From: Andy Hayes Area: Public Key Encryption To: TURIYAN GOLD 29 Apr 95 22:50:00 Subject: PGP stuff UpdReq In a message to ANDY HAYES, TURIYAN GOLD said... TG>Yes, its called autopgp. I just recieved it. I am using it in this TG>message. All you have to do to sign a message is type a command in [], TG>and it configures for many bbs software. Cool. Where do I get it? TG>Version: 2.3 Why are you using PGP version 2.3??????????????? Andy |-| Jose (: * QUOTEOLX 2.4 1892898 * * OLX 2.2 TD * Never test for an error you don't know how to handle. 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Andy Hayes Area: Public Key Encryption To: TOM ALMY 28 Apr 95 06:57:00 Subject: Send/rec PGP Msg's UpdReq In a message to JASON CARR, TOM ALMY said... TA>Private, direct email would be better. Why post (for wide distribution) a TA>personal message? Only advantage is to thwart traffic analysis, but I doubt TA>most people using a PGP encryted message echo is really thinking along those TA>lines. I agree. TA>I'd say those that are doing it wrong are treating it like a game. And I've TA>seen plenty of that. It takes a lot of work to follow all the suggestions in TA>the PGP manual. I bet that an overwhelming majority of users: TA>1. have the private keyring publicly accessible TA>2. have a poor passphrase TA>3. trust public keys on PGP_KEYS and on Internet keyservers TA>4. sign keys where they aren't absolutely sure about the owner (meet them TA> personally and check IDs). TA>The large number of "unofficial", and incompatible, versions is also not TA>taking things seriously. I agree WHOLEHEARTEDLY with ALL of your points. Good Job! (: Andy |-| Jose (: * QUOTEOLX 2.4 1892898 * * OLX 2.2 TD * Born crying, live complaining, die disappointed. 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Andy Hayes Area: Public Key Encryption To: SHAWN MCMAHON 28 Apr 95 06:58:00 Subject: Send/rec PGP Msg's UpdReq In a message to JASON CARR, SHAWN MCMAHON said... SM>(Now watch as Richard Dale claims I'm comparing PGP usage to serial murder.) Why are you comparing PGP usage to serial murder? Just kidding man, but who's Richard Dale? (: Andy |-| Jose (: * QUOTEOLX 2.4 1892898 * * OLX 2.2 TD * It only works when you're not looking. 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Jeffrey Bloss Area: Public Key Encryption To: Shawn Mcmahon 1 May 95 10:10:00 Subject: Re: encrypted messages UpdReq SM>> JB> specific laws, but as of late 1994 approximately 70% of the SM>> JB> world's countries had varying degrees of legal requirements SM>> Irrelevant to the present discussion, but an interesting figure. No Shawn, it's *exactly* what this discussion is about. Attempting to brush it aside because it conflicts with your misinformed opinion is irrelevant. SM>> JB> and 40%(+/-) limit or require permits of some type to use SM>> JB> it internally. SM>> Source, please. And in any event, if "requires a permit to use" translate SM>> as "illegal" then automobiles are illegal in the United States. The Operating a vehicle without a license *is* illegal, just as exporting encryption software outside the US without a license is illegal, just as moving encrypted message traffic inside many countries without popper license is illegal. The only differences being the severity of the crime in the eyes of the law, the rate at which licenses are issued, and what you have to do, or be, before you can get these licenses. There are *NO* countries that flatly ban the use of encryption, but there are MANY that require you to meet their definition of "need" or "authority" to use it. Technically, and in reality, this makes public use of encryption software illegal. Simply put, encryption is restricted to official military/governmental use in more countries than most people suspect, and it's getting worse by the week. :( SM>> discussion was countries where PGP is ILLEGAL. Do you have any numbers on SM>> that? And, if so, can you tell us where you got them? ASIACRYPT Abstracts, EUROCRYPT Proceedings reports, reams of official documentation such as ISO/IEC 9799, uncountable e-mail conversations with the people who live it first hand, and a few years of electronic crypto/security experience with the US Air Force. What do you base your assumptions on Shawn? 