From: jason carr Area: Public Key Encryption To: All 3 Dec 94 20:13:18 Subject: A .bat to call PGP from BWave. UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I bought a [dinosaur] laptop last month and started doing the mail via BWave olr rather than through timEd. For the last week or so I've been using PGPBLU25 to interface BW <-> PGP. It is an excellent interface, to be sure. But I had previously been thrashing about with timEd/PGP and had kludged together CALLQ.BAT (posted here) that offered encryption, decryption, and clearsigning. So-o-o-o-o-o-o, I altered that .bat to perform the same rudimentary actions when called from BW. I'm using it to make and clearsign this post, so it would appear to be at least minimally functional. I will post the script in the next msg. jc NOTE: The .bat also contains routines to encrypt msgs to multiple recipients, because that fits my particular needs. These routines rely on the presence of environmental variables in called ECHO and FRIENDS. If you don't need these options, feel free to hack them out. But it =is= an interesting idea... You can have encrypted echos (like PGP_ECHO) or even totally encrypted networks... Hmmmmm. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: PGP_ECHO: CypherEcho to the gods... iQCVAwUBLuEK/UjhGzlN9lCZAQFsNQP+I1VfZ7yVSj68EUZUnAXhYoAOj9QsDgMP +DVxDHCHBCzuwqwPh6hZxZZbNC9zvCKyJiFLXqc+YZ6rwM03EnjcwPwNG8ClrZIx J7QblZV/CYuNrrgkrvbHhhz5do5ssSltrjTtj0bAFVcwQSX9/G/M2zlriDoVxpir nGlQio+B8n0= =x47/ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ... Key fingerprint = 60 97 B2 AE 7D 90 11 2F 05 1C 35 98 E9 B9 83 61 // BlueWave > BW-PGP.BAT < PGP 2.6.2 ` 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Jim Grubs, W8GRT Area: Public Key Encryption To: Mike Riddle 1 Dec 94 14:31:06 Subject: A question UpdReq > In a message to All on Nov 24 94 at 04:06, Ron Bigalke wrote: > RB> A few weeks ago I ask a question in this echo but never saw > RB> a response if indeed there was one. > RB> So at the risk of annoying a few here, can anyone tell me > RB> why Canadians have access to the US version of PGP? > RB> Opinions are nice, but I'd like a reference or two of some > RB> treaty or something. Thanks for the time. > Since the reason comes from our Congress and your Parliament, it may not > be logical, :-), but the reason is that the U.S. statute and regulations > on International Trafficing in Arms specifically allow export to Canada > without license. I imagine there's a treaty or executive agreement > behind it, but the documents I've seen don't mention it. Regardless of the actual enabling documentation, I'll wager the NORAD treaty is the root of it. Sincerely, Jim Grubs, W8GRT 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: jason carr Area: Public Key Encryption To: All 3 Dec 94 20:21:36 Subject: BW-PGP.BAT UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- @ECHO OFF rem ----------------------------------------------------------- rem BW-PGP.BAT, a way to make BWave call PGP for encryption, rem decryption, clearsigning, and viewing. Dissect, hack, correct rem and distribute as desired. I'm sure it needs lotsa help; let rem me know the fixes so I can update my copy, too. rem rem This .bat requires the following: rem * Dos 6.XX, b/c of the CHOICE command, or GET or something rem to make the crude menu in the :pgptest label. rem * The "editor" called in BWAVE Directories must be this .bat rem Like so: "C:\BW\BW-PGP.BAT @F" rem * When replying to a msg that has some form of PGP in it, the rem msg must first be (S)aved as BW.PGP in the directory where rem BW-PGP.BAT is. rem rem NOTES: rem You will need to change the .bat to reflect your own directory rem structure, and choice of .txt editors. Qedit (Q.EXE) is the rem editor being called here. Insert your fave-o-rite editor rem wherever Q is called. rem BW-PGP.BAT is a mutant strain of CALLQ.BAT, which did the same rem thing for timEd. rem ----------------------------------------------------------- rem Note: The following section has been moved to the autoexec.bat rem ----------------------------------------------------------- rem Sets echo respondents in one variable (multiple recipients) rem 4df65099=me! rem 79410d5d=ls rem 98cbe9bd=th rem 01dd44a9=dh rem 08c756dd=ak rem ----------------------------------------------------------- rem set echo=0x4df6 0x7941 0x98cb 0x01dd 0x08c7 rem set friends= rem ----------------------------------------------------------- rem Because of a strangeness in clearsigning, the name of rem the file passed to this .bat must be changed. DOS chokes rem when you try to REN a passed parameter (like %1), thus rem the COPYing gymnastics. rem ----------------------------------------------------------- copy %1 c:\bw\bw.msg if exist %1 del %1 cls rem ------------------------------------------------------------ rem Needs to know whether to look for TIMED.PGP or TIMED.MSG rem because TIMED.MSG has indented quotes that choke PGP rem ------------------------------------------------------------ if exist bw.pgp goto unpack goto edit :unpack del bw.msg pgp bw.pgp -o bw.msg rem ------------------------------------------------------------ rem If the decrypt fails (sig or post), BW-PGP goes to edit rem TIMED.PGP, as the sig could've just gotten grunged. Of course, rem if you can't decrypt an encrypted post, this .bat won't do you rem any good, anyhow. rem ------------------------------------------------------------ if errorlevel 1 goto fail goto edit :fail pause cls echo PGP failed! Editing armor block... pause q bw.pgp goto unpack :edit rem ------------------------------------------------------------ rem Actual editing happens here. rem ------------------------------------------------------------ q.exe bw.msg cls rem ------------------------------------------------------------ rem Poor Speller? rem ------------------------------------------------------------ rem rem This option is temporarily REMarked out, although GET still rem asks the ???. Comment out the whole section if you don't rem want it. I'm using it to maintain the same feel as the rem version I run on my BBS. rem get c "Spellcheck?" yn rem if "%get%" == "N" goto pgptest rem if "%get%" == "Y" goto spell rem :spell rem d:\spell\ss bw.msg :pgptest rem ------------------------------------------------------------ rem Ahhh, the goodies! rem The [e] choice invokes the %echo% environmental variable rem [F] invokes the %friends% environmental variable rem ------------------------------------------------------------ cls echo C == Clearsign echo E == encrypt to the trusted participants in pgp_Echo echo N == No pgp echo Y == encrypt - specifY user id or key id when prompted echo F == encrypt to Friends echo. get c "Choice? " ynecf if "%get%" == "C" goto sign if "%get%" == "E" goto group if "%get%" == "N" goto end if "%get%" == "Y" goto show if "%get%" == "F" goto friends :show rem ------------------------------------------------------------ rem Displays keys on keyring, in case you can't remember. rem ------------------------------------------------------------ cls pgp -kvm rem ------------------------------------------------------------ rem Radix-64 encryption rem ------------------------------------------------------------ pgp bw.msg -ea -o bw.msg goto switch :sign rem ------------------------------------------------------------ rem I can't seem to get the -o switch to work while clearsigning, rem hence all the file renaming excitement. I'm not saying it rem can't be done, only that I'm not going to wrestle with it. rem ------------------------------------------------------------ pgp -sta +clearsig=on bw.msg del bw.msg ren bw.asc bw.msg goto switch :group rem ------------------------------------------------------------ rem This will encrypt the msg with all the hex IDs in %ECHO% rem ------------------------------------------------------------ pgp bw.msg %echo% -ea -o bw.msg goto switch :friends rem ------------------------------------------------------------ rem This will encrypt the msg with all the hex IDs in %FRIENDS% rem ------------------------------------------------------------ pgp bw.msg %friends% -ea -o bw.msg goto switch :switch rem ------------------------------------------------------------ rem This section is for adding anything you want to the end of rem the reply. I add in my key "fingerprint," stored in FINGER. rem ------------------------------------------------------------ copy bw.msg + finger goto end :duhhh rem ------------------------------------------------------------ rem Duhhhhhh.... Forgot to save the non-quoted ver. No problem, rem will just recycle back to timEd so you can try again. rem ------------------------------------------------------------ cls echo. echo You forgot to (W)rite timEd.pgp!!! echo. pause goto end :end if exist *.bak del *.bak if exist bw.pgp del bw.pgp rem ----------------------------------------------------------- rem Here we get the file back to the original name BW gave it rem ----------------------------------------------------------- copy bw.msg %1 del bw.msg rem Have a beer. Get some sleep, too. rem rem jason carr rem the Penny University BBS rem Irving, Tx 214.65.0382 rem 1:124/3208 rem 88:214/109 rem 99:817/0 rem 99:817/1 rem 150:151/110 rem 250:214/100 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: PGP_ECHO: CypherEcho to the