From: jason carr Area: Public Key Encryption To: TURIYAN GOLD 3 May 95 06:39:38 Subject: Re: Exon bill passes as a UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- TG> What areas dont allow clearsigning? MB> C_ECHO, C_PLUS_PLUS, 80XXX (assembly), ALL THE LOCAL ONES, MB> CAN_CHAT, a bunch of others that i've tried it on...as a matter of MB> fact, i've been told off by every moderator there is for using PGP to MB> clearsign messages except here... BBSLAW allows clearsigning. So does COLLEGE. :) I don't know about the rest (other than this one, of course). -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Fully-encrypted echos =work= iQCVAwUBL6dO8kjhGzlN9lCZAQG1ZwP/U05JxacP4hsZpmy/qthoxFueX+q/aE7B 3cKQ0uyBcCVlV9L/iLGvAa1Zrj+BP0pkq54kOKlxQakSZPhTKIR1pTojffJyk3Ef rY1j4u7jbZzCs+3I7k3DG2K4TattVoHbURC8/8D0ev6KLVHaiTUrvY1UrS1l+QYS D5EGNs46x+A= =ybzu -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- jason ... BW-PGP.BAT / BlueWave 2.12 / PGP 2.6.2 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Andy Hayes Area: Public Key Encryption To: GARY ROTH 2 May 95 06:08:00 Subject: PGP stuff UpdReq In a message to ANDY HAYES, GARY ROTH said... GR>AutoPGP version 2.2b2. Any idea where to get it? Andy |-| Jose (: * QUOTEOLX 2.4 1892898 * * OLX 2.2 TD * You might as well. I stole yours. 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: jason carr Area: Public Key Encryption To: Michael Babcock 3 May 95 06:22:54 Subject: Re: Send/rec PGP Msg's UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- -=> Quoting Michael Babcock to JASON CARR <=- MB> Thanx :) ... i've been working at making a version here work MB> faster... i've changed the keyring handling to use Borland's Paradox MB> Engine...it's FAST...and it's licensed...and doesn't require per-copy MB> royalties...so it'd be nice if I got it to work well and made a MB> translator - TO-FROM the old/my keyring file formats...later. Sounds cool. Are you going to post peridical progress reports in here? That way we can goad you into doing the rest of it. :) MB> ... Now I know she loves me ... she unplugged the modem! How perfect! -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Fully-encrypted echos =work= iQCVAwUBL6dLBkjhGzlN9lCZAQGu4AP+J1thmXccFnx/8IS7jutyAhLsMZ8kI0dr FahvfaqQVYpPMKbnzA6oX7LnvpHD5P9XRLSlbnjqj4/+a6DT95Cj7oeV2JpdG3A9 QNPLEm6vThnXzdhjtI4vOe27tE4wX/elA67NgnP5W56MfuDNDa3WeCo4yqUmXk9Q W3dYHSFeNQM= =j6x8 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- jason ... BW-PGP.BAT / BlueWave 2.12 / PGP 2.6.2 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: John Cruz Area: Public Key Encryption To: All 2 May 95 17:01:16 Subject: PGPWave UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- This is my PGP key. Please send me a copy of PGPWave... I'm using PGPBlue and from what I hear, PGPWave blows it away. - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.1 mQCNAy+mhWoAAAEEAMkCgHqrUNI+58E8/KjR3rbXaziN8KkTKLU8Fiws5ana9o/n XtIbCztTAh+tJlT8QSzeFsnSw6iyn9FvTEkmPTVzqNqmTw/7DWUwueSDV7y+IgMW 7d92Hcg2RRVgIniejPQvbSNvR+t5mYP6zYU0Sy8wINvMGFfYMXqhqRP07sXlAAUR tAlKb2huIENydXq0CUFnZ3Jlc3Nvcg== =JtIa - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.1 iQCVAwUBL6bHxHqhqRP07sXlAQEmgQP9GE9Mwxm5+3QrZmkogfa5Trj/u3zSJuUn y/LrKZ+qZ/u4JCV0Lg9v+6/pPBPa/WErtk+PgQnYdXfQhcdqSi5mD+70ciDrG7LC yLk2Cmu2bvMBWb/MUNm7R1FY/AfYqWTj4XQHOqWeNBcwsBIli9dX9TQVXKpWmwBG e8ZpfvPCkKg= =O/h5 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ~~~ PGPBLUE 2.0 ... We now return to our regularly scheduled flame-throwing. 