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Christopher Baker Area: Public Key Encryption To: All 1 May 95 00:52:48 Subject: PGP-related filename conventions in FidoNetUpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- [the following are the standard magicnames for various PGP-related files available from participating FidoNet systems. please adjust your magicnames to match those in the list. this will make it much simpler for folks to find PGP-related stuff they need. thanks] the following is the list of standard PGP-related magic filenames that should be used for uniformity by all who provide such files: PGPKEY for your public-key. make the filename distinctive with your Node number or name. mine is BAK37414.ASC. KEYRING for your public-keyring. make the filename distinctive likewise. mine is BAKPUB14.ASC. REVOKE for any key revocation certificates you might issue. mine is BAKREVOK.ASC. PGPFILES for your PGP/privacy/encryption filelist. mine is PGP37414.LST. PGP for the current version of MSDOS PGP executables and docs. PGPSRC for the current version of PGP source files. PGPALL for both executable and source. PGPAMIGA for Amiga version of PGP. PGPATARI for Atari version of PGP. PGPMAC for Macintosh version of PGP. PGPOS2 for OS/2 version of PGP. PGPUNIX for Unix version [if there ever is one] PGPVAX for Vax version [likewise] [send them the source if they request a Unix or VAX version!] if we all use the same conventions, it will be easy for anyone anywhere to file-request just what they want and get what they expect. [grin] thanks. TTFN. Chris p.s. in addition, some of us compiled PEM public-keys for Internet use. those keys and rings are available as: PEMKEY for your PEM public-key PEMRING for you PEM public-keyring C. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: SUPPORT the Phil Zimmerman Legal Defense Fund! iQCVAwUBL6RpE8sQPBL4miT5AQHQ+wP8CTL1YlkjU+OVu1delkCi8CeL4575ByuF 8IVrswpQRxZZkSpsbNZSVFeURQgP0483oPJSLhOSULPPlufU3dm9XiatILeTefC1 IYLRDNii9b2bfHe4ToovlfTaH1MRS4Ad9dUayZfgdpaCULQum7HoY8YJBXZz9RV6 UYV11lS6Sm4= =NtOm -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Christopher Baker Area: Public Key Encryption To: All 1 May 95 00:51:54 Subject: PUBLIC_KEYS Echo Guidelines - regular repostUpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- This is the PUBLIC_KEYS Echo. The purpose of the Echo is to provide a place to discuss public-keys for data privacy within FidoNet and elsewhere. We also consider electronic signature possibilities using public-keys and discuss data and software encryption and the various schemes and programs that produce them. This is a technical Echo with very few rules. Those very few rules are: 1. Stay on-topic. Topics of keys and encryption and related privacy and electronic signature issues are welcome. Others are not. 2. No politics [except as it relates to privacy issues] and no religion. 3. No personal attacks, slurs or innuendo. Stick to issues not personalities. 4. No Private flagged messages in Echomail! Encrypted traffic using public-keys is permitted for the exercise so long as it is on-topic. Don't send person-specific encrypted traffic. Such specific traffic belongs in direct Netmail. Encrypted traffic should be in the form of ASCII-armored or personal key encrypted messages that can be read by anyone with PGP 2.6+ and your public-key. Include your public-key in a separate message before sending such test messages in case the other end doesn't have it or make them aware of how to get it from your system. If you just want to post your public-key, use PKEY_DROP Echo. 5. Clear-signed messages are not encrypted and may be used freely in this Echo. 6. This Echo may be traveling around the world so try to be concise. Avoid excessive quoting for one-liner responses. 7. Be aware that Echomail is NOT secure. Don't take anything at face value. 8. The posts in this Echo are the sole responsiblity of the poster. If you need verification, use Netmail. 