From: Shawn McMahon Area: Public Key Encryption To: James P.caldwell 5 Sep 94 20:16:40 Subject: Phil's Views UpdReq Despite the stern warnings of the tribal elders, James P.caldwell said this to Jim Grubs: JP> Try the section of 2.6 where random numbers are generated. Say what you think's wrong with it, James. Otherwise, this is just another unproven insinuation. 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Shawn McMahon Area: Public Key Encryption To: Tim Devore 5 Sep 94 20:18:44 Subject: -- Help -- UpdReq Despite the stern warnings of the tribal elders, Tim Devore said this to Shawn McMahon: TD> also..so I'm ending by not even replying to any more posts of TD> yours to me about the subject.... Not surprising. 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Shawn McMahon Area: Public Key Encryption To: jason carr 6 Sep 94 00:14:32 Subject: Net 106 still at it? UpdReq Despite the stern warnings of the tribal elders, jason carr said this to Shawn McMahon: jc> Oops. What does this mean for NetMail utils like NetMgr? I jc> suppose it would be more serious if NetMgr scanned the body, but jc> it only scans the header, AFAIK. Dunno; I'm not a lawyer, and you're getting way beyond the things clearly spelled out by the text now. However, remember that necessary system actions are allowed by the ECPA. I don't know what NetMgr does for sure, since I don't use it, so I can't really express an opinion on it's use. 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Shawn McMahon Area: Public Key Encryption To: Bruce Bozarth 6 Sep 94 00:17:06 Subject: -- Help -- UpdReq Despite the stern warnings of the tribal elders, Bruce Bozarth said this to Shawn Mcmahon: BB> Would rather put up with a Windows program that doesn't see BB> non-information characters than ill-mannered posters who lack BB> adequate potty training. ;) People's names contain non-information characters, and those who use their names despite the fact that your software can't handle them are demonstrating parental negligence? Ooooookay, Bruce. :-) 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Jared Foley Area: Public Key Encryption To: All 2 Sep 94 14:58:56 Subject: What is this message area for? UpdReq What is this message area for? JF ... The time is right to make new friends. 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: jason carr Area: Public Key Encryption To: all 4 Sep 94 13:23:24 Subject: comment disabled? UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I'm using 2.6ac now. Does anybody know if the ARMOR_VERSION keyword has been disabled in the new vers? I can't jack with it to make it report itself as 2.6ac. Was that keyword only usuable in 2.6uix? jason ... Endless Love: Steveie Wonder and Ray Charles playing Tennis! -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6a Comment: Want a feed to PGP_ECHO? Encryption, sigs welcome. iQCVAwUBLmotK0jhGzlN9lCZAQEbFAQAqqvPb1pYQZkbJ7PGWDQ4FzPVPRbpgqy1 ch6ef1xlbthnWngdO35odJqLYuEGSJxBzZnlGbka3d1uyvFRpN/Rz6Qj+eDXar55 GkEY+2yWpUAPEgt7591uTxVnbp+Gei1WfmsjfouYvBKo3qQI2VDSbDXMtf7OnSMF I9fLxyQ5Kks= =aogq -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: jim bell Area: Public Key Encryption To: GEORGE HANNAH 5 Sep 94 00:04:00 Subject: Re: RSA Broken UpdReq -=> Quoting George Hannah@1:255/7.0 to Wes Landaker@1:105/105 <=- -=> Quoting Wes Landaker to Bob Reddert <=- WL> It can be done with a small key, with a _lot_ of computing power, yes. WL> But unless there is a phenominal break in technology suddenly, it's not WL> going to happen with PGP. =) GH> So it's probably safe to say that PGP will be able to keep ahead of GH> "brute force" computing power by adding brute force keys - 1024 bits, GH> 2048 bits etc. Well, the current best systems for factoring large numbers are FAR better than "brute force" systems. For example, the factoring of a 430-bit number (equal in size to that recently factored to "break" a particular RSA key) would presumably take an average of 2**214 "tests" if you checked every number up to sqrt-N, or perhaps 1/1000 of that if you could somehow only check prime numbers. Even that is somewhere around 2**200, or a trillion trillion trillion trillion trillion. The fact that such a factorization could have been done in a "reasonable" amount of time should warn us that further improvement may be possible. ... Way Too Much is Not Nearly Enough. ___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Keith Bugner Area: Public Key Encryption To: All 4 Sep 94 21:48:42 Subject: FAQs UpdReq Would there happen to be a FAQ file for this echo? I'm interested in learning more about the subjects covered here, but don't want to take up everyone's time. Thanks in advance for your help. 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Wes Landaker Area: Public Key Encryption To: Mike Lenker 5 Sep 94 08:41:52 Subject: Net 106 still at it? UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hello Mike! 02 Sep 94 00:36, Mike Lenker wrote to Wes Landaker: WL> Syslaw . . . if it's shareware, I'm assuming it is a program? WL> :) If so, (or even if not!) where might one obtain a copy? =) ML> Oops. I was about to say that it could be freq'd from my system, ML> but that is not the case. The thing I had in mind was a ML> competitor called BBSLAW, copyrighted by someone else. You can ML> freq THAT if you like from here almost anytime, at 14.4 Kbps, but ML> beware that it's half a megabyte (BBSLAW01.ZIP). It includes ML> what amount to textbook chapters, and screens you can use for ML> your BBS (if you register it). Okay, I'll give that a try, see what it's like. =) ML> I'll be on the lookout for SYSLAW, and send a netmail note if I ML> find it. Okay, great. =) wjl [Team OS/2] * 1:202/1822@fidonet.org * 371:30/1@chnet.ftn * * wjl@f1822.n202.z1.fidonet.org * PGP Key: AD2254A5 * FREQ: PGPKEY * -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6wjl iQCVAwUBLmtKZMlPrmStIlSlAQHQHQQApcUAYjO4BPa4/A1CkHiz+Kku7EDADo3s c0B9qP6P/P0+8H+l3WUseZHuxx1aRdWPqQCBVFWTmohfPkjJy68k6Y0/jIl0CN+6 HfIRt97WMidPwkn/X5pm/o4yjZw4Q4TFEAGBbho0z1RNE2LKVN8I5E6snhWFJtfJ vt7S7kElTPU= =DuY2 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Wes Landaker Area: Public Key Encryption To: Christopher Baker 5 Sep 94 11:59:40 Subject: Keys UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hello Christopher! 