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ... Key fingerprint = 60 97 B2 AE 7D 90 11 2F 05 1C 35 98 E9 B9 83 61 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: jason carr Area: Public Key Encryption To: Laurence Lane 10 May 95 06:31:32 Subject: Re: Send/rec PGP Msg's UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- LL> *** Foreword: I'm experiencing rather grave echomail difficulties. LL> It appears that only four of my posts have actually "echoed" over the LL> past month and half. Please notify me by e-mail or netmail if you LL> receive this message. Of course, an on-topic echomail reply is LL> welcomed as well. :) Thanks! I saw you, at least. :) LL> My idea is just the opposite of yours; instead of encrypting LL> individual messages, encrypt the FTN mail packet. That would provide I'm not sure it's /opposite/, but it's certainly a good idea. There are compression aps that can use PGP, I think. And .ZIP has it's own (apparently not-very-robust) encryption routine. LL> for secured transportation and leave the receiving system to its own LL> security devices (after the packet is decrypted and processed). LL> That would also be a great way to eliminate mail bombs in smaller FTN LL> systems or within a NET or HUB level in Fido. Just a couple of LL> thoughts... Packet-level passwords also kill mail-bombs... So the solution for the more obsessive among us would be encrypted echos packed in encrypted packets with packet-level passwords, moved in secure sessions. :) I like it. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Fully-encrypted echos =work= iQCVAwUBL7CHjkjhGzlN9lCZAQF6jwP/e5q/Vp5APAyvnCgv2Tj1IBhLZjJRWgLu uS5PIF1rLE/MQJrff3ClzAJmSGhMuBlLubN+pKzhKVNmiAyLjH4FXnuPolrUm+Gx qNyCr2rxjTsAupNyfh8NBtI0tnK6iFeAbJsOpllcKfVFZhpeCByPjiBqnqkuwbEP cHl2l4BHiOc= =M+7l -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- jason ... BW-PGP.BAT / BlueWave 2.12 / PGP 2.6.2 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Shawn McMahon Area: Public Key Encryption To: Jeffrey Bloss 10 May 95 10:39:50 Subject: keyring problems UpdReq Despite the stern warnings of the tribal elders, Jeffrey Bloss said this to Shawn Mcmahon: JB> Who cares... we're viewing the contents of a *public* keyring. JB> Nothing can be compromised by writing the list to a file, JB> printing it, mailing it to your friends, or broadcasting it JB> on national TV. It's already public knowledge. :) Yes, but I'm assuming that you don't wish to edit your config file just before viewing the keyring, and then edit it again after you're done. If that assumption was in error, I apologize. :-) 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: David Chessler Area: Public Key Encryption To: Glen Todd 11 May 95 02:33:00 Subject: Encrypted messages UpdReq On 05-08-95 (09:12), Glen Todd, in a message to David Chessler about "ENCRYPTED MESSAGES", stated the following: GT>JB>> The NSA *is* the approving authority for exportable encryption GT>DC> No. The State Department has the final say in the matter. If you >can >DC> convince State that it is in the National Interest for you to be >granted an GT>Which, IMO, is a totally bass-ackwards interpretation. In an >'allegedly' free >country, the burden of proof should be on the government to prove that >the >specific export does in fact constitute a clear and present threat to >the >people of this country (and not to just a few bureaucratic egos), rather >than >the citizen having to prove the opposite. Again IMO, the current >system >smacks of the Napoleonic Code idea of 'guilty until proven innocent'. Most foreign trade requires export licenses. However, these are freely granted except for a few limited classes of commodities. nuclear materials are one, and we probably agree with that. encryption software and hardware is another, and one we generally don't agree with, mostly because of the futility of trying to ban it. There's nothing to prove, except that you can export gas centrifuges if you can convince the authorities that it's in the US's interest to let you do so. However, most commodities, the export license is granted automatically when you file the export declaration. Dangerous commodities are exceptions. You don't see PGP as dangerous; the state department does. My point was that NSA is not in the process at all, except that State may draw upon its expertise. >(1:128/203.1) -- ___ __ david.chessler@neteast.com d_)--/d chessler@capaccess.org chessler@trinitydc.edu * SLMR 2.1b * E-mail: ->132 1:109/459 david.chessler@neteast.com 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: David Chessler Area: Public Key Encryption To: Jeffrey Bloss 11 May 95 02:48:00 Subject: Re: encrypted messages UpdReq On 05-08-95 (02:13), Jeffrey Bloss, in a message to David Chessler about "RE: ENCRYPTED MESSAGES", stated the following: JB>DC>> You have referred to a number of documents, but, by not giving >specific >DC>> citations to them in printed format or their URLs, there is no way >anyone >DC>> can verify your claim. JB>There most certainly is! Take the time to do the research... don't >speculate. I've helped you along by giving reference to some of the >best sources of information available. It's a terribly long paper You've given inadequate references to material that does not appear to be pertinant, or to be of limited applicability. JB>As far as is known by WHO? By you? As far as is known