From: Glen Todd Area: Public Key Encryption To: gk pace 19 Dec 94 09:18:00 Subject: A Good Idea! UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Bright the day, gk! Saturday December 17 1994 19:38, gk pace wrote to All: gp> With the threat of prosecution for Phil Zimmermann becoming imminent, I gp> would like to suggest an effective means of protest. As many of us as gp> can write coherent messages should send PGP SIGNED statements of gp> support for Phil Zimmermann to president@whitehouse.gov. gp> This would have several effects: It would show support for freedom of gp> encryption. It would show that people are actually using PGP in their gp> daily lives. And it would put our names on the line; we're giving gp> *proof* that we personally sent those messages. (And for exactly that gp> reason, be sure not to admit to anything illegal or say anything that gp> might be considered a threat of violence.) I like it. My only question would be an address for those of us who don't have direct internet hookups. (Like me -- grin.) Wind to thy wings, Glen Fruit Loops are gay Cheerios. - --- GoldED 2.42.G0615+ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Joe McCarthy would have loved the Clipper chip. iQCVAwUBLvWyyR1IzyRmn+dFAQEfcAQAhY3t4iLHDlAglU/FqGGW6k5dzCm91/46 XOZ8cSw1y2T0/5huFW0g+7LgTSC+7N9NyB0o1OB3jz87DpNNyNg2QCNX8z0quSxj IRkgdz3B6k8CF/na7p8JRmA7ZxeY786Suw+0z3TtERSvsVJOI1fbnf7QfbUuhgXH jqT1VEGBTsY= =roPD -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Bill Brown Area: Public Key Encryption To: Christopher Baker 20 Dec 94 13:17:00 Subject: The reverse switch on my floppy :) UpdReq Hello Christopher, Thursday December 15 1994 11:01, Christopher Baker wrote to All: CB> BACKUP! BACKUP! BACKUP! [clear?] [grin] I just did (again.) But I figured I'd mention it "one more time" for those of us (MOST of us) who get lazy from time to time...those of us from the "It'll never happen to me" school. Of course, I ONLY backed up my PGP keys. :( Bill Brown 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Mike Haglund Area: Public Key Encryption To: All 21 Dec 94 15:04:36 Subject: 2048 bit keys UpdReq Remember, on the 1st of January, PGP 2.6.2 will accept and generate 2047 or 2048 bit public keys. You could set your clock ahead to that date and make one now... Also, it seems, a key generated this way can be read by 2.6.2 even if Jan 1, 95 hasn't passed yet. Try it. Mike Haglund 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: John Schofield Area: Public Key Encryption To: Glen Todd 20 Dec 94 23:11:56 Subject: A Good Idea! UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- --====-- gp> With the threat of prosecution for Phil Zimmermann becoming imminent, I gp> would like to suggest an effective means of protest. As many of us as gp> can write coherent messages should send PGP SIGNED statements of gp> support for Phil Zimmermann to president@whitehouse.gov. GT> I like it. My only question would be an address for those of us who GT> don't have direct internet hookups. (Like me -- grin.) You can send Internet messages through Fidonet. Send mail with the "TO" field "UUCP", set the Fidonet address to an Internet gateway, and make the first line of the message "To: " followed by the Internet address. Make sure you skip a line, and then start your message. To find an Internet gateway, search for the "GUUCP" flag in the nodelist. Any system with that flag should accept the type of message I described above. The default gateway is 1:1/31, although you should probably use one closer to you. John -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.7 Comment: Call 818-345-8640 voice for info on Keep Out magazine. iQCVAwUBLvfUOGj9fvT+ukJdAQF/8gQAvjdHfq8KqiiQ1O1gYIrtq10st4Cln2m5 ECYnU/XcTUknywlfUiO9+B6RtZ5WnWi58bBJNJV50RKhBkkY4LhktjTQt3e/R/aB i6myv/LGTgvavL2QPDvn4q2PzolrUGmnM8Q9App2ha3nKRRGhPKnht8lGE7j3CHJ S+r4fGK9MkM= =ibuo -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- **EZ-PGP v1.07 ... Booze and math don't mix. Don't drink and derive. 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: gk pace Area: Public Key Encryption To: Glen Todd 21 Dec 94 18:30:48 Subject: Re: A Good Idea! UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In a message dated: 19 Dec 94, you were quoted as saying: GT> Bright the day, gk! GT> Saturday December 17 1994 19:38, gk pace wrote to All: GT> gp> With the threat of prosecution for Phil Zimmermann becoming imminent, I GT> gp> would like to suggest an effective means of protest. As many of us as GT> gp> can write coherent messages should send PGP SIGNED statements of GT> gp> support for Phil Zimmermann to president@whitehouse.gov. GT> I like it. My only question would be an address for those of us who don't GT> have direct internet hookups. (Like me -- grin.) GT> Wind to thy wings, GT> Glen Easy enough... Address the Fidonet message (header) to uucp at 1:1/31 