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Jeffrey Bloss Area: Public Key Encryption To: David Chessler 3 May 95 10:12:00 Subject: Re: encrypted messages UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- DC>> >laws, but as of late 1994 approximately 70% of the world's countries ha DC>> >varying degrees of legal requirements that had to be met before sending DC>> >encrypted traffic across their borders, and 40%(+/-) limit or require DC>> >permits of some type to use it internally. Pick your figure... either DC>> Ummmm. What does this mean? In the US, for example, only DES may be used DC>> for financial transactions. By your count, the US regulates cryptography DC>> for internal use. Well, yes, but only for a specific purpose, and only to Apples and oranges... setting a "standard" for a specific use wasn't at all what I was talking about. I'm talking about having to meet some sort of legal requirement before using any personal encryption software.. be it membership in one of the "standardized" groups such as banking or military, or an individual encryption "driver's license" issued and/or controlled by a third party, and carrying legal penalties for non-compliance. I claim, and have backed up with references, that contrary to your belief "many" countries restrict or regulate the use of personal encryption software... and that more and more countries are tightening this control. Your own account of actions in the former Soviet Union would also seem to support this claim. DC>> JB>... Why put Braille dots on the keypads of drive-up ATM's? DC>> Ever use one by walking up to it? Ever hear the words "tag line"? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: -=[ Privacy Through Random Acts Of Encryption ]=- iQCVAwUBL6ePJOkStfMM4BMZAQF0aAP+LzWnJ982peZOdZJhqV0DI7Nd7X2LBMSw LT9GjQEGWO+df3gJEC8sVi6C1loe3fLCFOjUsIf+7J59x5MnADWlach/FbeQTBjL 9j+UnswStNl0OaK5TVaMYCZm0Zx+n+Jg5nllYqtIagVOGSfwb8B4Or0JT6xOvrSd WgW3NdOWocs= =RhS+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ... if(quacks_like(duck)) return(duck); 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Jeffrey Bloss Area: Public Key Encryption To: David Chessler 3 May 95 21:24:00 Subject: Re: encrypted messages UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- DC>> Maybe. NSA has nothing directly to do with export licensing. That's The NSA *is* the approving authority for exportable encryption algorithms. The NSA gets a copy of your source code, they review it and make recommendations, you implement them (or not), and are then given a license (or not). ;) You may have to go through another agency to get there, but the NSA has first and final say in the matter. :(( -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: -=[ Privacy Through Random Acts Of Encryption ]=- iQCVAwUBL6gsoukStfMM4BMZAQGGWgP/bjR/ZVXSnMWXovw/zDSbM2cKEhcD5nAS DUmcYtsR6x7zNII3hgHqLzDrnLIv2uDZ0e5qZ7yYAbzU0CwOUndWnMNu15R3M1yo WsW08X377dqGTtI6NQXPlYWiOs5a4mt0F7zYETrCcx2hpqXLYaLYj7STog2dar/s KjKt3M8Q8Tg= =40uc -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Jeffrey Bloss Area: Public Key Encryption To: Tom Almy 3 May 95 08:39:00 Subject: Send/rec PGP Msg's UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- TA>> IH> newsgroup, like alt.anonymous messages, one can pick up or drop off TA>> IH> information from almost anywhere. Literally, there is no email TA>> IH> address to be traced. TA>> OK, so it *is* a way to foil traffic monitoring. You can neither tell who TA>> sending the message nor to whom it is being sent. Actually, what is descri Just a nit, but PGP doesn't perform well under these circumstances to begin with. :( Even "anonymous" encrypted messages will cause PGP to display "This message can only be decrypted by...." errors. Pretty much kills the "to whom" security unless you're prepared to generate enough key pairs to boost the S/N ratio above the traffic analysis threshold. IH has a point, but not a practical one. ;) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: -=[ Privacy Through Random Acts Of Encryption ]=- iQCVAwUBL6d5aOkStfMM4BMZAQH0IQP7BZjlqQbw5TeDAwXPuvsyFUPqlHLjh2rL 1O9r9ABhuSxQY9jCtmYkuztEOCT/W1r8kU96X3tBrk0RqQAZnvCcfBquImWZurpf IagvVWCUQkJlviUiSyNlV4lDsc/9GAUrGpFc8+n3P7bwdg2vwLAIDtvkDQE/BzfJ isDv8dL3qS8= =L6Kr -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ... jbloss@meadville.com 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Jeffrey Bloss Area: Public Key Encryption To: Ian Hebert 3 May 95 09:51:00 Subject: Send/rec PGP Msg's UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- IH>> Using a newsgroup for receipt of messages makes it virtually impossible IH>> to trace a sender or a recipient. You may have seen the recent post I Would be true, except for the fact that PGP barfs "This message can only be read by:" errors when you try to decrypt a message to someone else. And the fact that even anonymous remaillers are traceable... only hiding the origin of the message from very honest people. ;-) Boosting noise ratios to defeat traffic analysis is useful only when traffic analysis can reveal something useful. Personal communications that don't revolve around an event that the person(s) your trying to hide the information from have at least SOME knowledge of, are pretty much immune anyway. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: -=[ Privacy Through Random Acts Of Encryption ]=- iQCVAwUBL6eKWekStfMM4BMZAQFZ8AP9GapqQ+c8ZPH+1L2167FdsTu4Lx7ljZa+ 9Q79hkJFYwJ9pijuYbKK1FzOiEQ9ptAVC8CdY81Z+sw/iEzjsGmwC3MLHaDp48yS mFxuxQlCuPTDV3qO2bjqx1l2Iqjzhc+afilnoB/N5RPjrmOqlaRkiddJlTbqqE72 Y6ZID11+POc= =kut4 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Tom Almy Area: Public Key Encryption To: Michael Babcock 3 May 95 16:30:44 Subject: keyring problems UpdReq -=> Once upon a time, Michael Babcock said to TOM ALMY <=- MB> I don't trust any keys practically...but as far as mail's MB> concerned... if I get a key off the keyserver or the keys echo, and MB> your signature comes out right (see above quote) then it's good enough MB> for keeping...but i'm not going to sign it :) MB> Unless you were someone MB> in a high position in which case it would matter if I believed in that MB> key...but for echos, this is sufficient proof. However I would contend that except in cases of extreme paranoia, a FREQed key from a nodelisted individual, or (over the Internet) a FINGERED key would be sufficient to know the message came from the individual with that particular node number or Internet address. That's certainly as good as telephone verification would be, which is what Phil Zimmerman recommends. Now does signing a key mean that the key belongs to the individual at a specific address, or a specific individual? I would say the latter. The address is only there for convenience and to handle identical names. And unless I've met the individual who holds that address I don't sign their key. Tom 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: John Stephenson Area: Public Key Encryption To: Shawn McMahon 30 Apr 95 11:20:30 Subject: PGP + Editors UpdReq SM> Despite the stern warnings of the tribal elders, John Stephenson said SM> this to Ted Rolle: JS> PGPWave is freeware, mouse driven, and has a nice interface. And JS> well, PGPBlue is shareware, no mouse support, and well.. I'll JS> leave the rest to your imagination. :) SM> PGPBlue is available for OS/2, as well as the obsolete MS-DOS OS. Is SM> PGPWave? No. Pgpwave doens't have an OS/2 version. I would have written one if I was able to compile an OS/2 application however. I'll give you that PGPBlue is better for a native OS/2 app, but if you want the best DOS PGP shell, check out PGPWave. - John ... Oxymoron: Near Miss. 