31 Aug 94 19:11, Christopher Baker wrote to Wes Landaker: WL> Okay, thanks. :) You should probably post your key in WL> PKEY_DROP, if you haven't already--that's the slightly WL> un-official "distribution echo" for PUBLIC_KEYS' keys. CB> nothing 'unofficial' about it. [grin] CB> it's THE place for posting public-keys. Yeah, it sure beats a 500 meg keyring file off of a keyserver, all right. Doesn't do you any good to have a bunch of unvalidated keys of people you've never heard of, if you ask me. :) But then again, I'm one of those kinds of people who tries to verify nearly all of the keys on my keyring, unless they are already signed by several people I trust completely. =) wjl [Team OS/2] * 1:202/1822@fidonet.org * 371:30/1@chnet.ftn * * wjl@f1822.n202.z1.fidonet.org * PGP Key: AD2254A5 * FREQ: PGPKEY * -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6wjl iQCVAwUBLmt5gMlPrmStIlSlAQFG9AP+J5zBjxLFBNS/k/vh02UpPjCVgU4Fn67t VgTGEoHamirNqQliBfE78VQdtmLf3L6KA2loi7wcyXTM8vIYE4merItQb8MToNsv nWAd9yR5MDdd017ofJLa669c8wmYJKU1b96AaHBvNzyQPS/EDaXkgrI7qqF3A4c6 yZBV79EtdDk= =2IOU -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Wes Landaker Area: Public Key Encryption To: All 5 Sep 94 14:47:56 Subject: 4096 bit keys. :) UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hello All! Just for kicks, I thought I'd see how long it would take to generate a 4096 bit key with the OS/2 version of PGP 2.6a (being as it has this capability) . . . let's just say that my 486-33 isn't fast enough to make the wait reasonable for every-day use. ;-) Of course, I think some of this wait might be because of RSAREF, as it also takes longer (not MUCH longer, but longer) to generate a 1024-bit key, sign a message, and do just about anything than PGP 2.3a and PGP 2.6ui do. =-) wjl [Team OS/2] * 1:202/1822@fidonet.org * 371:30/1@chnet.ftn * * wjl@f1822.n202.z1.fidonet.org * PGP Key: AD2254A5 * FREQ: PGPKEY * -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6a iQCVAwUBLmuSb8lPrmStIlSlAQGCVwP/fPfQ+YOgNgaWInVaAVEao7DFDvJmwRv1 wSw34CJLOI0t4MCirHe0GFY+zVYWwK6Og+Q3GhvilpdzrLNfy52EQiXRiPKMYSbR T+PBWhwVOJ5gV3ImKZahLEdFdNmkpX4ENlv5BD/MfnTOADJGR7niLx0xVvZnGzdB 8w8VCPB8emU= =COmO -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Dick Norris Area: Public Key Encryption To: Mike Riddle 5 Sep 94 15:57:06 Subject: am I missin' something? UpdReq I got the binkley.cfg from your 'bink' area. Sad to say the BT will not run. Yes, I looked over the contents and changed the configuration to fit my box, still no go. Reading the reference doc I find mention of a 'BTCL' program that may need to be run at installation. This item was not part of the .LZH I got, nore did I see it in the 'bink' section, by it's lonesome. Did I miss something; say the 'boat' perhapse? Dick 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Brad Stiles Area: Public Key Encryption To: Shawn McMahon 5 Sep 94 07:13:00 Subject: New to PGP UpdReq Hello Shawn! TB>> "Electronic Mail"), but those rights are predicated on the TB>> message being placed in an area where there is "A reasonable TB>> expectation of privacy" -- and all other issues of that SM> Mike Godwin, a legal counsel for the EFF, [...] says that if the messages SM> have restricted viewership, [...] then they're covered by the ECPA. SM> He's a communications attorney, Tim. Why should any of us take your word SM> over his? While I'm inclined to agree with you on this one Shawn, let's look at why others might not. Tim has at least attempted to justify his opinion in the context of the ECPA itself, while all I've seen from Mr Godwin is a second-hand statement that such private messages are covered by the Act, *without* referencing it, rather just saying that it is covered. The "I heard him say..." type of thing. Now I am *not* saying that just because Tim offers an explanation for his position, it is necessarily the right position, but he *has* offered a reason. Whether or not that reason is a good one, remains to be seen. What I *am* saying is that a statment from an expert, without giving the reasons for that statment, isn't any more worthy of automatic acceptance that the opinion of a non-expert who has at least taken the time to provide some reason. That said, is there any chance that Mr. Godwin has published the rationale for his opinion? If so, where can it be had? If I missed it, I apologize and withdraw the above statement, and could somebody repost or netmail it? Brad CIS: 76450,3637 Fido: 1:280/119 Internet: tyb30n@mqg1.usmc.mil +++ PGP public key available - FReq PUBLIC_KEY or PGPKEY 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Christopher Baker Area: Public Key Encryption To: Shawn Mcmahon 5 Sep 94 13:11:26 Subject: Net 106 argument can cease now [Was: Re: New to PGP]UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In a message dated: 03 Sep 94, Shawn Mcmahon was quoted as saying: SM> privacy, then what exactly is it that you have to hide? Are you SM> engaged in some kind of illicit purpose? could you and Richard take this to Netmail please? we have an NSMH in Net 106 so whatever Net 106 honchos want to do with the mail they route is irrelevant to our ops. this is beginning to take on the aspects of a religious or political debate where neither side is convincing the other. thanks. TTFN. Chris -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6a Comment: PGP 2.6 is LEGAL in Zone 1! So USE it! [grin] iQCVAwUBLmtRMssQPBL4miT5AQH5WwP9Gx+6ELViUSctuY3dBMndwiu0xcUBH3Ck JaXgjpVmkEBb+1hzEJpHqCnryX77Y6nVlxXDHwY0ZamMJYyoMQ7vpAZzvZudGiv6 YgI5MM0JFraZQrvbOlh9QYx0VbKYT7ecyQ10fjBr7Klf+uj1hMEhhOwE7mbgph8c bVfZZo/mIQs= =0jQw -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Christopher Baker Area: Public Key Encryption To: Shawn Mcmahon 5 Sep 94 13:13:32 Subject: CUD, CPD, EFF [Was: Two things] UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In a message dated: 04 Sep 94, Shawn Mcmahon was quoted as saying: SM> 1) Is Computer Underground Digest available on any of the SM> filebones? i have them here for Ticking if you want them. they go out under their own area tags above. send session and Tick passwords if you don't already have such here. Raid is not installed so send direct Netmail with your request. TTFN. Chris -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6a Comment: PGP 2.6 is LEGAL in Zone 1! So USE it! [grin] iQCVAwUBLmtRr8sQPBL4miT5AQFQqQP/S65pYyUFVqTP3GnHAG5Rr3Dbg/C2z43Y gSRz6qcSfT8aNMb+c63ow2Laba1MwadXbSKlZUlV7Rty4yGp8fk1OQ5wzCqME+le Qjl62wp+pHnzy868Wo2BjoDfgyH6WZVvj+ip9chXwLCwsmCbT8StA4zl9O7Exlmb TU0CrcW6N/A= =ID+N -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Christopher Baker Area: Public Key Encryption To: All 5 Sep 94 13:15:38 Subject: PGP 2.6.1 coming soon UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- according to Phil Zimmerman, 2.6.1 and source should be out by the time you read this from MIT. i will hatch it as soon as i receive it. this will be the OFFICIAL replacement for PGP 2.6 MIT and not an alternate. hopefully, it will have addressed the various bugs and enhancements of the alternate. TTFN. Chris -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6a Comment: PGP 2.6 is LEGAL in Zone 1! So USE it! [grin] iQCVAwUBLmtSLcsQPBL4miT5AQFfWAQAjts5d3RgTS/I8z2DmnEV/sgqgGHLG3SP GW9259u3lxdIJQoW15Nvc7w69Pg8jv7mTiePgDJdbzVpYGe+HevAGIGmy8jaqytR Vc1lTkQTuDuckW60SjmwM3BX5KO/O2wr4w6dYIFxQCh2eFHUahsve7WbjRsyGYYV nKtkvBrSQag= =bObb -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Kevin Lo Area: Public Key Encryption To: Bruce Bozarth 3 Sep 94 12:01:00 Subject: Re: -- Help -- UpdReq Greetings Bruce, -=-= On 01 Sep 94 at 11:25, you wrote to Wes Landaker =-=- WL>> Does it just look funny, or does it crash the program? BB> The reader does not support ANSI/high ascii and is not "faulty". Then you should either: 1) Change readers 2) Skip the message altogether WL>> Not that I use a lot of high-ASCII, but I'm not going to stop using WL>> accent marks and cedillas where I need them. =) BB> In an echo were English is traditional, why would you need accent BB> marks and cedillas? Such messages would contain illegible words on