From: Rob Borek Area: Public Key Encryption To: Daryl Turner 5 Sep 94 23:09:00 Subject: Re: New To Pgp UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In a message dated 09-02-94, Daryl Turner said to John Schofield: DT>In a message of <31-Aug-94 16:13:52> John Schofield (1:102/903) wrote: DT>How do you figure they deserve it? Do they pay for it? Well, no one DT>here is going to pay, and the only person that will decide who DT>deserves what is the one paying the bills. Me. If the laws here in DT>Canada EVER start to say as a Bulletin Board operator that I am DT>REQUIRED to do anything, then I will never open up a BBS. (This is a DT>mail only node for me only right now.) Actually... there are some laws that have a bearing on BBS's - there's been nothing proven, but there is a section in the Criminal Code of Canada dealing with private mail (written, electronic, or the like) Rob Borek Internet: rob.borek@rivspill.dt-can.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAwUBLmvK4oYb8t7nzw8JAQETvwP+IK8XD4hTDyfIflt9Kl4bvRdKHxljLK5H gV6whWn6lKKptckJaphvxtcOkb75F3I7R6C8v7csTMZae+biFDGVdjo4ymeXEeAp KmYkPpXoOXmnE0h8EuJ88AQ28rU53TI4nsOSm/aTtoRckH3XRpwt92xODBE93Sxr bG+z4Dr9h48= =9FS8 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ___ * MR/2 2.06 NR * "Apple" (c) Copyright 1767, Sir Isaac Newton. 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Shawn K. Quinn Area: Public Key Encryption To: Brian McMurry 2 Sep 94 15:33:24 Subject: Re: Phil's views UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- *** Quote: Brian McMurry to All on 29 Aug 94 19:34:58 *** Subject: Re: Phil's views PRZ> However, because of a negotiated agreement between MIT PRZ> and RSA Data Security, PGP 2.6 will change its behavior slightly on 1 PRZ> September 1994, triggered by a built-in software timer. BM> "behavior"? Let's call it what it is; it'll use a different BM> encryption algorithm. Hold on a minute here. This is copied verbatim from PGPDOC2.TXT in version 2.6: > PGP version 2.6 can read anything produced by versions 2.3, 2.3a, 2.4, or > 2.5. However, because of a negotiated agreement between MIT and RSA Data > Security, PGP 2.6 will change its behavior slightly on 1 September 1994, > triggered by a built-in software timer. On that date, version 2.6 will > start producing a new and slightly different data format for messages, > signatures and keys. I see mention of a different *data format*. I see nothing about encryption algorithms changing. PRZ> It appears that PGP 2.6 has spread to Europe, despite the best PRZ> efforts of MIT and myself to prevent its export. Since Europeans now PRZ> seem to be using version 2.6 in Europe, they will have no problems PRZ> maintaining compatability with the Americans. BM> Hahaha, in the original docs to PGP doesn't Phil state that wide BM> distribution was the key to success? I'm sure he's (secretly) BM> overjoyed. Yeah, well that is his business, NOT YOURS. The only reason he wanted to prevent its export in the first place was for legal protection. I would have done the same thing had I been legally harassed in the same way he was. SKQ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAwUBLmeMBTzG+cClnFb5AQG1EAP6A1dyr8aFXD2XVRhYmmBaBHQX+fxhjfeQ dEfCrlSWtahBV8a26qqNLzp5hf47vBOljEpYn5tRLCwgOxhiPyQKSEi20tsurun+ rBWVdX8nACRwzw9zbhoV8E3faDtrIuzg+LpL6lgaJv4+v0MqGv0pKnLMirc4uHbZ Zp128NWsS1Y= =8v1D -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ... Punny Book: Too Many Beers - I.P. Freely 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Shawn K. Quinn Area: Public Key Encryption To: Richard Godbee 2 Sep 94 15:38:20 Subject: My key... UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- *** Quote: Richard Godbee to All on 29 Aug 94 20:48:02 *** Subject: My key... RG> I have one or two AKA's on my key as of now. If I were to delete an RG> AKA, add an AKA, get it signed by someone, etc., could people with my RG> old un-modified key still send me encrypted messages that my PGP could RG> decrypt? I know my key would change, but would there still be RG> compatibility between the two? The key itself