which is the Fidonet <==> Internet Gateway. The FIRST Line of the message text should be: To: president@whitehouse.gov There should be at least one blank line following it, as I've done above. Your message text INCLUDING the signature block, etc. must follow the blank line... Do not wrap the signature around the first line, which will be the Internet address line... Properly done, the message will go to 1/31 to be reformatted as an Internet message, and be delivered to the President at the White House. Failures should result in a returned message to you, with some cryptic explainations as to why it was not delivered. Anyone in Fidonet should be able to do this easy enough... -gk -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Fight to keep the Basic Human Right of Privacy! iQCVAwUBLvi6oY9JNB7uOPtBAQGhNgP/eStryt+SbYFG2lMt8LJGORUqPxUYkFtQ x+cXvmsYRtuNsW4e+Yg678RUBWWT3/3CLFIcW1u8DsDr9UB1bL7kJP8eHmlWWcJI mskRBJoyqTBOFywLb4kXYR1PecCcuvRHmHJCrTOL0T9ueXoewyrgMlXhdnpmhTJ8 /KG3oltnFtU= =mk4k -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Brian Giroux Area: Public Key Encryption To: Michael Bauser 18 Dec 94 18:46:00 Subject: CERTIFICATION QUESTION UpdReq MICHAEL BAUSER pounded out random words to BRIAN GIROUX, and it looked something like this: MB>In the end, the only way to truly be certain, of course, is to have >a trusted signature (yours or somebody else's) on Scott's key. Calling >Scott up to verify his identity is NOT enough verification to rate you >putting a verifying signature on his key, though. Yet. So there's no way that I can know that the message you wrote to me and signed is really from you until I meet you in person, check your driver's licence and two major credit cards, speak to your mother, and check the mole on you left shoulder blade :) Brian Giroux True-Tech Computer Supplies --- 1st 1.11 #1757 IPL0006 Mouseman II serial Cdn$78.00 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: n8642420@rowlf.cc.wwu.edu Area: Public Key Encryption To: All 19 Dec 94 00:24:56 Subject: Encryption to be banned soon? Huh?? UpdReq * Original Message Posted via A-SOC-CIV-LIB * Date: 22 OCT 94 14:48:58 * From: n8642420@rowlf.cc.wwu.edu @ 1:999/9998 * To: All * Forwarded by: Mike Lenker @ 1:106/1776 * Message text was not edited! @EID:174a 1d567600 @PID: WILDUUCP! v1.10d Reg @MSGID: 1:999/9998 1ECF742C Saw this on alt.scanner or some such. ---------------------------- Xref: henson rec.radio.shortwave:42246 rec.radio.scanner:14786 alt.radio.scanner:14081 Newsgroups: rec.radio.shortwave,rec.radio.scanner,alt.radio.scanner From: crisp@netcom.com (Richard Crisp) Subject: FBI director says they may pursue outlawing non snoopable crypto! Message-ID: Organization: Netcom Online Communications Services (408-241-9760 login: guest) Date: Fri, 21 Oct 1994 04:49:05 GMT Lines: 83 We all knew it was coming, here it is: ----- Washington, DC -- If private encryption schemes interfere with the FBI's ability to wiretap, they could be outlawed, according to recent comments made by the agency's Director Louis Freeh. Freeh told attendees here at the recent conference on Global Cryptography that if the Administration's Escrowed Encryption System, otherwise known as the Clipper Chip, failed to gain acceptance, giving way to private encryption technologies, he would have no choice but to press Congress to pass legislation that provided law enforcement access to *all* encrypted communications. If, after having pushed Digital Telephony through Congress (which hadn't yet happened when Freeh spoke at this conference), all the Bureau ended up with during wiretaps were the scratchy hiss of digital one's and zeros being hurled back and forth, Freeh made it clear that he would seek a congressional mandate to solve the problem. In other words: Roll your own coded communications; go to jail. Freeh's comments, made during a question and answer session at the conference, are the first public statements made by an Administration official hinting at a future governmental policy that could result in the banning of non-governmental, unbreakable encryption methods. Freeh's remarks were first reported on the WELL by MacWorld writer and author Steven Levy. The FBI confirmed those statements to Dispatch. The Administration, however, continues to state that it has no plans to outlaw or place any restrictions on private encryption methods. A White House official said there are "absolutely no plans" on the table to regulate domestic encryption "at the present time." He wouldn't comment, however, as to whether the Administration would back an FBI attempt for such legislation. "Freeh doesn't seem to need a lot of White House support," to get things done, the official said. FBI sources said any moves to approach Congress about regulating private encryption are "so far out there" time wise, that the subject "doesn't merit much ink," as one FBI source