9. The Moderators will deal with off-topic traffic. Don't respond for them. Links to this Echo will only be curtailed when absolutely necessary so please don't make it necessary. [grin] The Moderators are Christopher Baker [KeyID: 1024/F89A24F9 1994/05/18] and GK Pace [KeyID: 1024/EE38FB41 1994/05/14] at 1:374/14 and 1:374/26, respectively. It is Gated into Zone 2 by Jens Mueller at 2:24/24 who sends it on to Harry Bush at 2:51/2. Consult Jens or Harry for Zone 2 feeds. The Echo is gated into Zone 3 by Jackson Harding at 3:800/857. [thanks, guys!] The other Zones are open [hint, hint]. It is recommended that individual, public-keys be made available via Netmail or by file-request with the magic filename: PGPKEY and that the public-key provided for that request by given a distinctive filename using part or all of each provider's name and address. For example, on my system, a file-request of PGPKEY will give BAK37414.ASC to the requesting system. A magic filename of KEYRING will yield extracts from my Public Keyring as BAKPUB14.ASC. This will avoid duplicate overwriting and make it easier to track the keys. Using standard magic filenames will make it easier to find keys and keyrings on different systems. The PGP and Privacy and encryption related files on each system should be maintained with a magic filename for file request. PGPFILES should be set on all participating systems to allow your current related files to be picked up at any time. It is suggested that the actual filename indicate the origin of the list to avoid confusion and overwriting. PGPFILES requested from this system gets the requestor a file called: PGP37414.LST. The contents of this Echo are archived on 1:374/14 as the area is purged. The current past traffic is in the file PUBKEY.ECO. Archives are no longer kept. This Echo is currently available on the Zone 1 Backbone. It has been EListed as of ELIST211. Please feel free to announce this Echo in all Nets and Networks. A companion Echo for the purpose of submitting public-keys only is now available as PKEY_DROP Echo. PKEY_DROP may be obtained via the same channels as PUBLIC_KEYS. NOTE: If you lose your secret-key password [or forget it] or your secret-key in a drive crash [because you failed to back it up on floppy], you cannot issue a revocation certificate. In that case, you should make a general announcement in all related Echos that your old key should be disabled using the PGP disable command [PGP -kd userid] for your userid. That keeps your useless key on their keyrings [so they won't be replaced from other lists who didn't get the word] and permits them to add a new key from you without one interfering with the other. BACKUP! BACKUP! BACKUP! [clear?] [grin] Thanks. TTFN. Christopher Baker & GK Pace Moderators -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: SUPPORT the Phil Zimmerman Legal Defense Fund! iQCVAwUBL6Ro3ssQPBL4miT5AQFS1wP+I+th/WPvzfT/JIuhmU2mVSHR26Im5Hd/ PG1J8d6eOCWv6hJc0uMPNQ1/AEEIrnLRMmsJFCOxo58IStu7L1idsWif3fceZbU8 ioaqLKJ6dsa7XaS0F5SKhyDCJxBMwb8ZK6AWE8S8pgkbWqum9XgDI2CbdG08caWK 1NyMZ+yq3bw= =CxXe -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Christopher Baker Area: Public Key Encryption To: All 1 May 95 00:54:26 Subject: SecureMail Host Routing map UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- SecureMail Host Systems Zone Sysop Address |--ISMH Jim Cannell 1:216/21 | | |--Z6SMH Open | |--Z5SMH Open | |--Z4SMH Open | |--Z3SMH Open | |=================================================================== | |--Z1SMH Jim Cannell 1:216/21 | | | RSMH Net Sysop Address Flag | |--- 10 Dan Wilson 1:206/2507 X | | | SMH |-- 102 Dave Lord 1:102/338 | |-- 119 Richard Ratledge 1:119/88 | |-- 125 Barry Kapke 1:125/33 X | | |-- 352 John Burrows 1:352/333 X | |-- 143 Radi Shourbaji 1:143/110 X | | |-- 204 Ken Humrich 1:204/1001 | |-- 161 Mike Burgett 1:215/705 X | | |-- 215 Joe Pye 1:215/25 | |-- 202 Guy Martin 1:202/905 X | |-- 203 *none at present* | |-- 205 Zorch Frezberg 1:205/1701 X | |-- 206 Dan Wilson 1:206/2507 X | |-- 207* Dave Sparks 1:207/212 | |-- 210 Steve Garcia 1:210/11 X | |-- 216 Jim Cannell 1:216/21 X | | |--- 11 Ryan Anderson 1:120/379 | | | |-- 120 Ryan Anderson 1:120/379 | |-- 226 Jeffrey Oxenreider 