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Tom Almy Area: Public Key Encryption To: Bill Brown 3 May 95 16:30:44 Subject: Sign v. use UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- -=> Once upon a time, Bill Brown said to Turiyan Gold <=- BB> Thursday April 27 1995 02:24, Turiyan Gold wrote to Tom Almy: TA>> 4. sign keys where they aren't absolutely sure about the owner (meet TA>> them personally and check IDs). BB> For example, I can use the keys in PKEY_DROP to verify signatures at BB> the bottom of echomail messages. But that is NOT the same as SIGNING BB> those keys, staking my reputation that those keys are in fact from the BB> persons that they are reputed to be from. Yet (to site the misuse), when I posted my key to PKEY_DROP I got back several signed copies! That's a blatant misuse of signing, which relegated their signatures to the "don't trust" level in PGP. Tom -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBL6gOntmt3ugi2IbhAQE7YAP+MrkhIpdN3fZfK6ZtFYxAm/je5rarH/cy KKbl6boyj9dlMbG4jOidRptBnQ9s45OSbyOWqVhb6zAKbc1aJbvAXhnp0utDAcdW LwqG7rrJd3QBox/ERgYs93SzSGgsMTAFWqeHP1jFTcemQhq3JIoUC6VgB9kEtH6R YcrViOtK/DQ= =R28U -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: quake!noc.cis.umn.edu!klp Area: Public Key Encryption To: All 4 May 95 13:06:56 Subject: Re: Freeh calling for ban on PGP? UpdReq * Original Message Posted via CYPHERPUNKS * Date: 03 May 95 05:15:18 * From: quake!noc.cis.umn.edu!klp @ 1:102/825 * To: All * Forwarded by: Christopher Baker @ 1:374/14 * Message text was not edited! @MSGID: mid__2fa80076617a002@noc.cis.umn.edu 6550001 @REPLYTO 1:102/825 UUCP @REPLYADDR quake!noc.cis.umn.edu!klp @PID GIGO+ sn 154 at borderlin vsn 0.99.950303 @Received: from warp10.smartdocs.com (jeffs@smartdocs.com [204.118.4.2]) by quake.Quake.COM (8.6.12/8.6.12) with ESMTP id PAA20509 for ; Wed, 3 May 1995 15:39:26 -0700 @Received: from relay4.UU.NET by warp10.smartdocs.com(8.6.12/SMARTDOCS-1.0) with id PAA19397 ESMTP @ for on Wed, 3 May 1995 15:30:26 -0700 @Received: from toad.com by relay4.UU.NET with SMTP @ id QQyoej23158; Wed, 3 May 1995 18:19:05 -0400 @Received: by toad.com id AA00653; Wed, 3 May 95 15:16:33 PDT @Received: from noc.cis.umn.edu by toad.com id AA00586; Wed, 3 May 95 15:15:28 PDT @Received: by noc.cis.umn.edu; Wed, 3 May 95 17:15:18 -0500 Message-Id: <2fa80076617a002@noc.cis.umn.edu> From: quake!noc.cis.umn.edu!klp @Subject: Freeh calling for ban on PGP? @To: quake!toad.com!cypherpunks Date: Wed, 3 May 1995 17:15:18 -0500 (CDT) @Mime-Version: 1.0 @Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII @Sender: quake!toad.com!owner-cypherpunks @Precedence: bulk Picked this up in alt.security.pgp, anyone have any more info, or a copy of the newsbytes article? -- From: feustel@netcom.com (David Feustel) [1] If's Official: Freeh Wants to BAN PGP Organization: NETCOM On-line Communication Services (408 261-4700 guest) Date: Tue May 02 17:06:46 CDT 1995 Lines: 9 Newsbytes News service reported today that FBI Director Freeh is now calling for a ban on PGP and other unbreakable encryption methods. alt.security.pgp -- Dave Feustel N9MYI Internet: 219-483-1857 Compuserve: <73532,1747> Finger feustel@netcom.com for PGP public key ASCII PGP encrypted mail welcome -- Kevin Prigge | Holes in whats left of my reason, CIS Consultant | holes in the knees of my blues, Computer & Information Services | odds against me been increasin' email: klp@cis.umn.edu | but I'll pull through... 