will not change. You can do "pgp -kvc [your_userid]" before and after to verify this. The answer, of course, is yes, you can still decrypt messages sent to you using that key. I've done what you describe before with absolutely no ill effects. SKQ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAwUBLmeNLzzG+cClnFb5AQGkBwQAuiz1t1xuc+tdSUxWbWIFc0cbTpo+fSWo V85PxFiyGiLMGv2uaBDWWXElpKm4pFT3ueBoK60IZ52KNa0Si1C6bL7Q4mXVCOzb auwtw0cuJhj0VZqbIxJTxd2x7wGgvxcpyjCEiHZNkl+dxqNtWyzHNo2hzf8TdoYM RACLFGW1THk= =gHo7 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ... Michael Jackson vs Barney in a 13 round winner take all. 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Shawn K. Quinn Area: Public Key Encryption To: Richard Walker 2 Sep 94 15:41:16 Subject: Re: New to PGP UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- *** Quote: Richard Walker to Wes Landaker on 31 Aug 94 22:43:51 *** Subject: Re: New to PGP RW> Your Honor, I neither read, nor censor, any mail; PERIOD. If people RW> want to include encrypted data that screws up my mail handling RW> software, I can't stop them, but I'm certainly not responsible for RW> doing anything more than making an effort at returning the message to RW> the sender. Actually, it should be more like: "Your Honor, I don't give a flying f*** about the ECPA. I'll read mail and return it to sender whenever I _think_ it's screwing up my software. Go ahead and send me to jail." SKQ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAwUBLmeN5TzG+cClnFb5AQEwaAP/f3kEnRry7EhD+9NAa8FNlhq+ZfAX9foD hkWHARbeGXXb0yhMkLWiDr1EdDj82ODSlLpio7D4mQhp0FjVJZACRzK4KnwutcBk nxxS946VT2Lm8FRkNyU3skYU3cYg/Hy+33jRZGt2GbZi4Ydgfh1vtcBtjVUdGfGQ aG590WnXpCs= =gDhv -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ... 94? Blasted TARDIS is on the fritz again! 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Shawn K. Quinn Area: Public Key Encryption To: Richard Walker 2 Sep 94 15:43:14 Subject: Re: Net 106 still at it? UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- *** Quote: Richard Walker to Wes Landaker on 31 Aug 94 22:55:29 *** Subject: Re: Net 106 still at it? RW> Personally, if I were to be a gambling person, I'd put higher bucks on RW> this happening to someone who uses PGP than someone who refuses to RW> deliver PGP signed mail for someone else. HUH? The latest version of PGP (2.6) is now LEGAL. You can't be held liable for anything for using it. SKQ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAwUBLmeOXTzG+cClnFb5AQHhRwQAogeMjzomW0ieYg46LaO1uOeVrn6Oj1bm GpZ+M0YJ2w+DoSx0FRzKgPDcLlR49J1D0ETRh1BTfGMO2jLD2xOIlU2+CWikod9F gJGvkRRyFrS869nmt1edTs55eLJTFVrV+7l8ZStySgfn4V84LLKx/fhHIyRwN/GN Nu/0rI1Qyhk= =8MpM -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ... A Smith and Wesson beats four aces. 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Shawn K. Quinn Area: Public Key Encryption To: Richard Walker 2 Sep 94 15:45:08 Subject: Re: Net 106 still at it? UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- *** Quote: Richard Walker to Tim Bradley on 31 Aug 94 23:11:37 *** Subject: Re: Net 106 still at it? RW> I don't really give a flip about civil liability though; only criminal RW> possibilities worry me, so your mileage may vary. I can live without RW> money, I can't live without freedom. You can't run a BBS without money either. To everyone: let's get a case against this guy, and sue him. Maybe that way he'll have to cash in his computer and modem for legal fees. 8-) SKQ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAwUBLmeOzjzG+cClnFb5AQFKvQQAlgpxnBYh7w5JTWFcMqAqvLpRRFoZ89o5 wVcE97RmjtYmgzkCdr/PxnYwFhGKevHqck5X9fFyHn0qv0125ykXhAtEJt/1okOm s8+DRIDeeaRnxW41AibajuU5q/NzGtBetMafFJgtyc2n2vIHvpLN9zp/gj6elgDr 9OTTzHB7+Qg= =MDID -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ... I can't remember which Taglines are mine and which I stole. 