1:226/560 | |-- 231 Joe Eversole 1:231/425 | |-- 2202 Ryan Anderson 1:120/379 | |-- 2215 Jim Bailey 1:2215/480 | |-- 2240 Ryan Anderson 1:120/379 | |-- 2410 Ryan Anderson 1:120/379 | | |--- 12 Paul Henry 1:221/280 X | | | SMH |-- 167 Frederic Giroux 1:167/535 | |-- 221 Paul Henry 1:221/280 X | |-- 225 *none at present* | |-- 252 *none at present* | | |--- 13 Marc Stuart 1:2624/402 X | | | |-- 107 *none at present* | |-- 267 *none at present* | |-- 2613 Jack Mooney 1:2613/108 X | |-- 2623 Cindy Ingersoll 1:2623/71 | |-- 2624 Marc Stuart 1:2624/402 X | | |--- 14 Jason Buchanan 1:286/702 X | | | SMH |-- 285 Mike Riddle 1:285/27 X | |-- 286 Jason Buchanan 1:286/702 X | |-- 287 *none at present* | |-- 291 *none at present* | |-- 296 *none at present* | | |--- 15 Dave Munhollon 1:128/86 X | | | |-- 114 *none at present* | |-- 128 Dave Munhollon 1:128/86 X | |-- 303 Thomas Lange 1:303/5 | |-- 314 Doug Preston 1:314/5 | | |--- 16 Todd Rourke 1:323/110 | | | |-- 132 Allan Hitchmoth 1:132/209 | |-- 323 Todd Rourke 1:323/110 | |-- 325 Frank Perricone 1:325/611 X | | |--- 17 Ted Rolle 1:105/36 | | | SMH |-- 105 *none at present* | |-- 153 Eldridge Currie 1:153/962 | |-- 340 *none at present* | |-- 346 *none at present* | | | |--- 18 Christopher Baker 1:374/14 X | | [cbak.rights@opus.global.org] | | | |-- 4:97 Juan Jose Rodriguez 4:970/4 | | | |------- 285 Mike Riddle 1:285/27 X | | | SMH |-- 116 *none at present* | |-- 123 Scott Miller 1:123/416 X | |-- 135* David Bobo 1:135/110 | |-- 151 James Barrett 1:151/132 X | |-- 360 Stephen Frazier 1:360/23 X | |-- 362 Jack Whaley 1:362/940 X | |-- 365 Chris Britton 1:365/200 X | |-- 366 Rob Buckman 1:366/844 X | |-- 369 *none at present* | |-- 374 GK Pace 1:374/26 X | |-- 375 Michael Hess 1:375/48 X | |-- 378 Sydney Marcus 1:378/10 X | |-- 379 *none at present* | |-- 3608 Michael Smeby 1:3608/3 X | |-- 3636 Chris Chastain 1:3636/16 X | |-- 3647 Gale D. Wilkerson 1:3647/1 X | |-- 3649 Chris Hunter 1:3649/17 X | | |--- 19 Mike Lenker 1:106/1776 X | | | SMH |-- 106 Mike Lenker 1:106/1776 X | |-- 124 Bob Ratliff 1:124/7020 | |-- 130 Dale Hopkins 1:130/908 X | |-- 147 Bill Teasley 1:147/3660 X | |-- 170 *none at present* | |-- 382 Chuck Haynes 1:382/502 X | | |=================================================================== | | |--Z2SMH Harry Bush 2:51/2 | | | RSMH Net Sysop Address Flag | |--- 50 (Russia) Dmitry Kiselev 2:5026/3 | | | SMH |-- 5022 Dmitry Turevsky 2:5022/8 | SMH |-- 5026 Dmitry Kiselev 2:5026/3 | SMH |-- 5057 Andrey Semiuglov 2:5057/1 | | |--- 51 (Latvia) Egons Bush 2:5100/8 | | | SMH |-- 5100 Egons Bush 2:5100/8 Note: Those nodes listed with an asterisk "*" are accepting SecureMail for their Nets, but do not currently route mail from their Nets thru SecureMail channels. SecureMail Hosts are identified by the following flags in the FidoNet Nodelist: ISMH - International SecureMail Host ZSMH - Zone SecureMail Host RSMH - Region Securemail Host NSMH - Net Securemail Host SMH - SecureMail participating Node [these flags may or may not be preceded by a U in the Nodelist.] SecureMail Hosts are requested to ask their Local Coordinator for the appropriate UserFlag for their primary Node number. Those currently flying the ?SMH flag in the nodelist are show with an X by their node number. Complete information on the FidoNet SecureMail Host routing system is available by file-request or first-time download as SECUREML.ZIP from the ISMH or any of the RSMH systems. -30- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: SUPPORT the Phil Zimmerman Legal Defense Fund! iQCVAwUBL6RpdssQPBL4miT5AQF+AQP/WPyYHvYB11KYJKxem1t4bCLOC0uHovbc 6Bc5MLiiIrHQ3xEi+G7U7VMmReUZMpmX4N/Q1vGPMu1o42j5D5x9egyDvUwEV3Zs KmfqEE9y8hUXAg07t97R1g4UfhZMpm089yH3cOhOQUW2JF/j7cnhuUr72WTQi28F 9jFPxiirO2w= =5Ru3 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Christopher Baker Area: Public Key Encryption To: All 1 May 95 00:53:34 Subject: SecureMail Host Routing System info UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The FidoNet (r) SecureMail System 30 Mar 94 Copyright (C) 1994, 1995 Jim Cannell [Source: GK Pace, 1993; Christopher Baker, 1994] Introduction: This document describes