systems BB> which do not use ANSI/high ascii. Think about this for a second- there are thousands of systems out there, and probably 2% of them aren't ANSI-Compatable. For those poor souls, they cannot read the nice little squiggly lines on top of the letters, but for the other 98%, they understand perfectly. Also, there happen to be many different echos out there, some with people that have foreign names. Lastly, I wish that this thread would end. I originally posted a message asking how PGP can clearsign ASCII messages. Evidentally it cannot, so the problem was solved. :> Later! |o|---------------------------------------------------------------------|o| |o|Kevin Lo | Internet: dt194@nextsun.ins.cwru.edu | Freq' KEVLO.ASC |o| |o|FDC Merlin| FidoNet: 1:374/98.5 (Palm Bay, Fl) |@1:374/98 - PGP Key|o| |o|---------------------------------------------------------------------|o| 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Randy Edwards Area: Public Key Encryption To: All 5 Sep 94 20:09:06 Subject: Wiretap Bill Alert: Contact Rep Brooks!UpdReq * Original Message Posted via CIVLIB * Date: 03 Sep 94 13:50:10 * From: Randy Edwards @ 1:325/806 * To: All * Forwarded by: Christopher Baker @ 1:374/14 * Message text was not edited! @MSGID: 1:325/806 15c096fc From: NY Transfer News From listserv@cpsr.org Thu Sep 1 00:48:07 1994 Sender: cpsr-announce@Sunnyside.COM Date: Tue, 30 Aug 1994 09:18:10 -0700 Wiretap Bill Alert Voter's Telecommunications Watch (VTW) has issued the attached alert on the pending FBI Wiretap Bill. The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) is working in conjunction with VTW and other organiza- tions to educate the public on this legislation. Your involvement is crucial -- please contact Rep. Jack Brooks IMMEDIATELY. EPIC is a project of the Fund for Constitutional Government and Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility. =================================================================== Subject: INFO: Status of the Digital Telephony bills (SB 2375 & HR 4922) From: shabbir@panix.com (Shabbir J. Safdar) Date: 29 Aug 1994 23:28:26 -0400 Message-ID: <33u90q$8mk@panix2.panix.com> [updated August 29, 1994 shabbir] ********************************************************************* DISTRIBUTE WIDELY ********************************************************************* Table of contents: Status of the bills Five things you can do RIGHT now to stop Digital Telephony Records of legislators supporting/opposing/wavering on DT Digital Telephony bill FAQ The VTW Press Release Sample Letter To The Editor Who are we and how can you contact us? ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- STATUS OF THE BILLS (updated 8/10/94) Aug 18, 94 HR 4922 reported back to committee (write to Rep. Jack Brooks!) Aug 11, 94 Sen. Leahy & Rep. Edwards hold a joint hearing on the bills in Wash. DC at 1pm in Rayburn 2237. Aug 10, 94 HR 4922 referred to Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights Aug 10, 94 SB 2375 referred to Subcomm. on Technology and the Law Aug 9, 94 Rep. Hyde officially cosponsors HR 4922 Aug 9, 94 HR 4922 referred to House Judiciary Committee Aug 9, 94 SB 2375 referred to Senate Judiciary Committee Aug 9, 94 Identical House and Senate bills are announced by their respective sponsors, Rep. Don Edwards (D-CA) and Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-VT) EFF states the legislation is "not necessary". VTW will be monitoring this legislation in the same way that we monitored the Cantwell bill, with the blow by blow, day to day updates that cost us significant long distance bills. :-) We're not asking for money though. Don't send us money; we don't want it and it causes us bookkeeping work. Call/write your legislator instead and relay to them the sample communiques below. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- FIVE THINGS YOU CAN DO *RIGHT* NOW (in their order of importance) 1. Write to the House Judiciary Committee Chairman, Jack Brooks (D-TX) and ask him to oppose the Digital Telephony bill. (HR 4922) 2. Fax/mail a copy of the VTW press release to your local newspaper, tv station, call-in show (everything from NPR to Rush Limbaugh), etc. 3. Write to your legislator (especially if s/he is on the Judiciary Committee (House or Senate) and ask that they oppose the Digital Telephony bills. (SB 2375/HR 4922) 4. Forward a copy of this FAQ to three friends who don't know about it. Or, print it out and place it on a bulletin board at work, at school, hand it out, etc. 5. Write a letter to the editor of your local newspaper, opposing the Digital Telephony bill. 1. CALL/WRITE TO REP. JACK BROOKS, HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM. CHAIRMAN Sample phone Communique: Rep. Jack Brooks Phone: (202) 225-6565 Dear Mr. Brooks, The recent Digital Telephony bills (HR 4922 & SB 2375) disturb me greatly. The FBI has not yet made their case that justifies building wiretap functionality into the telephones of 250 million people to justify the privacy intrusion. Please oppose HR 4922 and SB 2375. Sincerely, _______________________ Sample fax/letter Communique: Rep. Jack Brooks 2449 RHOB Washington, DC 20515 Phone: (202) 225-6565 Fax: (202) 225-1584 The Honorable Jack Brooks, Please oppose Senator Leahy's and Representative Edwards' Digital Telephony bills (HR 4922 & SB 2375). This legislation asks us, the American public, to trade our privacy to ensure law enforcement's future ability to continue to perform wiretaps. Unfortunately, the FBI has yet to make its case to the public to prove that it is unable to administer significant numbers of wiretaps. Telecommunications technology is very new and the change of pace in it is very rapid. The Digital Telephony bills are premature and should not be considered until: -the standards bodies are appointed and include privacy rights groups (not just the Electronic Frontier Foundation) at both the technical and policy levels -the standards are defined and accepted by the three stakeholders (law enforcement, common carriers, and privacy rights groups) -an adequate oversight agency has been given the authority previously allocated to the FCC -the technology has advanced to a point where the effect of such a broad ruling on the undustry can be ascertained. Please oppose HR 4922 & SB 2375. Sincerely, _______________________ If you want to help make legislators responsible for their actions, report this information back to vtw@vtw.org. We'll add their position to our database. 2. Take the press release attached and fax/mail/email it to local tv stations, radio stations, callin shows, newspapers, etc. Drop a note to vtw@vtw.org, where we'll track the coverage. 3. Forward this file to your friends and coworkers. Use it when you phone call-in shows; educate everyone you know. This is literally a "net" effort. Few people outside of the Internet know about this legislation; they would be horrified to discover its existence. Help educate them. 4. Call/write your legislator and ask them to oppose the Digital Telephony bill. Use the sample communiques above. To find your own legislator, contact the League of Women Voters in your area. 5. Write a letter to your local newspaper's editorial page about the Digital Telephony bill. We have attached a sample editorial page letter that you might base your letter upon. Feel free to use significant license. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- LIST OF LEGISLATORS SUPPORTING/OPPOSING/WAVERING ON DIGITAL TELEPHONY -REPRESENTATIVES All addresses are Washington, D.C. 20515 Dist ST Name, Address, and Party Phone Fax ==== == ======================== ============== ============== 16 CA Edwards, Donald (D) 1-202-225-3072 1-202-225-9460 2307 RHOB House sponsor of the 1994 Digital Telephony bill 6 IL Hyde, Henry J. (R) 1-202-225-4561 1-202-226-1240 2110 RHOB Cosponsor of the 1994 Digital Telephony bill -SENATORS P ST Name and Address Phone Fax = == ======================== ============== ============== D VT Leahy, Patrick J. 1-202-224-4242 na 433 RSOB Washington, D.C. 20510 Senate sponsor of the 1994 Digital Telephony bill ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- DIGITAL TELEPHONY BILL FAQ What are the (DT) Digital Telephony bills and where did they come from? The DT bills were initially introduced by the Bush administration presumably at the request of the FBI. The initial proposals were very unpopular and met with great opposition, preventing them from moving through Congress. The current incarnations of the legislation (SB 2375 & HR 4922) have several features, but basically require the same thing: common carriers must be able to provide law enforcement officers with court orders access to personal communications. (eg, if the FBI presents a court order for a wiretap on your phone calls to NYNEX, NYNEX should be able to provide the FBI with the ability to intercept your communications under the terms of the court order.) To do this will require changes in the telephone equipment we use today. Since this will obviously cost money, the bill appropriates $500 million in Federal money to these carriers to compensate them for the changes. Does this include bulletin boards and Internet sites like Netcom, America OnLine? No, the legislation specifically identifies common carriers. Information Services, such as these above, are not common carriers. How will this affect me? Imagine there's a giant socket on the side of the phone company's equipment that says "FOR FBI USE ONLY" in giant red letters. Imagine if the fine for not implementing that socket was $10,000 per day for the phone company. How many communications carriers do you think will make any noise about the privacy of their customers' communications? Now imagine that you were asked to pay the bill for this. The proposed budget for implementing this functionality is $500 million dollars for 1995-1998. Just how many wiretaps per year are there? In 1992 there were less than 1,000 wiretaps performed. It is important to note that the legislation is targeted towards wiretaps that the government says they cannot implement. Since there is thus far no published evidence of unimplementable wiretaps, turning the nation's phone system into a giant eavesdropping device to prevent a problem which has not yet been documented or become widespread, sacrifies too much privacy for too little gain. Is there ever a legitimate need for law enforcement to conduct wiretaps? @ Origin: Elections which can be bought are not "free." (1:325/806) @PATH: 325/806 3615/50 374/1 98 14 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Randy Edwards Area: Public Key Encryption To: All 5 Sep 94 20:09:16 Subject: 02:Wiretap Bill Alert: Contact Rep Brooks!UpdReq * Original Message Posted via CIVLIB * Date: 03 Sep 94 13:50:22 * From: Randy Edwards @ 1:325/806 * To: All * Forwarded by: Christopher Baker @ 1:374/14 * Message text was not edited! @MSGID: 1:325/806 15c09796 Yes, according to the 1992 Government Accounting Office's "Report on Applications for Orders Authorizing or Approving the Interception of Wire, Oral, or Electronic Communications (Wiretap Report)", there were 919 wiretaps authorized in 1992 (there were no requests denied). There were 607 individuals convicted as a result of these wiretaps. Although this is not an excessive amount, it is not ignorable either. However 607 convictions is infinitesmally small when one considers the number of people convicted yearly in the US. Furthermore, the report does not specify if any wiretaps were unimplementable because of advancing technology. The FBI maintains that advancing technology will prevent this, though this has not yet been documented. VTW feels that until the the FBI makes their case to the public, this bill should not be considered as legislation. Why should I be worried about this bill? THE BILL IS VAGUE REGARDING STANDARDS SETTING The bill requires industry standards groups to be formed to work with law enforcement to create technical standards for this functionality. There are a number of problems with this. First is that these standards bodies may not have even been appointed yet, giving incredible power to a presently unnamed group that will be responsible for appointing those bodies. Secondly, these standards bodies do not currently include any public input. There is a delicate balance involved in wiretapping vs. a citizen's privacy. The standards bodies that are proposed do not have any provisions for public input. Public-interest and/or privacy groups should be included at every level (including the technical level) in order to ensure that this balance is found. Without such input, the standards are likely to sacrifice privacy while giving more functionality than is needed by law enforcement to do its job. THE STANDARDS SHOULD BE ACCEPTED BEFORE THE LEGISLATION IS PROPOSED The DT legislation is vague regarding the standards for wiretapping functionality. Many of the questions and problems we have with this legislation stem from the vagueness of the details regarding the standards. The standards body should be appointed (with representatives from law enforcement, industry, and the public at both the technical and high level) and the standards accepted before the legislation is proposed. THE BILL PUTS GREAT POWER INTO STANDARDS AND COMMITTEES THAT DO NOT EXIST YET By empowering standards bodies that do not exist, and mandating standards that do not yet exist, great power is given to those individuals who can appoint the members of the standards bodies. Furthermore, no process is mandated for the appointment of the members of these standards bodies. THE BILL DOES NOT APPOINT AN ADEQUATE OVERSIGHT AUTHORITY In many situations the (FCC) Federal Communications Commission is appointed to be the final arbiter if industry standard bodies cannot agree on technical standards. The FCC currently serves the interest of industry in regulating the communication carriers. Because the Commission serves the interest of both groups, there is a conflict of interest. A different ageny should be appointed and given the FCC's oversight authority. TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY IS NOT MATURE Telecommunications is a very new technology. Within the last twenty years, we have seen amazing advances in the technology. Ordering the implementation of such a broad privacy- sensitive function will have far-reaching effects on the future of the technology. This legislation should wait until the technology is more stable. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- PRESS RELEASE [Please fax this to your local newspaper] Voter's Telecommunications Watch invites fellow citizens to join its media awareness campaign by emailing or faxing this press release to one of two media institutions. East of the Mississippi: Burlington Times email: _________ fax: ___________ West of the Mississippi: San Jose Mercury-News email: _________ fax: ___________ VTW is also experimenting with a fax/email chain letter. The document "An Open Letter on Digital Telephony" is currently circulating the Internet. VTW has also prepared an FAQ for Digital Telephony. Point your gopher to panix.com (port 70) and check under the VTW main menu entry, or use the URL: FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE NEW YORK, NY -- 08/22/94 -- Contrary to popular belief, not all online civil libertarians support the Government's attempts to ensure the FBI can wiretap every citizen. Voter's Telecommunications Watch (VTW), a New York-based online activism group, working in conjunction with the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) and other privacy advocates, is working to energize and focus the grassroots opposition to the recently introduced Leahy-Edwards Digital Telephony Bill (H.R. 4922, S. 2375). The Digital Telephony Bill would require telecommunications service providers to design all their equipment to allow FBI agents and other government officials to wiretap any telephone conversation -- only if there is a court order permitting it, of course, the FBI promises. Adding this feature to the telecommunications system is costly -- so costly that the bill appropriates $500 million taxpayer dollars to reimburse phone companies for their "reasonable" expenses. "It's objectionable for the FBI to try to make us pay for invading our own privacy," says Alexis Rosen, co-founder of Public Access Networks Corporation, a regional public Internet provider. According to FBI Director Louis Freeh, there were 183 wiretaps in 1993 that would have been facilitated by the digital telephony mandates. "Should we really spend half a billion dollars for a couple of hundred wiretaps that compromise the privacy of two hundred million Americans?" asks Simona Nass, President of the Society for Electronic Access, a New York-based organization devoted to issues of civil liberties and public access. VTW is spearheading a drive to defeat the bill. Using the Internet to keep millions of electronically-connected citizens informed, VTW workers have put together summaries and analyses of the legislation and are tracking the bill's movements through the byzantine halls of Congress. Using this informations, citizens can inundate their representatives at optimum moments. VTW is tracking each influential legislators' position on the Digital Telephony initiative, and periodically publishes a scorecard summary of their positions, party, districts and contact information. To access VTW's anti-Digital Telephony effort, join the VTW electronic mailing list by sending Internet e-mail to vtw-list-request@panix.com. Information is also available via Internet Gopher in the VTW area of gopher.panix.com (port 70). For further information, contact Steven Cherry at 718-596-2851. PRESS CONTACT: Steven Cherry (718) 596-2851(voice mail) stc@acm.org (electronic mail) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- SAMPLE LETTER TO THE EDITOR [Note, this is Steven Cherry's "Open Letter" on Digital Telephony. Please do not submit it to the New York Times. -Shabbir] An Open Letter Regarding Digital Telephony Digital Telephony, embodied in bills entered into Congress by Sen. Leahy (S.B. 2375) and Rep. Edwards (HR. 4922), would require that telecommunications carriers alter their equipment so as to allow wiretaps and similar surveillance to be performed at the companies' offices, or the offices of law enforcement. In a word, to make telecommunications equipment, "wiretap friendly"; to make a wiretap order executable "at the press of a button." With the help of some civil liberties activists, the bill admirably distinguishes between common carriers and information services. Only the former are subject to its provisions. But the distinction, while clear in the abstract, is hard to make in practice. The mom-and-pop neighborhood bulletin board service or Internet provider is excluded, but even if it is providing store-and-forward message-passing for an individual or other small provider? Indeed, the very definition of common carrier in the proposed legislation is problematic, as the definition relies on that used in the Communications Act of 1934, when just now that Act is being overhauled finally, after sixty years. The bill's authors have sensibly and cleverly left out of the legislation all the details of implementation. It is impossible to object to the bill on the grounds of being unworkable. It is also difficult to object on grounds of the risks to individual privacy, insofar as the risks are largely unquantifiable by virtue of being largely unknown. The very clever lack of any practical detail, however, leads the prudent citizen to question the public expenditure of $500,000,000 -- the figure is likely far too high, or far too low. Indeed, all we know is it is unlikely to be correct, and we therefore object to it as being unrealistic to the needs of the enterprise. In point of fact, one other thing is known about this figure -- it is but a fraction of the total expenditures resulting from the mandates of the bill. The balance will be borne by the common carriers, who, in turn, will either have to raise rates, reduce services, or restrict investment and expansion of their business at the very moment in the history of telecommunications that calls for them to do just the opposite. Indeed, the very forces of technological change that caused law enforcement to request this bill demand that it be defeated. We would like to return to the issue of increased risks for a moment. While unquantifiable, they are equally undeniable. The more facile the system, the more it will be overused and error-ridden. We must of course balance risk with reward. Who would refuse an extra paycheck for fear of getting a papercut? We must ask, what are @ Origin: Elections which can be bought are not "free." (1:325/806) @PATH: 325/806 3615/50 374/1 98 14 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Randy Edwards Area: Public Key Encryption To: All 5 Sep 94 20:09:26 Subject: 03:Wiretap Bill Alert: Contact Rep Brooks!UpdReq * Original Message Posted via CIVLIB * Date: 03 Sep 94 13:50:28 * From: Randy Edwards @ 1:325/806 * To: All * Forwarded by: Christopher Baker @ 1:374/14 * Message text was not edited! @MSGID: 1:325/806 15c097b6 the rewards of digital telephony? The FBI Director has variously stated the number of cases where a wiretapping was subverted by a digital switch or signal, offering contradictory figures from a low of 80 to a high of 183. The Director has not said all of them, or even any of them, were cases where a conviction was not obtained, or where a conviction could have been obtained with the wiretap, or could only have been attained with a wiretap. Of course, only these last possible instances really lend any justification to digital telephony. It is quite clear that digital technology offers more challenges to law enforcement than digital switches and signals. The object of a wiretap can easily use unbreakable encryption to protect the privacy of his or her communications. While the transmission of a message would be intercepted, the content would still evade the eyes and ears of law enforcement. Indeed, any, or all, of these 80 or 183 cases could have been subsequently frustrated by encryption even had digital telephony solved the initial digital barrier. Let us state the potential rewards as generously as possible -- or even more generously than possible. There were approximately 1000 wiretaps in 1993. Let us imagine, contrary to actual fact, all of these to be subverted by digital technology. Let us imagine the number to double in coming years. (Any or all of which could remain private through encryption.) 