gods... iQCVAwUBLuEL1EjhGzlN9lCZAQGoqwP8Cdt2JYXXNfVCugXKj/77J9PoLVn32DaI x62igvoKm5fUalZTH4Yy9jcXUC6VRQY1xvpfw5tEswIs/kRaH066AIQlAl1uNtLU DSE/ikVYAheS1D9LdrGVydr3wGrd8Qu3cGZF2BzDxDFi0ZnM5hAJxosFwitpySUO wbdSxX6Dm5E= =uq7S -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ... Key fingerprint = 60 97 B2 AE 7D 90 11 2F 05 1C 35 98 E9 B9 83 61 // BlueWave > BW-PGP.BAT < PGP 2.6.2 ` 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: John Schofield Area: Public Key Encryption To: Christopher Baker 3 Dec 94 21:18:42 Subject: Call Security shareware for telephone secure sessionsUpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- --== How is Philip Zimmerman's voice encryption program coming along? CB> haven't heard. Something called Nautilus (NAUTILUS.ZIP 42146 bytes) claims to be VoicePGP, with the crypto as yet un-implemented. They're still working on the crypto. In other words, Nautilus turns your computer into a regular telephone, not a secure telephone. Available for FREQ just like always. John -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.7 Comment: Call 818-345-8640 voice for info on Keep Out magazine. iQCVAwUBLuFNsmj9fvT+ukJdAQFX2wP/UAixRLwV/g9/NGeaXqCZevRNu6pZZ8au I7sTweKkT/xhuwx4ozv/mxpEvjuUpH0g/HO1Xpd7T96XrAiyjXB9PYdv57NK1CNP mu0shTwTtP1CqkjoUQfhK4rVj+nAisjlgj+p6e8PwQhbLhhux9Gg3xYx6T8Bw4xO vqFIgYzh/T4= =JJxz -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- **EZ-PGP v1.07 ... I think therefore I am...dangerous. 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Christopher Baker Area: Public Key Encryption To: Gordon Campbell 4 Dec 94 00:47:42 Subject: Re: Call Security shareware for telephone secure sessionsUpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In a message dated: 01 Dec 94, Gordon Campbell was quoted as saying: GC> * 30 Nov 23:01:28 BINK Intro: #&dN$T.bRU%qtj7p6E{" GC> 7krZmd GC> 8Xyj ! 30 Nov 23:02:19 BINK No YOOHOO/2U2 GC> I've freq'd from you before with no problems at all. Any ideas? line noise? hard to say. it has been freqed several times so it was probably just one of those transients in the wacky world of BBSing. [grin] TTFN. Chris -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: PGP 2.6.2 is LEGAL in Zone 1! So USE it! [grin] iQCVAwUBLuFYA8sQPBL4miT5AQEj5AP+IsKVOh/htBYWYQwbCmqZ6GvOkGKCgibg Ho9Z9nkKLu1cKtWRy8yrO3hq3bTVvmaxiS8awGDcj/OwU5yvly6Vu5i79ngoix06 73nqpLigeEqBwgrZA8xbhJGtVmhgGwDPwVF00pBAEav7wLy2pju3fK97R/HzxTlp /z2+NRdB2J8= =4W9o -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: jason carr Area: Public Key Encryption To: All 3 Dec 94 20:28:24 Subject: CALLQ.BAT UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- @ECHO OFF cls :: ----------------------------------------------------- :: CALLQ.BAT, a way to make timEd call PGP for encryption, :: decryption, clearsigning, and viewing. jason carr 1:124/3208 :: This .bat requires the following: :: 1) Dos 6.XX, b/c of the CHOICE command, or GET or something :: 2) TILDE, a file with two tildes in it :: 3) TEARLINE, like so, named differently for each network :: ===TEARLINE=== :: --- pgp .bat :: * Origin: FREQ JASONKEY.ASC 214.650.0382 (1:124/3208) :: ============== :: 4) The "editor" defined in timed.cfg must call this .bat :: "Editor d:\squish\callq.bat" :: 5) If PGP is invoked for a given msg, it must first be (W)ritten :: as TIMED.PGP in the directory where timEd is. This can be made :: the default in TIMED.CFG by using, for example: :: "WriteName d:\squish\timed.pgp" :: :: NOTE: Older vers of DOS may choke on the :: markers. You can :: replace them with REM. :: ----------------------------------------------------- :: Note: The following section has been moved to the .bat that :: calls timEd, which in turn calls CALLQ.BAT :: ------------------------------------------------------------- :: Sets echo respondents in one variable (multiple recipients) :: 4df65099=me! :: 79410d5d=ls :: 98cbe9bd=th :: 01dd44a9=dh :: 08c756dd=ak :: ------------------------------------------------------------- ::set echo=0x4df6 0x7941 0x98cb 0x01dd 0x08c7 :: ------------------------------------------------------------- :: Needs to know whether to look for TIMED.PGP or TIMED.MSG :: because TIMED.MSG has indented quotes that choke PGP :: ------------------------------------------------------------- if exist timed.pgp goto unpack goto edit :view :: ------------------------------------------------------------- :: Simply views the signed or encrypted msg, and returns to timEd. :: Msg reply is aborted. :: ------------------------------------------------------------- if not exist timed.pgp goto duhhh pgp -m timed.pgp pause del timed.pgp del timed.msg goto end :unpack if not exist timed.pgp goto duhhh del timed.msg