the SecureMail FidoNet (r) Routing System, its Statement of Purpose, and defines the principles by which it shall be operated. It should be noted that FidoNet is a registered trademark owned by Tom Jennings, used by permission to refer to the FidoNet, a hobbyist network of amateur, independent, interconnected systems (Nodes) providing E-Mail transfer services world-wide. Definition: SecureMail can be defined as a group of FidoNet Sysops who have volunteered to provide an alternative E-Mail routing service within the FidoNet Network. The SecureMail System is a component of the FidoNet Network. SecureMail is NOT an alternative, separate, or distinct network. Statement of Purpose: The primary purpose of Securemail, and reason for its creation is the desire for providing increased privacy in the routing of FidoNet E-Mail. The term privacy as used in the transfer of E-Mail is an arbitrary one. Absolute privacy cannot be expected. The degree of privacy obtained will always be related to the procedure(s), effort used to insure privacy, and should not be expected to be absolute if data is to be communicated from one place to another. Routing of E-Mail, as compared to sending it direct, cannot be expected to have as high of a degree of privacy as might be expected when sending it direct. Those who are engaged in operating the Securemail system do so with the primary goal of insuring that all E-Mail routed thru it be afforded the highest degree of privacy technically possible. Those using the Securemail System can expect to enjoy a higher degree of privacy than other forms of routing, but should not expect absolute privacy. Functional Description: The SecureMail System is a group of individual FidoNet Sysops who have volunteered to work together to provide the SecureMail Routing Service to FidoNet Sysops. This group is organized, but does not have authoritative positions. Each SecureMail Sysop is an independent volunteer furnishing a service. There are no monetary rewards, each Sysop contributes the resources he or she uses to provide the service, including all costs incurred in providing it. The operational structure may appear to have hierarchical order and indeed it does, however such structure implements a routing matrix, not positions of authority. The SecureMail operational philosophy can be described as cooperative autocracy. Each SecureMail Sysop is an independent operator who has volunteered to assume the various responsibilities required of an organized effort. No one is compelled to participate, but participation requires the performance of certain agreed upon functions, standards, and of course interaction as a group. Most of the activities parallel or are incidental to normal FidoNet activities. Routing Hierarchy: The basic routing strategy follows the normal FidoNet pattern of routing thru Zones, Regions, Nets, to Nodes. The difference is that SecureMail traffic is routed thru SecureMail Hosts rather than the FidoNet Hosts. A SecureMail Sysop serving in each position is referred to as a Host. There are functional (not Authoritative) positions such as Zone SecureMail Host (ZSMH) Region SecureMail Host (RSMH) and Net SecureMail Host (NSMH). An International SecureMail Host (ISMH) functions as a central coordinator for this functional hierarchy and maintains the routing lists and this document of intent and mission. Note that at any given time, all positions may not be filled, due to the fact that positions are filled by those who have the means and desire to provide the service of each position. Operational Practices: Each SecureMail Host (SMH) has agreed to route E-Mail (referred to as In-Transit mail) in a manner which provides the highest degree of privacy technically possible. Some variances can be expected, as the technical characteristics of each system differ, however each SecureMail Host strives to provide the best service possible. Specific operational practices include: - In-Transit mail shall not be read. Note that some systems do not provide the ability to restrict a Sysop from viewing In-Transit mail. In such cases the Sysop makes every effort to avoid noticing the content