2000 cases. Weighed against these are the 200 million Americans whose security and privacy are compromised by digital telephony. Well, what if the number of wiretaps doubles again, and again and again? Don't 20,000 or 30,000 wiretaps, hypothetically, justify? Perhaps. But what kind of society needs so many police listening in on the private lives of so many people? At what point do we regret the lack of a public policy debate on mass wiretapping of the American citizenry? We do not live in a police state nor will we. And so we are back to supposing a massive technological effort at great expense to achieve a modest wiretapping program of small, perhaps almost nonexistent, benefit. To sum up, it is as if the entire city of population 25,000, were to have its telephone system restructured, its citizen's phone privacy compromised, all to make effective a wiretap on a single alleged drug peddler or gangster, which wiretap may or may not help in convicting the offender, if indeed he or she is guilty. All at a cost of $62,500 to the taxpayers, and more to the local telephone companies and their ratepayers. For all these reasons, the unclarity, the expense, the risks to privacy, and the lack of substantive benefits, separately and together, we oppose this bill. Steven Cherry stc@acm.org ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- CONTACT INFORMATION The Voters Telecomm Watch is a volunteer organization dedicated to monitoring federal legislation that affects telecommunications and civil liberties. We are based primarily out of New York, though we have volunteers throughout the US. Voters Telecomm Watch keeps scorecards on legislators' positions on legislation that affects telecommunications and civil liberties. If you have updates to a legislator's positions, from either: -public testimony, -reply letters from the legislator, -stated positions from their office, please contact vtw@vtw.org so they can be added to this list. Voice mail: (718) 596-2851 General questions: vtw@vtw.org Mailing List Requests: vtw-list-request@vtw.org Press Contact: stc@vtw.org Gopher URL: gopher://gopher.panix.com:70/11/vtw WWW URL: We're working on it. :-) --- CPSR ANNOUNCE LIST END --- To alter or end your subscription to this mailing list, write to listserv@cpsr.org. For general information send the message: HELP To unsubscribe, send the message: UNSUBSCRIBE CPSR-ANNOUNCE You need to do this from the same machine you subscribed from. In both cases, leave the subject blank, or at least not resembling an error message. -- + 212-675-9690 NY TRANSFER NEWS COLLECTIVE 212-675-9663 + + Since 1985: Information for the Rest of Us + + GET INFO from ftpmail%transfr@blythe.org + + e-mail: nyt@blythe.org info: info@blythe.org + @ Origin: Elections which can be bought are not "free." (1:325/806) @PATH: 325/806 3615/50 374/1 98 14 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Michael Pierson Area: Public Key Encryption To: All 3 Sep 94 06:07:22 Subject: PGP 2.6.1 release from MIT UpdReq *****_FORWARDED_MESSAGE_BEGINS_BELOW_***** Subject: PGP 2.6.1 release from MIT To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks) Date: Fri, 2 Sep 1994 13:33:34 -0700 (MDT) From: Philip Zimmermann -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- To: All PGP users Date: 2 Sep 94 Re: PGP 2.6.1 release MIT will be releasing Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) version 2.6.1 real soon now. By tomorrow, I think. The MSDOS release filename will be pgp261.zip, and the source code will be in pgp261s.zip. The MIT FTP site is net-dist@mit.edu, in the pub/PGP directory. Be sure to adhere to US export restrictions when you redistribute PGP after getting it from MIT. Since Compuserve has an unfortunate restriction of 6-character filenames, I don't know how they will handle the name collision of the source archive filename. I suggest that anyone who uploads the sources to Compuserve rename the file pg261s.zip. Just for Compuserve only. This new version has a lot of bug fixes over version 2.6. I hope this is the final release of this family of PGP source code. We've been working on an entirely new version of PGP, rewritten from scratch, which is much cleaner and faster, and better suited for the future enhancements we have planned. All PGP development efforts will be redirected toward this new code base, after this 2.6.1 release. There are some important changes to the 2.6.1 manual, especially in the Legal Issues section. Please read the "Freeware Status and Restrictions" section. Especially those of you who want to make changes to PGP. I hope all PGP users are switching to the official MIT releases, now that the new data formats have become effective on 1 Sept. PGP 2.6, as well as this new 2.6.1, will always be able to read messages, signatures and keys produced by the older versions. See the manual for details. PGP has many really cool new features planned in its future, and these new features will require more new data formats to support them. Stay compatible by keeping up to date with the official PGP releases from MIT. This message may be reposted to all interested newsgroups. - --Philip Zimmermann prz@acm.org -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAwUBLmd9jGV5hLjHqWbdAQGSsAP/RVrmYG3rrVQPlrA4Qf4w5kTyB3RJNLr/ QSOX6C0Lqj3bczCDeyBRlvfydlkSYhwe955OXjF3/tyUdQ/aLyTkz/Sc50yXXxZ8 xfEyaaSDAGkkZPVzvA4dOpDdcgWiYf2q5C7iHM/MbVUUAIX+B6Xh7+3RNKR9U1kh D7QvXd9P1M8= =WqZF -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- *****_FORWARDED_MESSAGE_ENDS_ABOVE_***** 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Harold Pritchett Area: Public Key Encryption To: All 6 Sep 94 20:54:16 Subject: New Book available this fall UpdReq The following is email I recieved on my internet account. It was the complete list of O'Reilly Associates fall books. I have found that almost without exception, that if O'Reilly publishes a book on a topic that it is either worth reading, or is an important reference. Harold -------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Sat, 3 Sep 1994 08:47:52 PDT From: Brian Erwin Subject: Re: O'Reilly's Fall Releases To: Harold Pritchett Let us know if you have any questions. Feel free to pass this along to others. --Brian O'REILLY'S FALL RELEASES USING THE INTERNET ... (many lines removed) PGP: Pretty Good Privacy by Simson Garfinkel 1st Edition November 1994 (est.) 250 pages (est),ISBN: 1-56592-098-8, $17.95 (est) PGP is a freely available encryption program that protects the privacy of files and electronic mail. It uses powerful public key cryptography and works on virtually every platform. PGP: Pretty Good Privacy by Simson Garfinkel is both a readable technical users guide and a fascinating behind-the-scenes look at cryptography and privacy. Part I of the book describes how to use PGP: protecting files and email, creating and using keys, signing messages, certifying and distributing keys, and using key servers. Part II provides background on cryptography, battles against public key patents and U.S. government export restrictions, and other aspects of the ongoing public debates about privacy and free speech. ...