pgp timed.pgp -o timed.msg :: ------------------------------------------------------------- :: If the decrypt fails (sig or post), CALLQ goes to edit :: TIMED.PGP, as the sig could've just gotten grunged. Of course, :: if you can't decrypt an encrypted post, this .bat won't do you :: any good, anyhow. :: ------------------------------------------------------------- if errorlevel 1 goto fail goto edit :fail pause cls echo PGP failed! Editing armor block... pause q timed.pgp goto unpack :edit :: ------------------------------------------------------------- :: TIMETAG is a tagline util written by Richard Coffee. :: ------------------------------------------------------------- if exist timed.pgp goto edit2 timedtag d:\fd\tag /l25 if errorlevel 1 pause :: ------------------------------------------------------------- :: Actual editing happens here. :: ------------------------------------------------------------- :edit2 q.exe timed.msg cls :: ------------------------------------------------------------- :: Poor Speller? :: ------------------------------------------------------------- get c "Spellcheck?" yn if "%get%" == "N" goto pgptest if "%get%" == "Y" goto spell :spell d:\spell\ss timed.msg :pgptest :: ------------------------------------------------------------- :: Ahhh, the goodies! :: The [e] choice invokes the %echo% environmental variable :: ------------------------------------------------------------- cls echo C == Clearsign echo E == encrypt to the trusted participants in pgp_Echo echo N == No pgp echo Y == encrypt - specifY user id or key id when prompted echo F == encrypt to Friends echo. get c "Choice? " ynecf if "%get%" == "C" goto sign if "%get%" == "E" goto group if "%get%" == "N" goto end if "%get%" == "Y" goto show if "%get%" == "F" goto friends :show :: ------------------------------------------------------------- :: Displays keys on keyring, in case you can't remember. :: ------------------------------------------------------------- cls pgp -kvm :: ------------------------------------------------------------- :: Radix-64 encryption :: ------------------------------------------------------------- pgp timed.msg -ea -o timed.msg goto switch :sign :: ------------------------------------------------------------- :: I can't seem to get the -o switch to work while clearsigning, :: hence all the file renaming excitement. :: ------------------------------------------------------------- pgp -sta +clearsig=on timed.msg del timed.msg ren timed.asc timed.msg del timed.asc goto switch :group :: ------------------------------------------------------------- :: This will encrypt the msg with all the hex IDs in %ECHO% :: ------------------------------------------------------------- pgp timed.msg %echo% -ea -o timed.msg goto switch :friends :: ------------------------------------------------------------- :: This will encrypt the msg with all the hex IDs in %FRIENDS% :: ------------------------------------------------------------- pgp timed.msg %friends% -ea -o timed.msg goto switch :switch :: ------------------------------------------------------------- :: Now THIS is where it gets weird. TimEd puts the origin and tear :: in the post =before= you edit, so if you encrypt it'll be :: hidden. TEARLINE contains a tearline (surprise) and an origin. :: tilde contains two consecutive tildes, or timEd will wrap your :: block and decrypt/sig-verification will fail. :: :: You can go straight to :fido if you are not running PGP in any :: othernets :: ------------------------------------------------------------- cls get c "{F}ido {D}hy or {C}IA origin?" fdc if "%get%" == "C" goto cia if "%get%" == "D" goto dhy if "%get%" == "F" goto fido :: ------------------------------------------------------------- :: Appends CIA origin :: ------------------------------------------------------------- :cia copy tilde + timed.msg + tearline.cia + tilde fini del timed.msg ren fini timed.msg goto end :: ------------------------------------------------------------- :: Appends DhY origin :: ------------------------------------------------------------- :dhy copy tilde + timed.msg + tearline.dhy + tilde fini del timed.msg ren fini timed.msg goto end :: ------------------------------------------------------------- :: Appends Fido origin :: ------------------------------------------------------------- :fido copy tilde + timed.msg + tearline + tilde fini del timed.msg ren fini timed.msg goto end :duhhh :: ------------------------------------------------------------- :: Duhhhhhh.... Forgot to save the non-quoted ver. No problem, :: will just recycle back to timEd so you can try again. :: ------------------------------------------------------------- cls echo. echo You forgot to (W)rite timEd.pgp!!! echo. pause goto end :end if exist *.bak del *.bak if exist Timed.pgp del timed.pgp if exist timed.asc del timed.asc set echo= :: Have a beer. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: PGP_ECHO: CypherEcho to the gods... iQCVAwUBLuEMwEjhGzlN9lCZAQHS7gP9F8x9aMp5ymZm3QPlD/XkoqCnzATCH7Lp B3G3xQzp4LMJHG4DHkMqjHRfCWibYU/dkyq7Iap4smJWn/0HXM5FiDrYOAeZXqHB OhRrYVfqSU7GfVRIBnJ58heBY4bZjeeV8fChMtlK3HSc3Kla778WFXxiMJ7v0Ty3 cStOVSrsicc= =36Ah -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ... Key fingerprint = 60 97 B2 AE 7D 90 11 2F 05 1C 35 98 E9 B9 83 61 // BlueWave > BW-PGP.BAT < PGP 2.6.2 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: John Schofield Area: Public Key Encryption To: jason carr 3 Dec 94 21:18:40 Subject: cypherpunks UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- --====-- JS> There's an IMPORTANT note you guys should realize about the list. JS> This only applies if you get your Cypherpunks feed from me or JS> Christopher Baker (because he gets his from me). Because of the nature JS> of my Internet link, the list is READ-ONLY. Any message you post in jc> Understood. And I've let my downlinks know that's the deal. Thanks jc> for making this available to us. No problem, Jason--I'm glad to help out. John -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.7 Comment: Call 818-345-8640 voice for info on Keep Out magazine. iQCVAwUBLuFMu2j9fvT+ukJdAQGm8gQAqOdXYKLoU+9LpEdG8laVKR5mJo5nCvh6 2Ye2TelP8DOo2QbH+1duz/4I/kwISGCnWyYgPmDLJtg/EAW/9Dki/uTUbQfrsmyA 1UQ/Te9ex4x6CujyR8jtyNbvB1N+KlUTGhQUOnrjadmts023Zi3j0xUxDL3AE4jd Wtd5556FWtM= =Jw27 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- **EZ-PGP v1.07 ... "When cryptography is outlawed, bayl bhgynjf jvyy unir cevinpl." 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Christopher Baker Area: Public Key Encryption To: Jason Carr 4 Dec 94 22:22:38 Subject: Re: cypherpunks UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In a message dated: 03 Dec 94, Jason Carr was quoted as saying: JC> After seeing this list, it looks like I need to rescind my feed JC> request to you and swap over to john. You're getting the feed from JC> him, right? correct. let me know via Netmail when to shut it down from here to you. TTFN. Chris -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: PGP 2.6.2 is LEGAL in Zone 1! So USE it! [grin] iQCVAwUBLuKHgMsQPBL4miT5AQGXYQP/Wuy2zCVARUyDg57amPoH+5GtYEY1T3nE XX2Ck5bzEU98s6FlDLUCRoFb//wppYmBoOekmwf/AuBeB+EG9uFSDtWL5oJJWnt2 iP2psrVprklzUiJ77RZ4XuXcRT5zQTHCg4P2NhV3+ExgqcK74xEInoDQz7ibUnJj og6XNMaVP2g= =4124 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: John Schofield Area: Public Key Encryption To: All 3 Dec 94 14:34:00 Subject: Electronic Privacy BBS List ApplicationUpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- This is a SysOp application to have your BBS listed in the Electronic Privacy BBS List. The list is maintained by John Schofield, SysOp of the Sprawl BBS. Any BBS with a substantial focus on anonymity, digital cash, electronic privacy, electronic civil liberties, or data encryption is eligible (and encouraged) to submit an entry for the list. It's fine if electronic privacy is not the *primary* focus of your BBS, as long as it is a focus. Please fill out the following information completely. You can return this form by file-attach or routed netmail to Fidonet 1:102/903, send it as private e-mail to the SysOp of the Sprawl BBS at (818) 342-5127, fax it to (818) 342-5127, send it through the Internet to ac086@lafn.org, or (last resort) mail it to: P.O. Box 571312 Tarzana, CA 91357-1312 USA If you have any questions, feel free to ask through any of the methods above, or call (818) 345-8640 voice during normal (Pacific Time) business hours. =========================================================================== BBS Name : SysOp's Name (or pseudonym) : Year and month BBS started : BBS Location (City and state, *not* mailing address) : BBS Phone Number(s): Number of Lines : Modem type(s) : Lowest BPS accepted (Are 300 or 1200 BPS callers welcome?) : Network memberships (include addresses) : BBS Software : Cost (include time and download limits) : Short Description (75-word limit) : =========================================================================== -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.7 Comment: Call 818-345-8640 voice for info on Keep Out magazine. iQCVAwUBLuDxZWj9fvT+ukJdAQGtVgP6AtvNeIEgpiI4jRDhN4gB3So6p19QpFeH UqoWiVGsAyi2WqF1ectp4hKImKlOzPt9Y9ORU9xeq08uCTzW84569BSCwlp8shOd 7ui9g++k8SfnNRmRiOis97Zn0pZIeHRhWV0rbUQ+U+RsCaKStSS8vdeA1/iDKjZZ 1UbI7biyrZs= =/O2L -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- **EZ-PGP v1.07 ... Booze and math don't mix. Don't drink and derive. 