of such E-Mail as they scan thru their message bases. - The content of In-Transit mail shall not be disclosed, or given to anyone but the addressee, except as required for routing thru the SecureMail System. - All SecureMail Hosts agree to route any In-Transit mail they receive. This includes encrypted and clear-signed traffic now refused by some systems in FidoNet. In-Transit mail that cannot be delivered shall be returned to the sender along with a brief explanation of why it could not be delivered. If no local routing via another SMH is available, the mail will be sent directly to its destination by the receiving SMH. - In-Transit mail shall not be censored. Routing of In-Transit mail shall not be refused for any reason even remotely associated to the content of such E-Mail. Note: how could it be if it isn't read in the first place? Avoidance of Liability: Those participating in the SecureMail Routing System do so to provide a service at no cost to those who choose to make use of it. There is no guarantee of performance implied nor accepted by the SecureMail System as an organization, nor by the individuals who voluntarily participate to provide this service. Those who choose to make use of this service should recognize that although we strive to provide the best service possible, we cannot and will not offer any guarantees, nor do we accept any obligation for providing any service, or the performance of any service to a defined standard. Those who provide this service specifically deny any liability for the content of In-Transit E-Mail. Any liability that may apply must rest upon the originator. It is the stated practice of those who participate to provide this service, that In-Transit E-Mail is not read. On that basis, those who participate in the SecureMail Routing System will not have knowledge of the content of In-Transit E-Mail, will not censor, make judgements as to the legality, morality, nor suitability of any In-Transit E-Mail to be routed, before during or after having any contact with it. Those who participate in the SecureMail Routing System do so for the purpose of providing a service to others using the FidoNet E-Mail System. It is specifically denied that such service is supplied for the purpose of promoting, enhancement, implementation, or aiding the accomplishment of any illegal activity. No one participating in the SecureMail Routing System will knowingly allow its use to aid, abet, or otherwise participate in illegal activities, or make use of the SecureMail System for any illegal purpose. Further it is our stated operational practice that we shall not be engaged in viewing In-Transit E-Mail for the purposes of knowing whether or not the content of such could be considered illegal, and specifically deny that we could have any such knowledge. Those engaged in SecureMail Routing are constrained by the ECPA [Electronic Communication Protection Act] and FidoNet Policy in their ultimate handling of In-Transit E-Mail in regard to disclosure. Anyone who supports the goal of E-Mail privacy and who agrees to abide by the standards herein proclaimed, may apply to act as a SecureMail Host Routing System at their own expense and without regard to In-Transit E-Mail content. A list of current SMH Nodes is contained in the file SECUREML.MAP which accompanies this document. Applications may be made via direct Netmail to the ZSMH, RSMH, or NSMH closest to your area. International applications may be sent to the ISMH as listed in the map. Most SMH Nodes are identified by the flags listed above in the FidoNet Nodelist. Any questions regarding the SecureMail Routing System may be directed to any SMH listed Node. A FidoNet Echomail conference for all participating SecureMail Hosts is available as SECUREMAIL from any listed SMH. -30- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: SUPPORT the Phil Zimmerman Legal Defense Fund! iQCVAwUBL6RpQssQPBL4miT5AQGizgP+ILkdGmRLkajlPk5T0s2d0EwaMJiK3AEP rwkTJzLnc9SjNY05l2HiZRPEwh+moEm3xSwzFIdw2zNTodoHlSMIbXAcK3kVOKUY sK1EG62M3Zv+n9si9tN6NsfC7orLK5R/ShLbZ6pRzj/sqLvBMa3M6vaVoyOi5nW3 NUll6RVf6ZA= =Hd/p -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Jim