(many more lines removed) --------------------------------------------------------------------- These and other O'Reilly products are available in the Americas Japan, Eastern Europe, and Oceania through bookstores, or directly from the publisher (credit card orders 800-889-8969; Email order@ora.com). For information: Phone 707-829-0515 (800-998-9938 in US & Canada); Fax 707-829-0104; Email nuts@ora.com; or write O'Reilly & Associates, 103A Morris St., Sebastopol, CA, 95472, USA. GSA # GS-02F-6095A. O'Reilly's Catalog and Resource Center can be accessed online through gopher or telnet to gopher.ora.com -- or, for those on the Web (e.g., mosaic or lynx) the URL is http://gnn.com/ora/ Our international distributors: * EUROPE (except German-speaking countries), MIDDLE EAST, AFRICA. International Thomson Publishing, Berkshire House, 168-173 High Holborn, London WC1V 7AA, UK. Phone 44-71-497-1422; Fax 44-71-497-1426; Email danni.dolbear@itpuk.co.uk * GERMANY, SWITZERLAND, AUSTRIA. International Thomson Publishing, Konigswinterer Strasse 418, 53227 Bonn, Germany. Phone 49-228-970240; Fax 49-228-441342; Email ora-de@ora.com * ASIA. International Thomson Publishing, 221 Henderson Rd., #05-10 Henderson Building, Singapore 0315. Phone 65-272-6496; Fax 65-272-6498 * AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND. AUSTRALIA: WoodsLane, Unit 8, 101 Darley Street, (P.O. Box 935), Mona Vale, NSW 2103, Australia. Phone 61-2-979-5944; Fax 61-2-997-3348; Email woods@tmx.mhs.oz.au. NEW ZEALAND: WoodsLane New Zealand Ltd., 21 Cooks Street (P.O. Box 575), Wanganui, New Zealand; tel: 64 6 347 6543; fax: 64 6 345 4840. -- Brian Erwin, brian@ora.com O'Reilly & Associates 103A Morris Street, Sebastopol CA 95472 707-829-0515, Fax 707-829-0104 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: gk pace Area: Public Key Encryption To: Jason Carr 6 Sep 94 17:41:32 Subject: Re: comment disabled? UpdReq In a message dated: 04 Sep 94, you were quoted as saying: JC> I'm using 2.6ac now. Does anybody know if the ARMOR_VERSION keyword has JC> been disabled in the new vers? I can't jack with it to make it report JC> itself as 2.6ac. Yes... JC> Was that keyword only usuable in 2.6uix? Yes... -gk 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Alan Boritz Area: Public Key Encryption To: All 6 Sep 94 23:26:28 Subject: New Indecency Rules Proposed For All Online ServicesUpdReq * Original Message Posted via SYSOP * Date: 02 Sep 94 08:09:20 * From: Alan Boritz @ 1:2605/102 * To: Bob Moravsik * Forwarded by: Christopher Baker @ 1:374/14 * Message text was not edited! @MSGID: 1:2605/102@fidonet.org 465d0c97 @PID: Msgedsq 2.2e * Forwarded from RISKS digest) * Originally from djw@eff.org (Daniel J. Weitzner) * Originally dated Thu, 25 Aug 1994 14:32:40 -0600 (900#s in cyberspace) I. Overview During the final hours before the Senate telecommunications bill (S. 1822) was marked-up by the Senate Commerce Committee, a provision was added which would expand the current FCC regulation on obscene and indecent audiotext (900 number) services to virtually all electronic information services, including commercial online service providers, the Internet, and BBS operators. This proposal, introduced by Senator Exon, would require all information service providers and all other electronic communication service providers, to take steps to assure that minors do not have access to obscene or indecent material through the services offered by the service provider. Placing the onus, and criminal liability, on the carrier, as opposed to the originator of the content, threatens to limit the free flow of all kinds of information in the online world. If carriers are operating under the threat of criminal liability for all of the content on their services, they will be forced to pre-screen all messages and limit both the privacy and free expression of the users of these services. Senator Exon's amendment raises fundamental questions about the locus on liability for harm done from content in new digital communications media. These questions must be discussed in a way that assures the free flow of information and holds content originators responsible for their actions. II. Summary of Exon Amendment The Exon amendment which is now part of S.1822, expands section of the Communications Act to cover anyone who "makes, transmits, or otherwise makes available" obscene or indecent communication. It makes no distinction between those entities which transmit the communications from those which create, process, or use the communication. This section of the Communications Act was originally intended to criminalize harassment accomplished over interstate telephone lines, and to require telephone companies that offer indecent 900 number services to prevent minors from having access to such services. The 900 number portions are known as the Helms Amendments, having been championed by Senator Jesse Helms. These sections have been the subject of extension constitutional litigation. If enacted into law, these amendments would require that anyone who "makes, transmits, or otherwise makes available" indecent communication take prescribed steps to assure that minors are prevented from having access to these communications. In the case of 900 numbers, acceptable procedures include written verification of a subscriber's age, payment by credit card, or use of a scrambling device given to the subscriber after having verified his or her age. Failure to do so would result in up to a $100,000 fine or up to two years imprisonment. III. Carrier Liability and Threats to the Free Flow of Information These provisions raise serious First Amendment concerns. (Note that we use the term 'carrier' here to refer to a wide range of information and communication service providers. This does not suggest that these entities are, or should be, common carriers in the traditional sense of the term.) Overbroad carrier liability forces carriers to stifle the free flow of information on their systems and to act as private censors If carriers are responsible for the content of all information and communication on their systems, then they will be forced to attempt to screen all content before it is allowed to enter the