put it. "We've got to make sure the telcos rig up their current networks according to the new [digital wiretap] law before we go worrying about private encryption stuff," he said. An FBI spokesman confirmed Freeh's position that the Bureau would aggressively seek to maintain what the spokesman called "law and order objectives." If that meant getting laws passed so that the Bureau's "authorized wiretap activities" couldn't be thwarted by "criminal elements using non-governmental" encryption schemes, "then that's what he [Freeh] would do," the spokesman said. When the Administration went public with its Clipper Chip policy, it stressed that the program would be mandatory. Many civil liberties groups wondered out loud how long it would be before private encryption was banned altogether. The White House, anxious for the public to buy into its one-trick pony the Clipper Chip, said that wouldn't happen. But the Administration hedged its bet. Buried in the background briefing papers of the original Clipper announcement, is a statement that the White House doesn't consider the public's right to use private encryption methods are protected anywhere in the Constitution. @PATH: 999/9998 106/98 1776 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: raph@kiwi.CS.Berkeley.EDU Area: Public Key Encryption To: All 19 Dec 94 00:25:14 Subject: Re: Encryption to be banned soon? Huh??UpdReq * Original Message Posted via A-SOC-CIV-LIB * Date: 22 OCT 94 21:38:38 * From: raph@kiwi.CS.Berkeley.EDU @ 1:999/9998 * To: All * Forwarded by: Mike Lenker @ 1:106/1776 * Message text was not edited! @EID:d407 1d56acc0 @PID: WILDUUCP! v1.10d Reg @MSGID: 1:999/9998 14AAA484 In article , EriC wrote: >>Saw this on alt.scanner or some such. > >---------------------------- >>From: crisp@netcom.com (Richard Crisp) >Subject: FBI director says they may pursue outlawing non snoopable crypto! >Message-ID: >Organization: Netcom Online Communications Services (408-241-9760 login: guest) >Date: Fri, 21 Oct 1994 04:49:05 GMT >Lines: 83 >>We all knew it was coming, here it is: >[ CyberWire Dispatch article deleted ] Please give attribution where it is due. The article you posted was written by Brock Meeks, and distributed through his CyberWire Dispatch. This article is at http://cyberwerks.com:70/0h/cyberwire/cwd/cwd.94.10.20.html Other articles by Brock can be found at: http://cyberwerks.com:70/0h/cyberwire/cwd/ This story needs coverage, but give attribuation, please. Raph @PATH: 999/9998 106/98 1776 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Brian Giroux Area: Public Key Encryption To: Wes Perkhiser 18 Dec 94 20:19:00 Subject: KEY REVOKE UpdReq WES PERKHISER pounded out random words to BRIAN GIROUX, and it looked something like this: WP>Second, restore your PUBRING.PGP and SECRING.PGP files from your normal backups >that you do to make life easier after a disk crash. Backups? Yeah! That was going to be my NEXT step :( WP>If you are stuck with the revokation, just chalk it up to experience. I hate this kind of experience. Brian Giroux True-Tech Computer Supplies * 1st 1.11 #1757 * MXUS288F Sportster 28800 V.34 fax modem extl Cdn$489.00 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Lawrence Garvin Area: Public Key Encryption To: Wes Landaker 21 Dec 94 05:21:20 Subject: legal PGP UpdReq Wes Landaker said in a message to Ian Lin: WL> I see the bug in the Pentium--it's been proved--it's a WL> solid, rational, acknowledged flaw. With PGP, however, the WL> only "flaw" is a whole lot of rumors going around about how WL> "unsafe" it is. :) Here's one to think about. The flaw in the Pentium is a fourth-digit of accuracy mathematical error. Insomuch as PGP keys are a function of the multiplication of prime numbers, -large- prime numbers at that... What are the odds that a Pentium-based system might -incorrectly- cypher or decypher a PGP key due to a mathematical error? Lawrence.Garvin@f6018.n106.z1.fidonet.org 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Lawrence Garvin Area: Public Key Encryption To: Shawn McMahon 21 Dec 94 05:22:50 Subject: legal PGP UpdReq Shawn McMahon said in a message to Zorch Frezberg: SM> The Pentium bug is beyond obscure; even people doing a lot SM> of floating point ops aren't likely to hit it. SM> Read the latest Byte for details. Read the lastest InfoWorld. The bug exists in the fourth -digit- of accuracy. Not the fourth decimal place... but the fourth -digit-... Furthermore, the author of that arcticle displayed three -separate- computations which resulted in significant discripancies at the fourth digit. Now.. given Intel's "claim".... what do you suppose the odds are of -one- person creating -three- errors in the -same- digit.. for the -same- article.. in the -same- week. That, to me, is not obscure. :) Lawrence.Garvin@f6018.n106.z1.fidonet.org 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718