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Shawn K. Quinn Area: Public Key Encryption To: Richard Walker 2 Sep 94 15:47:10 Subject: Re: New to PGP UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- *** Quote: Richard Walker to Tim Bradley on 31 Aug 94 23:24:03 *** Subject: Re: New to PGP RW> You are right about the presumption of having something to hide; but RW> I'm not sure its all that unjustified. I do occassionally use RW> encryption technology, and can see its usefulness to protect RW> proprietary software, but I have a hard time understanding what RW> possible good it could be in an echomail/netmail message sent over RW> fidonet, except for illicit purposes, like hacker-twits trading phone RW> card, credit card, and ATM information... Yeah, I can't see why to put any postal mail in an envelope either. I mean, if it isn't on a postcard, it must be some hacker twit trading phone card, credit card, and ATM information. 8-) SKQ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAwUBLmePRzzG+cClnFb5AQEwbQP/Yzny4bjcEEchJP7hlnQxFZyHfCPTrnT9 qjk2EcOfZ1OF948aXQpKHNEsXZf2yyjOddv4StYaLw1kDGEqlxVMQg2rVRgahGsT lm2SR12qZOfK1zcYRXJBCJ84pQtOKYRIyIwbjnjAVcdsw4TEyogcYiN5eiukZWBL mItwCnvu7js= =eREV -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ... Clinton Cruise Lines: Taking America for a Ride! 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Shawn K. Quinn Area: Public Key Encryption To: Mike Riddle 2 Sep 94 15:55:44 Subject: Re: Philip Zimmermann on PGP UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- *** Quote: Mike Riddle to Jim Bell on 31 Aug 94 07:19:36 *** Subject: Re: Philip Zimmermann on PGP MR> Let me remind those new to the conversation that maximum penalties MR> under ITAR are something like ten years and $1,000,000. I haven't MR> researched the sentencing guidelines to see where first offenses would MR> fall, but you get the picture. This is not the same as speeding 55 in MR> a 35 mph zone. My best guess is that a first offense is probably 3-5 years probabtion and a fine somewhere around $2000-5000. That's only a guess, mind you; I haven't looked at the sentencing guidelines either. Of course, the conditions of probation are the biggest variable. SKQ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAwUBLmeRSjzG+cClnFb5AQEfxwP/S5KZznT4NQQ3rIiYqYBrT/qN/dpoQdud Tlxqvn8VzU9oC4+P3Ich8alPn50+8X7fZJEGbBpAw+OEmSC9RJJkQs//CWlpuVrb iwDERMz6URLXZ9iNJ9MES6oHhESzLZtZZF0LjinJFXX6q7eOEzw61OmxiSEogTw9 oHfDuq9Qulk= =dIT7 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ... "This creature appears hostile!" - Calvin to a moderator 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Shawn K. Quinn Area: Public Key Encryption To: Shawn McMahon 2 Sep 94 15:58:34 Subject: Question or two UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- *** Quote: Shawn McMahon to Carl Hudkins on 30 Aug 94 10:57:14 *** Subject: Question or two SM> Hopefully, they'll also chime in on what happens to a person who writes SM> a program to facilitate other's breaking the law. Can you say SM> "accessory to every ECPA violation committed with this program?" If it SM> was me, I wouldn't let anybody get a hold of the program, even if I SM> thought it was legal to use it. Well, if I wrote such a program (which I won't, but I'm just speaking for hypothetical purposes here) I'd say something like "not intended for use on private messages". Not sure how well that would work, but it's better than nothing. SKQ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAwUBLmeR8zzG+cClnFb5AQGubwP6Ah1yOwKhTJyJ8qFdyNSdTp6ng+6wahn2 v6Y6hbcBYpVExhWQ9ere9dnWyvyzNI58AhnElYUX7DCmZLBeDRgIJJ5GX8m1h5Hv e7uOXAa7pe2+zTNTYf5aOS850X6MDuA5dpYo1vi1nJcWiY6sBiQ6mdPNyvE8UxDA 2AgdavwRlHw= =/Nbx -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ... "All I did was pull the spark plug wire," Tom said shockingly. 