system. In many cases, this would be simply impossible. But even where it is possible, such pre-screening can severely limit the diversity and free flow of information in the online world. To be sure, some system operators will want to offer services that pre- screen content. However, if all systems were forced to do so, the usefulness of digital media as communication and information dissemination systems would be drastically limited. Where possible, we must avoid legal structures which force those who merely carry messages to screen their content. Carriers are often legally prohibited from screening messages. In fact, under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, electronic communication service providers are generally prohibited from examining the contents of messages or information carrier from one subscriber to another. Extension of the 900 number rules to all electronic information services may be unconstitutional The regulation of indecent 900 number programming was only accomplished after nearly a decade of constitutional litigation, with rules being overturned by the Supreme Court. The regulations were finally found constitutional only after being substantially narrowed to meet First Amendment scrutiny. Since the access methods offered by online service providers are significantly different than simple telephone access to 900 services, we doubt that the same constitutional justifications would support the newly expanded rules. This issue requires considerable study and analysis. Content creators, or those who represent the content as their own, should be responsible for liability arising out of the content. In sum, it should be content originators, not carriers, who are responsible for their content. Any other approach will stifle the free flow of information in the new digital media. IV. Next Steps Having only just received the language offered by Senator Exon, EFF still needs to do further analysis, and consult with others in the online community. We also hope to speak with Senator Exon's staff to understand their intent. Another important hearing will be held on S.1822 in mid- September by the Senate Judiciary Committee. By that time, we hope to have this issue resolved. While we agree that these carrier liability problems are in need of Congressional consideration, we do not believe that the time is ripe to act. Before any action is taken, hearings must be held and careful evaluation of all the issues, not just indecency, must be undertaken. Daniel J. Weitzner, Deputy Policy Director, Electronic Frontier Foundation, 1001 G St. NW Suite 950 East, Washington, DC 20001 +1 202-347-5400(v) @ Origin: Harry's Place - Mahwah NJ [HST/V.FC] (1:2605/102) @PATH: 2605/102 101 2606/583 2605/606 107/387 13/24 3615/50 374/1 @PATH: 374/98 14 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Wes Landaker Area: Public Key Encryption To: Carl Hudkins 5 Sep 94 16:41:48 Subject: Pres/vice pres UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hello Carl! 30 Aug 94 23:00, Carl Hudkins wrote to Wes Landaker: CH> I could use it when mailing to whitehouse.gov and be less CH> concerned about minor functionaries reading the E-mail without CH> Clinton seeing it. (Last I heard, people read it and send CH> Clinton a breakdown of topics covered in electronic mailings.) Actually, everything sent to president@whitehouse.gov is printed out and stuck in a pile--probably the same pile where all your SnailMail letters go. The president really never reads (or even _hears_ about, probably) 99% of that stuff. :) Anyway, I think some of these major government officials should get themselves logged onto their local Fidonet BBS where we can get our "hands" on them. =) wjl [Team OS/2] * 1:202/1822@fidonet.org * 371:30/1@chnet.ftn * * wjl@f1822.n202.z1.fidonet.org * PGP Key: AD2254A5 * FREQ: PGPKEY * -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6a iQCVAwUBLmutAMlPrmStIlSlAQHRlwP/WHNSlp40A+IAD+fRWvUWcH2JPmnlzXB2 kraQe8s5b9gDc8OdY7lrdK+WE3Ni5BqNfOwmislW/xQf6SQ8oJ2raS0Sjzme1upL /HoMNOv6JMl382cfF06eSVZvgXoFIOdI8yhODA07+kXIMl9GkPKmfYcwhhK8nPA5 +eZw0LlPKP0= =XVHI -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Wes Landaker Area: Public Key Encryption To: Shawn K. Quinn 6 Sep 94 15:28:24 Subject: Net 106 still at it? UpdReq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hello Shawn! 30 Aug 94 20:25, Shawn K. Quinn wrote to Wes Landaker: WL> As surely as you've read this message, someone did. Maybe WL> that isn't _PROOF_, but it's pretty damn close. :) SKQ> Someone, or perhaps, someTHING. Either way--it has the same effect of being read. =) wjl [Team OS/2] * 1:202/1822@fidonet.org * 371:30/1@chnet.ftn * * wjl@f1822.n202.z1.fidonet.org * PGP Key: AD2254A5 * FREQ: PGPKEY * -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6a iQCVAwUBLmztNslPrmStIlSlAQHVdwP/Rv0yt+8rcSfSj1AxtdnCWaCpL/SFS1Kj V/1grdYdOFqCZLn2eEvh2uur1snqqkCXDyH2sghd/oc4Iumflk8BN0HYhwbVkFme +N38KAxe1SybxaYnyAcjSCHMDkhmGJRZowHc+Cc792ooWVLMF5QL6EV0LQEA8MnD xqlLTKnT5Z4= =H9vO -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: jason carr Area: Public Key Encryption To: Shawn McMahon 7 Sep 94 00:15:34 Subject: Net 106 still at it? UpdReq Shawn McMahon wrote in a message to jason carr: jc> Oops. What does this mean for NetMail utils like NetMgr? I jc> suppose it would be more serious if NetMgr scanned the body, but jc> it only scans the header, AFAIK. SM> Dunno; I'm not a lawyer, and you're getting way beyond the SM> things clearly spelled out by the text now. Isn't that what we're here for, to push the envelope (as auto enthusiasts say)? :) SM> However, remember that necessary system actions are allowed SM> by the ECPA. I don't know what NetMgr does for sure, since SM> I don't use it, so I can't really express an opinion on it's SM> use. It re-addresses, bounces, or alters the handling bits on netmail depending on the FROM, TO, ADDRESS (from and to), SUBJ, or handling bits... They talk about it alot in ARTWARE. jason ... There is always a way, and it usually doesn't work. 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Shawn McMahon Area: Public Key Encryption To: Brad Stiles 7 Sep 94 13:37:06 Subject: New to PGP UpdReq Despite the stern warnings of the tribal elders, Brad Stiles said this to Shawn McMahon: BS> That said, is there any chance that Mr. Godwin has published BS> the rationale for his opinion? I never bothered to check, since my own reading of the ECPA led me to the same conclusions he reached. You could call him and ask him, if nobody shows up with the information you're seeking. 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718 From: Shawn McMahon Area: Public Key Encryption To: Christopher Baker 7 Sep 94 13:38:36 Subject: CUD, CPD, EFF [Was: Two things] UpdReq Despite the stern warnings of the tribal elders, Christopher Baker said this to Shawn Mcmahon: CB> i have them here for Ticking if you want them. they go out under CB> their own area tags above. I'll keep that in mind if I can't find 'em locally. My echomail hub used to be RSMH, and he was getting them back then. They've vanished now, since he turned the position over to someone else. 201434369420143436942014343694201434369420143436942014343694718