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: John Schofield Area: Public Key Encryption To: All 3 Dec 94 14:34:00 Subject: Electronic Privacy BBS List Posting UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In the messages following this one, you should see a BBS application to list your system in the Electronic Privacy BBS List, and the list itself. At present, there are only six systems in the list. It's a bit of a "toy" right now. However, I hope the list will grow quite a bit in the future. Any questions or comments are welcome, of course. John -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.7 Comment: Call 818-345-8640 voice for info on Keep Out magazine. iQCVAwUBLuDxKmj9fvT+ukJdAQH8kwP9HeVjnEebE2m032dyo6GOMBf/7ltpsINo FUgjI6UIdMNenaAGnawmnAAW0x5e7WoxfZSN34bSw4VeeHbap6tbUJRRbjeHV88G LuWB7xwCj10MZTEhyzJXUaduv1v9GxNRLm2yGCnE4v10dgg6yhkb9stTqBlxsVJ2 DH48kgnLy/E= =9H4Y -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- **EZ-PGP v1.07 ... Roses are red, violets are blue, some poems rhyme, but not this one. 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Jim Grubs, W8GRT Area: Public Key Encryption To: Shawn McMahon 2 Dec 94 09:03:00 Subject: GOP vs. Clipper...? UpdReq > Despite the stern warnings of the tribal elders, Jim Grubs, W8GRT said > this to Carl Hudkins: > JGW> A chance remark by Newt Gingrich gave me the impression he's > JGW> cyberspacee literate. At the very least, that means he'll > JGW> understand the issues better than most of them. > He's one of the very few congressmen with an Internet address. Yes, but the number is growing. There's a method, however, for using Internet to fax ANYBODY in DC; and almost all of them have fax numbers. Sincerely, Jim Grubs, W8GRT 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Jim Bell Area: Public Key Encryption To: USENET NEWS 3 Dec 94 01:22:00 Subject: Inman on Privacy and Clip UpdReq -=> Quoting Usenet News@1:285/27 to All <=- UN> ~Date: Wed, 23 Nov 94 09:54:12 EST UN> ~From: lethin@ai.mit.edu (Rich Lethin) UN> ~Subject: Admiral Inman visits MIT UN> Phil, below is something that I forwarded to cypherpunks a few days UN> ago, a rough transcription of class notes. The note you sent yesterday UN> mentioned that the NSA objected to the Triple-DES proposal on the X9 UN> committee. Admiral Inman's comments below might reflect on a motivation UN> for this. UN> Rich UN> 11/21/94 UN> Admiral Bobby Inman, the former director of the NSA, Deputy directory UN> of the CIA, and Director of Naval Intelligence spoke at Hal Abelson's UN> MIT class today about Clipper, export regulations and cryptography. He UN> was impressive with respect to the clarity of his points, his UN> even-handedness, and the precision with which he addressed questions UN> from the class. [stuff deleted] UN> The other side of this polarization between public cryptography and UN> government cryptography was an "evolution of concern" within the UN> government, driven by public perceptions, about white-collar crime, UN> which he said was a recent (since Watergate) phenomenon. Public UN> cryptography threatens white-collar enforcement, because the FBI has UN> become "totally dependent" on wiretaps. When asked later about the UN> proportion of concern within the government between the various UN> white-collar crimes, such as drugs, organized crime, terrorism, etc., UN> he replied that the governmental concern about wiretaps was and is UN> primarily and unambiguously about narcotics. UN> The driving concern about public cryptography changed from export to UN> domestic concerns. This led to the technological solution, Clipper, which UN>he termed a mini-disaster. UN> He said that people inside the government miscalculated the depth of UN> distrust of government which led to the anti-clipper groundswell. He felt UN> that this was simply a "blind spot" in those people; it's not that they UN> have bad motives, it's just that they can't comprehend why someone wouldn't UN> trust the government. That's strange. I, on the other hand, can't comprehend why someone WOULD trust the government! Just a day ago, I saw a news item which talked about the fact that the U.S. government proposed and operated a system where "enemy nationals" during WWII were kidnapped from Central and South American countries This was during the same period that the far-better publicized internment of Japanese-Americans occurred. This, of course, is simply in addition to all of the other revelations about the misbehavior of government over the last 60+ years, all of which, taken