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Alan Pugh Area: Public Key Encryption To: gk pace 6 Sep 94 22:35:18 Subject: Re: signing my own key. UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- MV> Why should I sign my own key? gp> I give up... Can't think of one good reson why anyone would sign gp> their own key, except in the case of revoking/re-issuing. When gp> revoking and reissuing, it makes sense to sign the new key with the gp> old, and sign the revokation with the new. Not an overly important gp> thing to do even then tho... there was a rather spirited discussion on this very topic here reccently. from what i understand, it helps to self-validate a key. if you look at a binary key with a viewer that can look at such things, you will notice that the name of the person is not encrypted. an fool with the appropriate editor can edit the name on the key and it will still seem to be valid. (i don't know why someone would like to do this. why do some fools write viri?) when you sign your own key, it will fail validation when someone attempts to add it to their keyring. i think i got it right anyway. i'm quite sure i'll be corrected if i'm still confused. =V= amp <0003701548@mcimail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCxAgUBLm001tQ9obngT6LhAQGaUATglAFwyxSFD3nrw6LEO8cezOGabOSHA9R2 nk1ctIPMs2GGBTxJFQ8Z92M2AtivOTCjzxe6hFWVh+2WgXXzB9LDndguF/I3BNXs Vvd6o+IgpF/T1mlFcbS/+bqqlTqBQ6swYP320NgLXy6n3e+hso9cZaOEdTYJDERM UA89ov6xSN2tBWT4qNjs4C4F18/XUZ185Q2YJOumtUFgR58u =1JYr -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ~~~ PGPBLUE 2.5 ... Redundant: Air bag in a politician's car. 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: jason carr Area: Public Key Encryption To: gk pace 8 Sep 94 07:48:08 Subject: Re: comment disabled? UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- JC> I'm using 2.6ac now. Does anybody know if the ARMOR_VERSION keyword has JC> been disabled in the new vers? I can't jack with it to make it report JC> itself as 2.6ac. gp> Yes... I printed and read the docs (RTFM!) right after that msg was scanned out to my feed... Missed it when I just read it in a txt editor... :-o JC> Was that keyword only usuable in 2.6uix? gp> Yes... Dang! jason ... It's Kinda Like A Symbiosis, But More Expensive... -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6a Comment: PGP_ECHO: Encryption, sigs, and fun in D-FtW... iQCVAwUBLm8krEjhGzlN9lCZAQHYBwQAmQab0UfhBSi9IQ7weWFPDip1fD1wno1N iHdo/Fu0oLjm7oTlv4JLxt94dTbWVE0CjPJqoQLSw+0GI7BBpWS8mg5Db8wDC3j5 5IJn2U5gExjsvq51gmVsi3POP4fI39MAS5xekm2jMSwgLa2clr3TIvDJAsmTlEHB NJhnCoLYlzA= =bFyM -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Richard Walker Area: Public Key Encryption To: Shawn K. Quinn 8 Sep 94 10:13:14 Subject: Re: Net 106 still at it? UpdReq SK> To everyone: let's get a case against this guy, and sue him. Maybe that SK> way he'll have to cash in his computer and modem for legal fees. 8-) Then you won't be able to receive these echos, now will you :->>>> Lets see... 1) my system doesn't route any mail for anyone. (I'm an end node) 2) I don't read any mail messages not addressed to me 3) I have no users that have access to the message areas. Now what is it, other than providing the only co-op distribution point for the PGP related echos that you don't like about my actions? Or is it you don't believe in free speach unless the speaker agrees with you. hmmmmmmmm. How come that doesn't surprise me. 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Richard Walker Area: Public Key Encryption To: Shawn K. Quinn 8 Sep 94 10:23:32 Subject: Re: New to PGP UpdReq SK> Yeah, I can't see why to put any postal mail in an envelope either. I SK> mean, SK> if it isn't on a postcard, it must be some hacker twit trading phone SK> card, SK> credit card, and ATM information. 8-) Envelopes do not provide security. They only provide physical protection for the letter inside from the mail flinging machinery. Simple physical possibility: 1.) Postal inspector wants to open envelope and read mail 2.) Postal inspector takes blank envelope and photocopies the front of yours onto theirs (minus stamp and postmark). [if careful, will instead place on a light table and trace it with the same color ink, to give written vs photo quality] 3.) Postal inspector opens yours and reads it. 4.) Postal inspector places your letter in his envelope, restamps and post marks it. 5.) Recipient recieves envelope, opens it, removes the letter, wadds up the envelope and tries for the three pointer from across the room, and reads the letter, none the wiser. Besides, a letter costs about $.40, a direct crash sent email will cost you only $.23 even instate and during the business hours. So if you want security, send it direct. 