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Bill Brown Area: Public Key Encryption To: Tom Almy 4 May 95 14:32:02 Subject: Sign v. use UpdReq Hello Tom, Wednesday May 03 1995 16:30, Tom Almy wrote to Bill Brown: TA> Yet (to site the misuse), when I posted my key to PKEY_DROP I got TA> back several signed copies! That's a blatant misuse of signing, TA> which relegated their signatures to the "don't trust" level in TA> PGP. Is it safe to assume that they didn't ALSO freq them from you? If not, I'd have to agree that they didn't read/understand the docs on key certification. Ah, I see your next message says... Wednesday May 03 1995 16:30, Tom Almy wrote to Michael Babcock: TA> a FREQed key from a nodelisted individual, or (over the Internet) TA> a FINGERED key would be sufficient to know the message came from TA> the individual with that particular node number or Internet TA> address. That's certainly as good as telephone verification would TA> be, which is what Phil Zimmerman recommends. It's a "form" of telephone verification, true. How about those who aren't nodelisted? For example, I have a couple of PGP users who point off my node. I've signed their keys, since I know them personally and can attest to the authenticity of the keys. Short of getting thei bossnode's signature, is there anything they can do to facilitate the credibility of their keys? TA> The address is only there for convenience and to handle identical names. With a name like "Bill Brown" I would have expected to run across many more keys with the name, but so far ... only my own! Bill Brown 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: ISLANDER Area: Public Key Encryption To: JEFF TROWBRIDGE 1 May 95 00:16:00 Subject: keyring problems UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Who: Juan Jose Rodriguez What: keyring problems When: 04-22-95 16:07 JJR> following up a message from Glen Todd to Jeff Trowbridge: JT> I'm having a problem viewing the contents of my keyring. It's gotten JT> so big it whizzes by and I can only see the last 8 or 9 names. I JJR> If my memory is correct you only add a -m to the command line JJR> and the output will be a screen at a time. And there is a line in the JJR> config.txt to specify the list program to use too. Using "-m" does page the display (and PGP has a built-in pager if you don't want to worry about picking one), but it seems obnoxiously slow when I try it. The built-in pager doesn't have a print option, either. If you're on a DOS box, you can make a printable list of keys with an obnoxiously simple old DOS trick. Type "pgp -kv > pubring.txt" to get a text file, or just "pgp -kv > prn" to print it out straight from the keyring. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: No, I don't need a larger key. Leave me alone. iQCVAwUBL6RfisRHZFQbZSuZAQEoZQP/VG2MCLGLI9ApFydbwQYegsWQ+IzgTD+d KpiKyWnu/EHtS4i51ApJZhddUzQ4SBPp+qZ3XCQtex8Gbn+9wRG6oZOR8DdiVt07 KLSF9hjiIJHVnF9ch8BbOyr4CwgTnYHowbQ68lzEQDqd8xQqBuGimmAzu82auEqP /dN5quNVB9A= =jtts -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- **EZ-PGP v1.07 ... 1984--We're behind schedule ___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12 # Origin: Akron Info & Party 32 Lines 17 CD's 1:2215/280 * Origin: PODNet <-> FidoNet EchoGate! (93:9600/0.0) SEEN-BY: 107/946 259/212 382/7 640/217 9000/0 9600/0 9608/0 9609/0 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Christopher Baker Area: Public Key Encryption To: All 5 May 95 19:47:50 Subject: Re: Re: Freeh calling for ban on PGP? UpdReq * Original Message Posted via NETMAIL * Date: 05 May 95 09:30:04 * From: Richard Ratledge @ 1:119/88 * To: Christopher Baker @ 1:374/14 * Forwarded by: Christopher Baker @ 1:374/14 * Message text was not edited! @REPLY: 1:102/825 2FA909B0,D9.0002 @INTL 1:374/14 1:119/88 @MSGID: 1:119/88 2fa9f171 @CHRS: IBMPC 2 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- * Reply to message in PUBLIC_KEYS q> Picked this up in alt.security.pgp, anyone have any more info, or q> a copy of the newsbytes article? q> -- q> From: feustel@netcom.com (David Feustel) q> [1] If's Official: Freeh Wants to BAN PGP q> Organization: NETCOM On-line Communication Services (408 261-4700 q> guest) Date: Tue May 02 17:06:46 CDT 1995 Lines: 9 q> Newsbytes News service