together, suggest that the Federal government is a criminal organization that any honest individual should work to destroy. UN> By proposing clipper (which is technologically UN> sound) with it's government-entity escrow, he said that they fed the UN> spectre of Big Brother, when it would have been better to deal with it from UN>the start. UN>One of the ways that they could have dealt with it was via commercial or UN>nongovernmental escrow, specifically citing the companies in Boston and NY UN>which deal with stock certificate transactions. However, he was skeptical UN>whether nongovernmental escrow had any political future since the initial UN>blunder. Inman is FOS. The whole concept of "voluntary escrowed encryption" is a crock. Here's why: Imagine there are to classes of people, "honest" and "crooks." Honest people can't see any reason the government would ever want to bug their phones, so they have no reason to participate in any such program. "Crooks," on the other hand, have every reason to want to avoid this too. In other words, nobody has any reason to participate in a "voluntary" system. If we postulate a third class of people, "Honest but aware the government may some day want to attack them," the situation gets even worse. That's the group which is probably most likely (after the "crooks") to want to buy encrypted telephones. I assert that the average citizen doesn't really fear wiretapping by other average citizens, even with totally unencrypted analog lines. Other "average citizens" either don't have the time or inclination to do this, or the technical ability. And even if they do, the chance of them hearing anything particularly damaging is low, and the chance of them actually DOING something "useful" (damaging to the person bugged) with that information is even lower. Quite the contrary: The Government has the time, the inclination, the money, and the ability to do wiretaps, and it has the authority (or, at least, the apparent authority) to harm those bugged based on what it hears. Logically, the average citizen has far more to fear based on GOVERMENT bugging than anybody else. (if not today, in the future.) If it weren't for the government he might not need encryption at all! This means that an encryption system based on escrowed encryption is "about as useless as tits on a boar," to hijack a crude expression. The threat it's most needed against is exactly the one it can't stop. The reason arguments of this kind aren't recognized (or at least, admitted to) by government employees is simple: They can't admit that THEY are the problem. UN>- From a public policy standpoint, he felt that given the UN> single-issue voting in the recent election, regarding crime, the UN>public's equivalence of crime with drugs, Where does he get this shit? Such an "equivalence," to the extent it exists, is based on government propaganda. UN> and the essential nature of the wiretaps as the sole source of leads UN>in combatting narcotics, that arguments *to the public* about privacy UN>would be ineffective. Most of the public do not see wiretaps as UN>threatening them. Before Waco, "most of the public" did not see the BATF as threatening them, either. Perhaps Inman forgot that Clipper was proposed on April 16, 1993, one day after "Tax Day." And it was less than a week later that the Branch Davidians burned in Waco. Why is he surprised that the typical computer-literate person vigorously opposed Clipper? ... The rest of this tagline is encryp*&l#1E0+=|>fcd}85^7@jowxz*7"[=- ___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Jim Grubs, W8GRT Area: Public Key Encryption To: Jason Carr 1 Dec 94 14:27:04 Subject: Lawyer 4/4 UpdReq > Basil Hoyl wrote in a message to All: > JGW> I sent a copy of this thread to Phil. He was fascinated. I'm > guessing > JGW> future PGP versions will not accept keys with "book" type IDs. > Any ideas about how that kind of control might be implemented? None whatever. It's only a guess on my part. All I know is he said he was going to think about it. Sincerely, Jim Grubs, W8GRT 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Jim Grubs, W8GRT Area: Public Key Encryption To: Christopher Baker 1 Dec 94 14:19:04 Subject: PGP 2.6.2 OS/2 compile? UpdReq > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > In a message dated: 23 Nov 94, Jim Grubs, W8grt was quoted as saying: > JGW> He's home now and has been for a week or so. Got an e-mail from > JGW> him just today > thanks, i'll tell GK. I think Phil's a little POed "Rebellious Guerrilla" never called him. Besides, he's gone again. > where you been hiding? [grin] At age 60 I decided to go back to college for a second degree. (Computer