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Scott Miller Area: Public Key Encryption To: Christopher Baker 8 Sep 94 23:17:00 Subject: Proposed FAQ update UpdReq Chris, do YOU keep the FAQ updated? If so, please add a section spelling out the fact that it is UNNECESSARY to sign your key, not like PGP -ks "mykey" but like --- Begin PGP signed message --- Heres my key - ---Begin PGP pubkey block--- dsfadsfsdfldsjfaldsfj adsfsdf dfdsf - ---End PGP pubkey block--- --- Begin PGP sig --- asfddsfdsfasdfasfdsdf asdfsda asdf --- End PGP sig --- I believe here and in PKEY_DROP we have agreed upon it, and we still have people annoyingly doing it. P.S. Anyone not agree with me? Write me, I'll be glad to argue some more. Scott Miller 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Shawn McMahon Area: Public Key Encryption To: Tim Bradley 9 Sep 94 14:10:02 Subject: New to PGP UpdReq Despite the stern warnings of the tribal elders, Tim Bradley said this to Shawn McMahon: TB> primarily determined in Case Law -- and there is *NO* case law TB> I'm aware of dealing with Sysops monitering mail. EVERY case TB> based on the ECPA I've heard of has dealt with improper handling TB> of EMail during and after Search & Seizures. If you know of ANY TB> cases even PENDING where the ECPA has been used against Sysop TB> READING of mail (NOT other criminal USE of that EMail, just for TB> READING &/or bouncing EMail), I love to hear about it. While it is true that that particular aspect has not been decided based on sysop reading of mail yet, I think you should be aware of the following: 1) The same sections that say law enforcement can't read your mail say sysops can't, with both relying on the assumption (challenged by the government in the Jackson case) that a computer BBS is a "remote computing device" under the ECPA definition. 2) The Jackson case upheld this definition; that court, for one, holds that a BBS is indeed a remote computing device under the ECPA. 3) The ECPA is quite clear about what you can't do with a remote computing device. Now, it is probable that this law will continue to be challenged. But then again, so will almost every law on the books. Even murder statutes get challenged on their face from time to time. However, keep in mind that the Justice Department people spoken to by Michael Hess, and quoted in this echo, feel that it does apply. What does this mean? It means that, whether you're convicted or not, the Justice Department is willing to arrest you and confiscate everything, under the right circumstances. I suggest that this outcome is not something you should court (no pun intended) even with your possible availability of free legal services. I don't know of ANYONE who's ever gotten all their equipment back without a significant portion of it destroyed, and most damaged. And I have a very close friend sitting in jail right now trying. I suggest that, unless and until case law REFUTES the ECPA, you're a lot better off complying with it. If I'm wrong and you follow my advice, all that happens is some messages you can't read go through your system, with no consequences likely. If I'm right and you don't, you get felony time in a federal pen. Pretty big gamble to take, since the defense "I didn't think the ECPA applied to me" won't help you in court. (Especially when they find a copy of the law on your hard drive.) Even if you stop doing it the day that portion of the ECPA is confirmed, you'll still be liable for every provable instance of violation up to two years before the action is filed. I'm talking about the civil portion, now; I don't know (can't find in a quick scan) the limitation on the criminal proceedings. The main thing is, Tim, that if I'm wrong, you can't get in any trouble for following my advice, because your lack of liability for the things people send in private mail on or through your system *HAS* been tested in case law. It's conjectured (again, by experts) that you can CREATE some liability, if you work hard enough at it. Such as making a policy of examining mail contents, even by device. 