by *me*, these >restrictions apply to ALL usage of encryption tools by ALL people. The Crap. There are specific uses that are restricted by governments. >greater majority of the governing bodies on the face of this planet DO >restrict, criminalize, or otherwise try to prevent the use of PGP and >anything vaguely resembling it. And the numbers ARE increasing. :(( Crap again. There are only a few that have laws that apply or are applied (perhaps some more have statutes that are never applied). Encryption is widely used in most countries, and there are no restrictions. Any attempt at restricting it is widely publicised and to date every reported instance has involved the imposition of a NEW regulation or statute. >DC>> unrestricted in most countries. Restrictions apply only to >telegraph and >DC>> telex. JB>And since you're into sources, where do you get this notion? The use of encryption in telegraph and telex is restricted by ITU (formerly CCITT) regulation. It's a treaty. All codes used have to be public ones, or "known" to the authorities. Actually, there are several public code books that used to be widely used, since they encrypted whole sentences of common phrases into a single 5 letter group. The best known is the one used by hotel keepers and travel agents, a copy of which is available in such public sources as the French Government's list of every hotel in France (or at least in the 20 year old copy I have). JB>DC>> >this control. Your own account of actionys in the former Soviet >Union >DC>> >would also seem to support this claim. JB>DC>> No. The Soviet Union had been completely unrestricted by law, >until the >DC>> current decree. This does not support your claim. JB>Horsehockey!! It DOES support my claims... I quote myself from a few >lines up: It denies your claim. There was no regulation of encryption UNTIL a recent DECREE (law or regulation) which forbade it. Had there been such a statute, the decree would have been unnecessary. JB>I think we'll all agree that a move from "legal" to "illegal" falls >squarely on the "tightening regulations" side of the fence... no? And just as clearly on the "was no regulation" side of the fence. If it was legal previous to the decree, then your claim that it is illegal in most countries is not supported by the situation. In fact, in every instance that exists or has been rumored (Holland, England, Italy) a NEW statute is under consideration: as in Russia, there was no EXISTING statute that applied to modern uses of encryption. JB>It is funny, and it does poke your "senses" a bit. What it's not, is >topical, important, or something that requires comments from the peanut >gallery. If you have nothing better to do than quibble over tag lines, >don't waste my bandwidth. :-( If you have so little sense of humor don't bother us. We were happy enough here before you came to spread misinformation then object to discussions of the taglines. > * Origin: Meadville Online (1:2601/551.0) -- ___ __ david.chessler@neteast.com d_)--/d chessler@capaccess.org chessler@trinitydc.edu * SLMR 2.1b * E-mail: ->132 1:109/459 david.chessler@neteast.com 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: David Chessler Area: Public Key Encryption To: Jeffrey Bloss 11 May 95 02:50:00 Subject: Re: encrypted messages UpdReq On 05-08-95 (01:40), Jeffrey Bloss, in a message to David Chessler about "RE: ENCRYPTED MESSAGES", stated the following: JB>DC>> No. The State Department has the final say in the matter. If you >can >DC>> convince State that it is in the National Interest for you to be >granted a JB>NO! The State Department has almost *NO* say. Existing laws give the >NSA the power to regulate the export of cryptographic material. If you >want an export license, you submit your product to the NSA. THEY approve >it, or not... period. Who handles the paperwork is irrelevant. ITAR refers to the STATE department and is administered by them. Grady Ward posted the regulations, and his correspondence with them. NSA is so secret that it can't have any direct enforcement. -- ___ __ david.chessler@neteast.com d_)--/d chessler@capaccess.org chessler@trinitydc.edu * SLMR 2.1b * E-mail: ->132 1:109/459 david.chessler@neteast.com 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Zorch Frezberg Area: Public Key Encryption To: Shawn McMahon 11 May 95 06:24:06 Subject: encrypted messages UpdReq In a msg on , Shawn McMahon of 1:3806/10 writes to Scott Mills: SM>> All the drive-ins here have big signs saying that due to SM>> insurance reg's walk up business is not allowed. SM> How do blind people read those big signs? :-) Who's letting them drive?!?!?! -zf- 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Glen Todd Area: Public Key Encryption To: Laurence Lane 11 May 95 08:53:06 Subject: Send/rec PGP Msg's UpdReq Bright the day, Laurence! Sunday April 30 1995 18:51, Laurence Lane wrote to jason carr: LL> My idea is just the opposite of yours; instead of encrypting individual LL> messages, encrypt the FTN mail packet. That would provide for secured LL> transportation and leave the receiving system to its own security devices LL> (after the packet is decrypted and processed). I'm working (slowly) on an add-on package for mail tossers that would provide just such a capability. Wind to thy wings, Glen ... Danger, @N@! Off-topic messages! Danger! 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718