Science Engineering. My first, 30 years ago, was in Mathematics.) Psweeuh! That's work. Sincerely, Jim Grubs, W8GRT 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Brad Stiles Area: Public Key Encryption To: Todd Jacobs 4 Dec 94 17:34:00 Subject: PGP VERSIONS UpdReq Hello Todd! SM>> 2.7 is some guy compiling his own, with changes. As for what source SM>> level it's based on, you'd have to ask the author. TJ> Not! :) 2.7 is the commercial version from Viacrypt, which legally uses TJ> the RSAREF 2.0 implementation of the RSA algorithm. Actually, there were a few copies that called themselves 2.7, sometimes with a "b" following, that *were* hacks of 2.3. Brad CIS: 76450,3637 || Fido: 1:280/119 || Internet: tyb30n@mqg1.usmc.mil 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Joe Eversole Area: Public Key Encryption To: Christopher Baker 30 Nov 94 20:24:00 Subject: Securemail UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- CB> SecureMail Host Routing is a internal, FidoNet volunteer routing system CB> for privacy's sake. we all use our FidoNet Node numbers. the only thing While I have you here, I am not listed (still) as NSMH for 1:231. Is this your area or should I contact Jeff? (R11SMH) Thanks! Joe Eversole , SysOp - HearthStone Internet: jeversol@iquest.net / PGP Key on Request -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: SecureMail Network Hub for FidoNet Zone 1 Net 231 iQCVAwUBLtz09OFwJfuHmTMdAQE3sgP/QLuujcC7f2AzLRgxaSN/6rpspiUpJZKN 7RdOSmx6R5rjUfjMTJmBoOzCw2keA/M+ZUnWq1t8l5mX3ZcKajEsxzyVU2fXWqVq bClclfQXjgrsIM1TBEaCi4Zx0mz2P4FunWnW+qRIB9UsZ3RcxNYB8xm3/jmIqPCz wu1k0pTawEI= =BFE9 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- * RM 1.4 B1371 * Nobody goes there anymore, it's too crowded.... 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Rob Perelman Area: Public Key Encryption To: John Schofield 5 Dec 94 16:45:00 Subject: Call Security shareware UpdReq JS>Something called Nautilus (NAUTILUS.ZIP 42146 bytes) claims to be >VoicePGP, with the crypto as yet un-implemented. Mind putting it on an FTP site or telling us about one? Thanks! ___ X QMPro 1.53 X That tagline is TRUE -> <- That tagline is FALSE 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Christopher Baker Area: Public Key Encryption To: John Schofield 5 Dec 94 14:45:50 Subject: Re: Call Security shareware for telephone secure sessionsUpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In a message dated: 03 Dec 94, John Schofield was quoted as saying: JS> Something called Nautilus (NAUTILUS.ZIP 42146 bytes) claims to be JS> VoicePGP, with the crypto as yet un-implemented. They're still i'll come and get a copy. i wasn't able to get thru for my poll last night so i'll add the freq to that. thanks. TTFN. Chris -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: PGP 2.6.2 is LEGAL in Zone 1! So USE it! [grin] iQCVAwUBLuNt8csQPBL4miT5AQGpLQQAg/EkrTXJaApHfDKdnj4ad3JAHz5n1rux RuZN2ci9JM/3pa3xBJwOzCHjnewWvtXTmKzzyUDNzYHnXLXwKYnomtBfXYeSCnsy mobG7UkRABp9VULtkQsjE75zef0BLxB1wFRJDuqq5xPm6Pb1rV5eDJxj5W1UpU+O ahm38fFZ9wE= =MDhR -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Bill Ziegenbein Area: Public Key Encryption To: Anyone 4 Dec 94 02:37:50 Subject: PGP 2.6.2 UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hi, I have been looking for the newest version of PGP. Can anyone tell me where it can be filerequested from? I am in northern Texas so the closer the better....:) > Greetings from Bill Ziegenbein -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 Comment: Insist on Privacy, use PGP!! iQCVAwUBLuFkqDlDQiS3y9TdAQGnAgP+M1goQR/6jiR//MvaahadyF5cMpL3dwMf afSXib2YSeISWrcHa7vFe317oiO3PhV5nkRE6YHT4hDkInUCkRuhjePtTcZFWa4Y DuRAN/hCCLHPjqrhzn34bQqQbAkSBdqZ6OH/E/ALzciL9laVdfr4y7nNDMt2a/oj DQ/M/wm/wZ0= =Zd88 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: jason carr Area: Public Key Encryption To: Christopher Baker 5 Dec 94 00:12:06 Subject: Re: Re: Call Security shareware for telephone secure sessionsUpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- MV> How is Philip Zimmerman's voice encryption program coming along? CB> haven't heard. Oh, the irony! :) jc -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: PGP_ECHO: CypherEcho to the gods... iQCVAwUBLuKSr0jhGzlN9lCZAQHeEgQAo/O2TqUH0g7DvSreYSEZ/jLu/FVG3Bzz FXLbW3nHHikuylADHq1rhEem8hefh1nX6Bz91zg/hIK9PCSOTMiu4HSjWvWr9SCl 5yg/fy5YvAwepUkGatQ118U973IC3ftrXhlfSTdHcvCbFs6UrsTSClDWSrMwnhVc XUwGzb8JcWs= =nmxa -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ... Key fingerprint = 60 97 B2 AE 7D 90 11 2F 05 1C 35 98 E9 B9 83 61 // BlueWave > BW-PGP.BAT < PGP 2.6.2 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718