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Shawn McMahon Area: Public Key Encryption To: Kevin Lo 9 Sep 94 14:14:32 Subject: Changes In PGP 2.6.1 UpdReq Despite the stern warnings of the tribal elders, Kevin Lo said this to All: KL> PGP 2.6.1 will now accept keys up to length 2,048 bits, Which, barring some fundamental breakthrough in factoring (which is always possible, but the entire world is looking and not finding anything) is beyond the reach of ALL projected increases in computing power. 1024 is secure enough to give you years to change; 2048 is believed to be secure enough that you'll never want to change again. 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Shawn McMahon Area: Public Key Encryption To: Shawn K. Quinn 10 Sep 94 01:32:10 Subject: Re: Phil's views UpdReq Despite the stern warnings of the tribal elders, Shawn K. Quinn said this to Brian McMurry: SKQ> legal protection. I would have done the same thing had I SKQ> been legally harassed in the same way he was. Indeed; remember, the guy is facing a MINIMUM of around four years in a federal pen. All because he wrote a program using code THAT ANYBODY IN THE WORLD, INCLUDING IRAQ AND COMMUNIST CHINA, CAN PURCHASE IN BOOKS. I'd have done the same thing, too; covered my ass like there was no tomorrow, short of actually not writing the thing. 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Shawn McMahon Area: Public Key Encryption To: Shawn K. Quinn 10 Sep 94 01:36:00 Subject: Question or two UpdReq Despite the stern warnings of the tribal elders, Shawn K. Quinn said this to Shawn McMahon: SKQ> Well, if I wrote such a program (which I won't, but I'm just SKQ> speaking for hypothetical purposes here) I'd say something SKQ> like "not intended for use on private messages". Not sure SKQ> how well that would work, but it's better than nothing. A lawyer would probably tell him to put something in about not using it to break the law, and not mention at all what that means. (No mention of ECPA, no mention of private mail, etc.) That would help with a defense, but here's the problem; the thing traps messages with PGP sigs. Censoring echos is against backbone policy, so what would it be used for in a Fidonet situation if not censoring netmail? 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Shawn McMahon Area: Public Key Encryption To: Richard Walker 10 Sep 94 01:37:24 Subject: Re: Net 106 still at it? UpdReq Despite the stern warnings of the tribal elders, Richard Walker said this to Shawn K. Quinn: RW> 1) my system doesn't route any mail for anyone. (I'm an end RW> node) 2) I don't read any mail messages not addressed to me RW> 3) I have no users that have access to the message areas. Then exactly what traffic is it you're bitching about, Richard? The traffic that isn't going through your system? 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Shawn McMahon Area: Public Key Encryption To: Richard Walker 10 Sep 94 01:43:20 Subject: Re: New to PGP UpdReq Despite the stern warnings of the tribal elders, Richard Walker said this to Shawn K. Quinn: RW> hours. So if you want security, send it direct. No need, Richard; we have federal law protecting our privacy. True, that federal law doesn't GUARANTEE privacy, any more than laws against murder guarantee no murders will be committed. To guarantee our privacy, we just encrypt, and help those who are preyed upon by you control freaks to learn how to protect THEIR privacy, too. No need to bother with expensive direct mail, especially to those private nodes you can't call direct; we'll just route around you, and on those rare occasions where somebody who's agreed to route mail decides to start illegally censoring some of it, we'll just file our federal charges and lawsuits, collect your system, and deal with your successor. Progress marches on, Richard; through you or around you, it doesn't care. 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718