Gorges Area: Public Key Encryption To: Christopher Baker 1 May 95 08:01:08 Subject: PGPWave via FTP UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I haven't been able to read this echo for two weeks, so this may be old news. PGPWAVE version 1.08a is now available for anonymous FTP from oak.oakland.edu and its mirrors. Look in subdirectory /SimTel/msdos/offline. Jim -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Privacy - A treasured right needing protection. iQCVAwUBL6Tcs+EuDSH9lznlAQHQcgQAkGAyH15MCjCRKHHIC47cPDeZdflpqVmU dhtdpM+Yps2nSZoVpGWucwnrB77jP70kY2jKoybZqfm3azCpbBqsu4DmuC2Kwt3d 0JuTC2QUTE3i+rBvHYNMV3bvUPQ4HGS/1OmpvvYalzWDV4fH598rpkRLRzsJbp6T lGamzAZPFBM= =HjDR -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ... If at first you don't succeed, join the club. Internet: Jim.Gorges@oubbs.telecom.uoknor.edu 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Jay Banks Area: Public Key Encryption To: Ian Hebert 1 May 95 13:36:00 Subject: Send/rec PGP Msg's UpdReq IH>TA> -=> Quoting Ian Hebert to Tom Almy <=- IH>TA> IH> Actually, there are two Usenet groups, alt.anonymous and >TA> IH> alt.anonymous.messages. The idea behind these is that people can IH> We would like to get in contact with the person who is > publishing the Operating Thetans of the Church of Scientology via > anonymous remailers. Your name has come to our attention. We have Yeah, I was reading in Boardwatch or something similar, and they had arrested or put a subpena out on the guy who was posting the Scientology material. It seems to catch him they went to the anonymous re-mailer with a warrant and a couple of cops, and the re-mailer service handed over all their records to them. It seems they had the choice of handing over just the records for him, or they would take his equipment and get everybody's records in the process. Some choice. It now makes me think twice about re-mailers, as maybe they aren't so anonymous after all. TTYL -=JB=- --- * QMPro 1.0 23-8855 * People say I'm indecisive. Am I? I don't know. 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Tom Almy Area: Public Key Encryption To: Ian Hebert 1 May 95 13:13:40 Subject: Send/rec PGP Msg's UpdReq -=> Once upon a time, Ian Hebert said to Tom Almy <=- IH> The idea is to implement an electronic equivalent of the espionage IH> agents' dead drop, only going one better. With a real dead drop, IH> there was always the potential for interception as one went to collect IH> the message or instructions. With a widely-distributed electronic IH> newsgroup, like alt.anonymous messages, one can pick up or drop off IH> information from almost anywhere. Literally, there is no email IH> address to be traced. OK, so it *is* a way to foil traffic monitoring. You can neither tell who is sending the message nor to whom it is being sent. Actually, what is described is not perfect as there have been security problems with anonymous remailers, and your message is not secure (as far as knowing you've sent it) until it reaches the first remailer. It doesn't take much imagination to believe incoming traffic to all these remailers is being tapped. Tom 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: jason carr Area: Public Key Encryption To: Tom Almy 1 May 95 16:13:22 Subject: Send/rec PGP Msg's UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >> You'll find it in the docs for 2.6.2: >> use. However, do not distribute a modified version of PGP under the >> name "PGP" without first getting permission from me. Please respect >> this restriction. PGP's reputation for cryptographic integrity Hmmm. I stand corrected. Thanks for pinning it down for me. :) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Cryptography and echomail aren't mutually exclusive. iQCVAwUBL6Vrr0jhGzlN9lCZAQHFtgP/arWkI4sjQAChIjBpv7bfP/OYxQvitV3l 8HYgnQzX+W9FKfdgwnOjL11d8QBUNtk7I9YPApFIRxPrcg224bC8ysf2s5PLl2rz MorovWFQ0QXE0Shcb3n4kRqhxjhaOGfVb3Z4fiqfKG6vzDP2AuhYed8BmIgJLYmC d2FVXplQs6s= =YiSJ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ... Key fingerprint = 60 97 B2 AE 7D 90 11 2F 05 1C 35 98 E9 B9 83 61 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718