reported today that FBI Director Freeh is q> now q> calling for a ban on PGP and other unbreakable encryption methods. q> alt.security.pgp q> -- q> Dave Feustel N9MYI Internet: q> 219-483-1857 Compuserve: <73532,1747> - - - - C - U - T - - H - E - R - E - - - - - - - - - - - - You'll probably get a hundred copies of this in the echo so I will send it netmail in case you don't and since I am polling you anyway. Here is what came though on NewsBytes on May 2, 1995. - - - - C - U - T - - H - E - R - E - - - - - - - - - - - - (NEWS)(GOVT)(WAS)(00019) FBI Renews Push For Encryption Controls 05/02/95 WASHINGTON, D.C., U.S.A., 1995 MAY 2 (NB) -- The Federal Bureau of Investigation is using the Oklahoma City bombing as an example of why the nation needs controls on private encryption. Civil libertarians are countering that the FBI wants to subvert the free speech clause of the US Constitution. In testimony last week to the Senate Judiciary Committee, FBI Director Louis Freeh expressed concern about the ability of terrorist group members to communicate on the Internet, using encryption technology such as Pretty Good Privacy (PGP). "Encryption capabilities available to criminals and terrorists endanger the future usefulness of court-authorized wiretaps," Freeh told the committee. "This problem must be resolved." Freeh also said the FBI needs increased access to "common carrier records," meaning telephone and telecommunications service carriers, "for counterterrorism and counterintelligence investigations." Freeh appeared to win a convert in Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.), ranking minority member of the committee and usually considered a strong free speech defender. Kennedy held up what he called a "how to manual for the terrorist" that a staff member had downloaded from the Internet, and said, "We know the advantage of the information highway, but there's the darker side, too, we need to be concerned about." Noting that the Senate Commerce Committee has included a ban on pornography on the Internet in the pending telecommunications legislation, Kennedy said, "We ought to stop terrorism, too." Later, a spokesman for the Massachusetts liberal said he was only seeking to raise the issue for debate and remains committed to the First Amendment. But civil libertarians remain concerned that in the charged atmosphere of the aftermath of Oklahoma City, Congress could try to impose limits on the anarchic and free-spirited Internet. "In these times," wrote Denise Caruso, a member of the board of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, in the New York Times, "it is easy to demonize the big, powerful, invisible Internet -- to be outraged that it harbors pornographers and hackers and hate groups, and demand a means to monitor and control their conversations on the network so they might be stopped." Noting that most of the militia field manuals are available legally in survivalist bookstores, Caruso quoted Benjamin Franklin: "They who can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety." The Times editorialized, "Government is right to worry about keeping pace with electronic criminals. But citizens should not generally be forced to surrender privacy just to make law enforcement easier." (Kennedy Maize/19950502/Press Contacts: FBI press office, 202-324-3691; Drew Taubman, EFF, 202-861-7700) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Assert your right to private communications. Use PGP! iQCVAwUBL6pT13fjleKpiL31AQGDDgQApJweOEzbAQ9jaCxUBFtB7QUf13x7cTyF D/aGHLagB3A9PQUgOxnd2D247sc3b70B5dWm13/x3/AHv4tz77Ie3nGKn7OO4BDj fzq0i/jINUkBc7mhxvXPheCrymWRSwu2+RvbztvOl3h08G2w4nYZ1+eNbyfeqjCC Xx1J8MKbETQ= =6Fa4 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- FleetStreet 1.03 #90 @ Origin: * Madman BBS * Chico, California * 916-893-8079 * (1:119/88) 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Christopher Baker Area: Public Key Encryption To: All 5 May 95 19:55:58 Subject: Re: Re: Re: Freeh calling for ban on PGP?UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In a message dated: 05 May 95, Christopher Baker stated: CB> "Encryption capabilities available to criminals and terrorists CB> endanger the future usefulness of court-authorized wiretaps," CB> Freeh told the committee. "This problem must be resolved." CB> Freeh also said the FBI needs increased access to "common CB> carrier records," meaning telephone and telecommunications CB> service carriers, "for counterterrorism and counterintelligence CB> investigations." and Ryder Truck rental sites make it easy to drive away in the bomb casing and feed stores make it easy to buy the bomb charge and plastic drum manufacturers make it easy to pack the charges into the bomb casing rental truck and so on and so on and so on. CB> Noting that the Senate Commerce Committee has included a ban on CB> pornography on the Internet in the pending telecommunications CB> legislation, Kennedy said, "We ought to stop terrorism, too." when cars are outlawed only terrorists will have car bombs. right. CB> The Times editorialized, "Government is right to worry about CB> keeping pace with electronic criminals. But citizens should not CB> generally be forced to surrender privacy just to make law CB> enforcement easier." first, have them prove a single instance of PGP use by a terrorist. then let them outlaw cars, fertilizer, fuel oil, blasting caps, acetylene, rental trucks, and politicians making excuses. TTFN. Chris -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: SUPPORT the Phil Zimmerman Legal Defense Fund! iQCVAwUBL6q7AssQPBL4miT5AQFqwgQAohqb3hCNmnWRqieLgI29LnG01gveNVy9 f8iX6IjtkHi910k378zoUG/ehZiOT03KBx/t5VIkrN37fh0zpKilogr04DaAvXcy /VviQ8km+qWzPRHVdUAq0j8FvrlgTV8QIE3uVih8Pn6XWQDzVIkHaql3rNzbUcEw yR0bCSLqh1g= =uUGB -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Tom Almy Area: Public Key Encryption To: Bill Brown 4 May 95 21:50:00 Subject: Sign v. use UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- -=> Quoting Bill Brown to Tom Almy <=- BB> Is it safe to assume that they didn't ALSO freq them from you? Yes. They just signed the publically posted key. TA> a FREQed key from a nodelisted individual, or (over the Internet) TA> a FINGERED key would be sufficient to know the message came from TA> the individual with that particular node number or Internet TA> address. BB> How about those who aren't nodelisted? For example, I have a couple BB> of PGP users who point off my node. I've signed their keys, since I BB> know them personally and can attest to the authenticity of the keys. This would mean that anybody who trusts you could trust the keys. BB> Short of getting thei bossnode's signature, is there anything they can BB> do to facilitate the credibility of their keys? Getting the Bossnodes signature is only good if the key recepient trusts the boss node. There is nothing to prevent me from creating bogus keys for all my points and then making them available here as PGPKEY. (However I haven't done so!) In this case, a voice call would be necessary to verify. BB> With a name like "Bill Brown" I would have expected to run across many BB> more keys with the name, but so far ... only my own! Sure would expect so. :-) Tom (I'm the only "Almy" in the server) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.1 iQCVAwUBL6msztmt3ugi2IbhAQHVTAP/WewpjeIXgUlwO9Mup3pQg//BHSerss0h K7momfLDaTlYApX0LZO43GuwKGzFUUMDwAgql5hNW2rjLrx6EzDG77dVv6eWZI1m S5WlxfuwsaWY09IevGj21RO84V2P1ObIJ0CUnjo3xqyJus0rpGO0DyOpvsVPPb9+ kTrKGTNqSOY= =i4wh -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718